Williams v. State, 4D00-3325.

Decision Date12 December 2001
Docket NumberNo. 4D00-3325.,4D00-3325.
Citation801 So.2d 284
PartiesJames WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Patrick C. Rastatter of Glass & Rastatter, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bart Schneider, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

FARMER, J.

This is a sequel to our decision in Williams v. State, 691 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). On that appeal, defendant sought review of a sentence of 10 years in state prison, followed by 5 years probation, arguing that the 10 years was an impermissible departure from the guidelines. We reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing with a departure still possible. After remand defendant was brought before the court for resentencing, and it became apparent that the state would no longer seek a departure. At that point, the following occurred:

STATE: Request that all the previous conditions with respect to restitution and several responsibilities that was imposed the first time be done again the second time. And ask that the paperwork from the first be incorporated in this.
COURT: The only thing that the Fourth District asked the Court to do...was to address the issue with respect to the number of years that was imposed for the sentence. In all other respects, the sentence was affirmed by the Fourth District. So effectively what my intention is, is to sentence the defendant under the guidelines, and nunc pro tunc this sentence back to the date of the sentence, incorporates all other matters that were addressed in the sentencing order of this Court to be effective and applicable at this point.
DEF'T: We didn't even appeal the other issues. It was only the number of years.
COURT: The Court at this time is going to sentence the defendant on the one count of manslaughter to a term of 95 months Florida State Prison....

That same day the court entered an Order stating, "it is hereby ordered and adjudged that the sentence of 8-17-95 be vacated. Defendant is sentenced under separate order." The trial court thereupon entered a separate order on resentencing providing for a 95 month prison term and nothing else. Two days later the court entered a "corrected" resentencing order, now providing for a prison sentence of 95 months followed by five years probation.

After serving his state prison sentence, defendant was released. He was then required to begin serving the period of probation set down in the corrected resentencing order. Later the state charged him with violating the probation.1 In response to the VOP charge, defendant argued that he was not properly sentenced to probation when he was resentenced and therefore could not possibly be found in violation of probation. We agree and reverse the present order finding that defendant was properly sentenced to probation.

We understand, and applaud, the trial court's desire to avoid unnecessary duplication in a case that had been previously before it. Ordinarily we would happily approve streamlined procedures that eliminate any waste of courtroom time, and thereby facilitate the disposition of a crowded docket. In this instance, however, we are reluctantly forced to conclude that the court's good faith attempt to avoid wasting time inadvertently ended up conflicting with indispensable sentencing procedures, in that the probation was not pronounced at the...

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3 cases
  • Pate v. State, 2D05-1086.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 24, 2005
    ...an amended sentence, deviating from the original one and increasing it in violation of double jeopardy protection); Williams v. State, 801 So.2d 284, 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that where the sentencing court did not pronounce a probation term on the record, it could not two days late......
  • Greene v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • September 10, 2003
    ...have pronounced each and every term of sentencing to ensure that the written sentence would be given effect. See Williams v. State, 801 So.2d 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In denying the appellant's motion, the trial court disregarded the general rule that the court's oral pronouncement prevails......
  • Dawn to Dusk, Inc. v. Hillsboro-Lyons Investors, Ltd., 4D00-1649.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 12, 2001

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