Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 29 September 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 45S03-9810-PC-602.,45S03-9810-PC-602. |
| Citation | 716 N.E.2d 897 |
| Parties | Douglas W. WILLIAMS, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Defendant below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana, John A. England, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Katherine L. Modesitt, Deputy
Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
Douglas W. Williams filed for post-conviction relief 21 months (arguably five months) after the completion of his unsuccessful direct appeal. Later Williams unsuccessfully sought to withdraw the case from the post-conviction judge for failure to rule. The court ultimately dismissed on grounds of laches. We find that the court did not lose jurisdiction over the case but did err in finding that Williams waited an unreasonable length of time before filing.
A jury found Williams guilty of murder and this Court affirmed Williams's conviction on direct appeal. Williams v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1198, 1199 (Ind.1989). On June 4, 1990, approximately five months after the completion of his unsuccessful appeal, Williams filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief with the help of another inmate. No action was taken on this petition by the post-conviction court. Williams subsequently withdrew this first petition on April 3, 1991, ten months after it had been filed.
Williams then filed a second pro se petition on October 23, 1991, approximately six-and-a-half months after the first petition was withdrawn and 21 months after completion of his appeal. Four years later, on October 20, 1995, now represented by the State Public Defender, the petition was amended. The post-conviction court held a hearing on January 17, 1996. When asked why he withdrew his first petition, Williams testified that a friend told him over the phone that another "veteran attorney friend" had reviewed it and said it was defective. Williams also testified that prior to his current incarceration for murder, he had never before been imprisoned. As a result, he was unfamiliar with the post-conviction remedy process and was not aware that he could amend his apparently faulty petition instead of withdrawing it and refiling. Also, he stated that during this time he "was under psychiatric care on psychotropic medication" and was unfamiliar with the prison law library. The remainder of the post-conviction hearing concerned the whereabouts and availability of former trial witnesses. At the conclusion of the January 17, 1996, hearing, the post-conviction court took the matter under advisement.
On June 4, 1996, Williams filed a motion requesting a ruling with the post-conviction court. On February 26, 1997, Williams filed a "lazy judge motion" pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 53.2. The Clerk of the Lake Superior Court denied Williams's motion on the same day. On March 17, 1997, Williams filed a motion requesting the clerk to reconsider her decision.
Williams chose not to file an original action in this Court seeking a writ of mandate to compel the clerk to rule on his T.R. 53.2 motion. On April 8, 1997, over five-and-a-half years after Williams filed his second petition, the post-conviction court denied Williams's petition, finding that laches had barred his claim for post-conviction relief.
Williams appealed the post-conviction court's determination, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the court's finding as to laches; the Court of Appeals also determined that Williams was estopped from claiming that the post-conviction court lost jurisdiction by failing to rule on his petition within the 90-day limitation set forth by T.R. 53.2(A). Williams v. State, 699 N.E.2d 1151 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).
We agree with the Court of Appeals that Williams was estopped from claiming that the post-conviction court lost jurisdiction to rule on his petition. However, we disagree that laches barred Williams's post-conviction claims.
Williams contends that the clerk erred in failing to withdraw his case from the trial court for a failure to comply with Ind. Trial Rule 53.2(A). As a result, Williams claims that the post-conviction court lost jurisdiction to rule on his petition.
Trial Rules 53.1 and 53.2 are intended to expedite proceedings by withdrawing cases from trial judges who have delayed their rulings beyond the specified period of time. Osborne v. State, 481 N.E.2d 376, 382 (Ind.1985).1 Trial Rule 53.1 sets a 30-day limit for a trial court to set a hearing date on a motion or rule on a motion. Trial Rule 53.2, the focus of this appeal,2 sets a 90-day limit for a trial court to hold a case under advisement and issue a final ruling. While we agree with Williams that each rule serves "a completely different purpose," we note that neither purpose is served by protracted appeals. Hence, the proper remedy for challenging the denial of a lazy judge motion under either rule is to seek a writ of mandate from this Court to compel the clerk to give notice and disqualify the judge. State ex rel. Ind. Suburban Sewers, Inc. v. Hanson, 260 Ind. 477, 480-81, 296 N.E.2d 660, 662 (1973) (T.R. 53.1 motion); Strutz v. McNagny, 558 N.E.2d 1103, 1109-10 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (T.R. 53.1 motion) (quoting Weber v. Electrostatic Eng'g, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 1152, 1153 (Ind.Ct. App.1984)), transfer denied; Weber, 465 N.E.2d at 1153 (T.R. 53.2 motion) (quoting Hanson, 260 Ind. at 480-81, 296 N.E.2d at 662).
Should a party choose not to follow this procedural course and allow the case to proceed to final judgment, the party is estopped from complaining that the original trial judge maintained jurisdiction over the case. Weber, 465 N.E.2d at 1154 (collecting cases); cf. Strutz, 558 N.E.2d at 1110 ( ).
In the present case, Williams filed his lazy judge motion with the clerk more than thirteen months after the evidentiary hearing that was held on January 17, 1996. In his motion, Williams requested that the clerk withdraw his case from the post-conviction court for its failure to rule within the 90-day limitation. The clerk refused Williams's praecipe to withdraw submission of his case. She concluded that a consistent reading of the lazy judge rules dictated that, because T.R. 53.1 does not apply to petitions for post-conviction relief, neither did T.R. 53.2.3
Instead of seeking a writ of mandate as required by this Court's decision in Hanson and the Court of Appeals's decisions in Strutz and Weber, Williams waited until an unfavorable judgment was entered denying him post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court never lost jurisdiction to rule on his petition. See Lou Leventhal Auto Co. v. Munns, 164 Ind.App. 368, 380, 328 N.E.2d 734, 742 (1975) (). Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Williams is now estopped from taking advantage of an error which he has caused by not following the proper procedural course for executing a lazy judge motion. Williams, 699 N.E.2d at 1154 (citing Weber, 465 N.E.2d at 1154).
Williams also contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding his claims barred by the doctrine of laches. To prevail on a claim of laches the State has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, first, that Williams unreasonably delayed in seeking relief4 and, second, that the State has been prejudiced by the delay. Perry v. State, 512 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ind.1987); Washington v. State, 507 N.E.2d 239, 240 (Ind.1987); Twyman v. State, 459 N.E.2d 705, 712 (Ind.1984).
In reviewing claims that evidence is insufficient to show laches, we do not reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. We consider only that evidence most favorable to the judgment, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. If the determination of the court is supported by substantial evidence of probative value, the judgment will be affirmed. Woodford v. State 544 N.E.2d 1355, 1356-57 (Ind.1989) () (citing Washington v. State, 507 N.E.2d 239 (Ind.1987)).
We have defined laches as "`neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time, under circumstances permitting diligence, to do what in law should have been done.'" Perry, 512 N.E.2d at 842 (quoting Frazier v. State, 263 Ind. 614, 616-17, 335 N.E.2d 623, 624 (1975)). We have also stated that "`[l]aches denotes a conscious indifference or procrastination which is wholly absent in one whose knowledge is constructive only.'" Id. at 844 (quoting Miladin v. Istrate, 125 Ind.App. 46, 56, 119 N.E.2d 12, 18 (1954)).
We hesitate to disturb the lower courts' judgments especially in light of our statement in Perry that "consultation with attorneys and incarceration in a penal institution with legal facilities are ... facts from which the fact finder may infer knowledge." Id. at 845. However, the post-conviction court heard testimony that Williams had never before been in prison and was unfamiliar with the prison law library.5 Furthermore, we previously recognized in Perry that a defendant's knowledge and acquiescence is "not really a separate, third requirement," id. at 843, from the two-part test requiring (1) unreasonable delay and (2) prejudice to the State. Rather, it is a factor to be weighed in determining whether delay was unreasonable.
The gist of the first requirement is still unreasonable delay or an "...
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