Williams v. State
Citation | 162 Ga. 327,133 S.E. 843 |
Decision Date | 18 June 1926 |
Docket Number | (No. 5211.) |
Parties | WILLIAMS . v. STATE. |
Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
The exceptions in which it is insisted that the Act of the General Assembly approved August 16. 1013, providing for probation of offenders in certain cases (Ga. L. 1913, p. 112), is unconstitutional, are not meritorious.
(a) The aforesaid act is not unconstitutional, for the reason "that the same is in conflict with article 5 [section 1], par. 12, of the Constitution of the state of Georgia, in that the same attempts to delegate to the courts of this state the pardoning or suspending of a sentence of a person convicted of crime, when such power under said constitutional provision is lodged in the Governor of the state."
(b) Nor is said act in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, upon the ground that the act attempts to cause the probationer to serve an antecedent sentence for the commission of an alleged subsequent offense, without any provision for any legal proceeding or trial to determine his guilt or innocence as to the second offense.
(c) Nor is the aforesaid act in violation of that equal protection of the laws guaranteed to all citizens.
(d) Nor is the aforesaid act unconstitutional because in violation of article 6, § 18, par. 1, of the Constitution of Georgia, because no provision is made for a trial by jury upon the hearing had to determine whether the parole shall be revoked.
One, who is sentenced upon his plea of guilty in a misdemeanor to pay a fixed sum of money as a fine, and also to serve a term named in the sentence in a chain gang, jail, or elsewhere as may be designated by the proper authorities, with a provision in said sentence that upon payment of the fine the defendant may be released from Custody and serve the chain gang or other sentence "outside the confines of the chain gang, jail, or other place of detention, under the supervision of the court and in such manner and on such conditions as it may see fit, " and who pays the fine and obtains his release from custody upon his tacit acceptance of the terms of the parole, is not in a position to assert that the provision for his probation in the sentence is void for any reason. Such an assignment of error presents nothing for the consideration of this court, because, even if the contention of the person sentenced were sustained and the portion of the sentence relating to his parole avoided, still the sentence of the court, inasmuch as it legally imposed no greater penalty than that authorized by law (being unaffected by the parole provision), would become immediately effective and enforceable.
Upon the hearing which it is provided must be had before the court in order that "the court after due examination may revoke" a parole or probation, the parole cannot lawfully be revoked as a mere matter of caprice. In such hearing the judge is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, but he is not permitted to withdraw a parole, ' unless there be sufficient evidence to authorize a finding that one or more of the conditions upon which the parole was granted-has been violated. Consequently, where, in a hearing such as above referred to, no evidence is produced before the court from which it can be determined whether the criminal act charged against the probationer as in violation of his parole was committed prior to the imposition of the sentence or subsequent thereto, a finding revoking the parole would be contrary to law and would not be authorized. The evidence at the "examination" before the judge of the city court did not sufficiently disclose where or when the alleged violation of the probationer's parole occurred. There was a review of the judgment revoking the parole of the probationer by certiorari, and the judge of the superior court erred in overruling the certiorari and in not sustaining the same upon the ground that the evidence in the record was insufficient to show that there had been a breach by the defendant of the conditions upon which the parole had been granted.
(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Final Decree or Judgment.]
Certiorari from Court of Appeals.
Joe Williams was convicted of misdemeanor, was sentenced and paroled. Parole was revoked, certiorari to the superior court was denied, and defendant brings error.
On November 22, 1924, in the city court of Richmond county, Joe Williams pleaded guilty to the offense of a misdemeanor. The court imposed the following sentence:
The defendant paid the fine of $200 imposed by the court, and was released from custody without being placed, so far as appears from the record, in the custody of either a volunteer probation officer or a county probation officer as provided by the act of 1913 (Acts 1913, pp. 112, 113, 114). Thereafter the solicitor of the city court of Richmond county filed a petition praying that the parole of Joe H. Williams be revoked, and that he be required to serve the remainder of his sentence within the confines of the said chain gang. The petition for revocation was based upon the following grounds:
"(1) That on the 25th day of November, 1924, Joe H. Williams entered a plea of guilty Of violating the prohibition laws of the state of Georgia, and was sentenced at the October term, 1924, of the city court of Richmond coun ty, to pay a fine of $200 and serve 12 months on the chain gang; (2) that the said defendant was permitted to serve the chain gang sentence outside the confines of the chain gang upon the condition that he would not again violate the prohibition laws of said state; (3) that said defendant paid said fine and was paroled in accordance with said sentence; (4) that subsequent to said sentence, to wit, on the 25th day of November, 1924, the said Joe H. Williams violated the terms of his said parole and was guilty of violating the prohibition laws of Georgia."
The defendant was arrested without a warrant, for the alleged violation of said parole on February 27, 1925, and was served with a copy of the petition. On February 27, 1925, on the call of the case for a hearing upon the petition for revocation of the parole, the defendant interposed a demurrer to said petition, which was overruled. The demurrer was based upon the following grounds:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Sellers v. State
...53 S.Ct. 154, 155, 77 L.Ed. 266. This does not mean that the probationer can be made the victim of whim or caprice. Williams v. State, 162 Ga. 327, 328, 133 S.E. 843; Sparks v. State, 77 Ga.App. 22, 24, 47 S.E.2d 678; Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 223, 53 S.Ct. 154, 77 L.Ed. 266, su......
-
State v. Hughes, 54565
...v. Cady, 50 Wis.2d 540, 185 N.W.2d 306. But the fact on which revocation is founded may not rest on rumor or surmise. Williams v. State, 162 Ga. 327, 133 S.E. 843; State v. Love, 236 N.C. 344, 72 S.C.2d 737. See Annot. 29 A.L.R.2d 1074, 1107--1113, 1114, 1115--1116, 1117--1118, 1120--1121. ......
-
Balkcom v. Gunn
... ... Without ... notice or hearing the judge revoked the probation features of ... the sentences, and Gunn was placed in the State prison at ... Reidsville ... To ... Gunn's petition for the writ of habeas corpus the warden ... filed a general demurrer, ... hearing. Roberts v. Lowry, 160 Ga. 494(1-2), 128 ... S.E. 746; [206 Ga. 169] Plunkett v. Miller, 161 Ga ... 466, 131 S.E. 170; Williams v. State, 162 Ga ... 327(3), 133 S.E. 843; Smith v. Veach, 165 Ga. 190, ... 140 S.E. 356; Robinson v. State, 62 Ga.App. 539, 8 ... S.E.2d 698; ... ...
-
Johnson v. State
...in respect to revocation are substantially the same as those in the act in question, was held to be constitutional in Williams v. State, 162 Ga. 327(1)(d), 133 S.E. 843, where it is stated: 'Nor is the aforesaid act unconstitutional because in violation of art. 6, § 18, par. 1, of the Const......