Williams v. State

Decision Date24 May 1982
Docket NumberNo. 63234,63234
Citation291 S.E.2d 732,162 Ga.App. 415
PartiesWILLIAMS v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

R. David Botts, Atlanta, for appellant.

Robert Wilson, Dist. Atty., Susan Brooks Asst. Dist. Atty., Decatur, for appellee.

BANKE, Judge.

The defendant, Hosea Lorenzo Williams, was convicted on the felony charge of operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his drivers' license as an "habitual violator" and on the misdemeanor charge of leaving the scene of an accident without stopping to render aid. This appeal is from the denial of his motion for new trial.

At the outset of the trial, defense counsel stipulated that Williams had been declared an habitual violator by court order in 1975 and that he was still "under" that court order on July 18, 1980, when the events at issue in this case took place. The factual question which the jury was called upon to decide was accordingly limited to whether Williams was the driver of a rented Buick automobile which collided with another car on that date.

The driver of the other vehicle involved in the collision testified that he had been hit nearly head-on when the Buick attempted to turn left in front of him and that, while he was dazed from a blow to his head, a person came up to the car, looked in, turned around, and left. The victim remained in his car, bleeding from a head wound, until others arrived on the scene a few minutes later, removed him from the car, and attended to his injuries. His car subsequently rolled several hundred feet down a hill.

Two residents of the area who had proceeded to the scene immediately upon hearing the crash testified that they overheard an unidentified black male in the crowd of onlookers remark that the driver of the abandoned vehicle was Hosea Williams. A third such resident testified that he heard an unknown declarant state that the driver had been wearing a flowered shirt and "looked like" Hosea Williams. All of this testimony was admitted under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.

Police officers and emergency medical personnel first arrived on the scene at about 8:20 p. m., which, from the testimony of other witnesses, appears to have been only minutes after the first onlookers arrived. A search of the Buick revealed various documents addressed to and from Hosea Williams, as well as a rental car agreement in Mrs. Williams' name. Based both on this information and on information received from persons at the scene, a radio lookout was broadcast for a black male in the area wearing a flowered shirt, who might possibly be Hosea Williams. Several minutes later, Williams was located at a bingo parlor which he operated about a mile from the site of the accident. He was wearing a flowered shirt, had a cut over his right eye, and was described by the arresting officer as appearing "real shaky, disoriented."

A police accident investigations expert who had examined the scene shortly after the collision testified that the driver of the Buick appeared to have struck the vehicle's rearview mirror. He based this conclusion on the fact that the rearview mirror was broken off at its base, it had a grease smear on it of the type normally left by contact with human skin, and there were blood stains on the dash underneath the spot where the mirror had been located.

At the police station, Williams claimed a briefcase containing some $1,400 in cash found in the Buick's trunk. He also claimed a bag of tomatoes which had been found in the car. A customer from the bingo parlor testified that she had given Williams a bag of tomatoes on the evening in question and that he had left the building carrying both the tomatoes and his briefcase just before 8:00 p. m. This witness further testified that after she learned of Williams' arrest she told him, "I think it was mean of you to get out of that car and leave my tomatoes," and that Williams responded, "No, I didn't leave them. I took them with me."

Williams characterized the case against him as a "political persecution." He denied that he had been the driver of the Buick and surmised that the car had been stolen from in front of the bingo parlor after the briefcase and tomatoes had been placed inside it. He testified that he had been present at the bingo parlor at the time the accident occurred and that he had cut his head on a door just prior to his arrest. Four witnesses, three of them employees of the bingo parlor and two of them Williams' children, offered testimony in support of this account; however neither Williams nor anyone acting on his behalf ever reported the alleged theft of the Buick to police. Furthermore, no mention of the alleged theft was made in an accident report which Williams' son later submitted to the rental car company. The person driving at the time of the collision was instead listed as one of Williams' employees.

A registered nurse employed at the county jail testified that she had examined the cut over Williams' eye on the night of his arrest and had concluded that it was deep enough to require sutures. In order to rebut this testimony, the defense introduced two photographs of Williams purportedly taken on July 19, 1980, the day following the accident, neither of which revealed any injury to his face or head. However, the photographer called upon to establish the date of these photographs admitted on cross examination that she had attempted to falsify a receipt relied on to support her direct examination testimony, stating that she had in fact prepared the receipt on the day of trial rather than July 19, 1980.

In this appeal, the defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him as to the "hit and run" charge but does contend that the evidence is insufficient to support the habitual violator conviction. He also raises several procedural issues. Held :

1. It appears from the record that the defendant was declared an habitual violator by the DeKalb County Superior Court on May 28, 1975, and was ordered at that time "not to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of the State of Georgia for the period beginning on the 28th day of May 1975 and continuing until such time as the defendant shall have his privilege to operate a motor vehicle restored by a court having jurisdiction as provided by law." (Emphasis supplied.) On June 6, 1980, the same judge who had entered this order entered another order granting authority to the Department of Public Safety to reinstate Williams' license, based upon a finding that the 5-year suspension...

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7 cases
  • Williams v. Melton
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • 7 Junio 1984
    ...The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Williams' felony conviction but affirmed his misdemeanor conviction. Williams v. State, 162 Ga.App. 415, 291 S.E.2d 732 (1982). He filed a federal habeas petition and the federal district judge granted relief finding that Georgia's res gestae except......
  • Eckerd Corp. v. Coweta County Bd. of Tax Assessors
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 11 Agosto 1997
    ...a request on the reverse side to include a "description" and the "market value" of personal property.3 See Williams v. State, 162 Ga.App. 415, 418(1), 291 S.E.2d 732 (1982) (opinions of the Attorney General are not binding upon this Court, even where applicable to the issues before us).4 Ev......
  • Shipes v. Hanover Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • 29 Septiembre 1989
    ...of section 33-34-8(c). While Attorney General Opinions are not regarded as binding authority in Georgia, see Williams v. State, 162 Ga.App. 415, 291 S.E.2d 732, 735 (1982), there is an absence in this case of any binding Georgia precedent on point. Because the interpretation adopted by the ......
  • Williams v. Melton
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • 9 Junio 1983
    ...an unknown declarant state that the driver had been wearing a flowered shirt and "looked like" Hosea Williams. Williams v. State, 162 Ga.App. 415, 415, 291 S.E.2d 732 (1982). The sixth amendment confrontation clause restricts the use of otherwise admissible hearsay in two ways. First, the s......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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