Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 12 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 4D13–1857.,4D13–1857.
• Citation: 154 So.3d 426
• Parties: Adam Tramane WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

154 So.3d 426

Adam Tramane WILLIAMS, Appellant

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D13–1857.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Dec. 12, 2014.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Jeffrey L. Anderson, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion

TAYLOR, J.

Adam Tramane Williams appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the state failed to present sufficient evidence that he had actual or constructive possession of cocaine.¹ We agree and reverse.

An officer on road patrol received a BOLO that there was an active arrest warrant for appellant in connection with a murder. The officer went to an area where he thought he might find appellant. When the officer arrived at this location, he saw appellant sitting on the front porch of a house with several other men. The officer parked his car in the driveway. When the officer exited the vehicle, appellant went inside the house, shut the door, and locked it. The other men remained in front of the house and did not move.

The officer waited outside the house until backup officers arrived. When the backup officers arrived, they established a perimeter around the house and waited for a search warrant. Shortly thereafter, appellant came out the front door of the house with his hands up.

As officers were handcuffing appellant in the front yard, an officer with a drug detection dog, Bingo, arrived at the scene. Bingo sat by the front door next to the officer. Suddenly, Bingo threw his head up and started sniffing along the front of the house. Bingo approached an open window to the left of the front door and jumped up with his paws on the windowsill. When the officer attempted to stop Bingo from jumping into the window, he noticed a Krazy Glue tube on the inside windowsill.

No one entered or exited the house while the officers waited for the search warrant. Once they obtained the search warrant, the canine officer used Bingo to search the house. Bingo alerted again to the windowsill, where the Krazy Glue tube was located. Sixty crack cocaine rocks were found inside the tube. Bingo did not alert on any other drugs or drug paraphernalia in the house.

No fingerprints were recovered from the Krazy Glue tube or the windowsill. No one saw appellant in actual possession of the cocaine or even in close proximity to it. The police investigation revealed that the house was leased to a female and that “a lot of individuals sit at this house and frequent this house.” The house did not look like anyone lived there.

An officer transported appellant from the scene to the police department. During the transport, appellant told the officer, “I ran into the house to put up my dope. I'm a dope boy, you know how we do. I might sell a little dope, but I ain't never killed anybody.”

At the close of the state's case, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal. He argued that the case was based on circumstantial evidence and that the state failed to exclude a reasonable hypothesis that the cocaine found by the police belonged to someone else. He argued that anyone who had access to the house could have placed the container of cocaine rocks on the windowsill.

The court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal and, after the defense rested, the jury found appellant guilty as charged. At sentencing, defense counsel informed the court that appellant had 43.2 points on the score sheet and requested the court sentence him to two years drug offender probation. Instead, the court followed the state's recommendation to sentence appellant to fifteen years in state prison because of his extensive criminal history.

“A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted only when it is apparent that no legally sufficient evidence has been submitted under which a jury could find a verdict of guilty.” Meme v. State, 72 So.3d 254, 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing Toole v. State, 472 So.2d 1174 (Fla.1985) ). The standard of review on a motion for judgment of acquittal is de novo. Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002). Generally, an appellate court will not reverse a conviction which is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Id.

Possession of cocaine may be either actual or constructive. Meme, 72 So.3d at 256. Actual possession exists where a defendant has physical possession of contraband. See Scruggs v. State, 785 So.2d 605, 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Constructive possession exists where a defendant does not have actual physical possession of contraband but knows of its presence on or about his premises and has the ability to exercise dominion and control over it. Duncan v. State, 986 So.2d 653, 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Mere proximity to contraband, standing alone, is insufficient to establish constructive possession of the substance. Brown v. State, 8 So.3d 1187, 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ; Edmond v. State, 963 So.2d 344, 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). The state must present independent proof of the defendant's knowledge and ability to control the contraband.

Martoral v. State, 946 So.2d 1240, 1242–43 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). However, in the case of jointly-occupied premises, the knowledge element may be satisfied where the contraband is found in plain view in a common area of the premises. Brown v. State, 428 So.2d 250, 252 (Fla.1983) ; Mitchell v. State, 958 So.2d 496, 500 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Here, the evidence showed that several ...