Williams v. State

Decision Date10 October 1984
Docket NumberNo. 69147,69147
Citation682 S.W.2d 538
PartiesArthur Lee WILLIAMS, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

James Stafford, Houston, for appellant.

John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty., Timothy G. Taft, Keno Henderson, Andy Tobias and Charley Davidson, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION

ODOM, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of capital murder; the punishment in this case is death. Appellant raises eleven grounds of error. Six relate to jury selection, two address rulings on the admissibility of evidence, two complain of jury argument, and one challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.

We first address the six grounds of error relating to the jury selection process. In three of these appellant complains of the trial court excluding prospective jurors on the state's challenge for cause. Reliance is placed on Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), which held it is improper to exclude a prospective juror in a capital case merely because he would be affected in deliberations by the fact that the death penalty might be imposed. It is not error, however, to exclude a prospective juror who would automatically vote against the death penalty regardless of the evidence. E.g. Griffin v. State, 665 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Woolls v. State, 665 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Jernigan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). The three prospective jurors addressed in appellant's grounds of error were properly subject to challenge for cause by the state on this ground, as reflected in the following excerpts of the record:

Prospective Juror Guyton:

* * *

* * *

"So can I take it from what you have said: Regardless of what the evidence was, you could just not answer those questions 'yes'?

"MRS. GUYTON: I could just not agree with capital punishment.

"MR. HENDERSON: Okay. But I need to ask you further: Could there be any circumstances or any evidence at all that would ever cause you to answer those questions 'yes'?

"MRS. GUYTON: There could be no circumstances, no."

* * *

* * *

"MR. STAFFORD: And, now again, like Mr. Henderson said, there are certain people who say, 'I just can't follow the law, regardless of what the situation is.'

"Do you think in your opinion that people like Charlie Manson out in California, who went in and killed all those ladies and cut open their stomachs and took their babies out, that they should not die at all? They should just live for the rest of their life?

"MRS. GUYTON: I think they should perhaps be punished, but not die from it.

"MR. STAFFORD: Okay. So in your opinion, regardless of how horrible the crime is--for example, like the guy down in Atlanta that killed all those young black boys, and it seemed like to be a very planned, premeditated--he sexually abused them, et cetera, and then killed them--that 'death' in that situation would not be a proper punishment?

"MRS. GUYTON: True. It is not a proper punishment.

"I don't think there is a crime--

"MR. STAFFORD: In your opinion.

"MRS. GUYTON: In my opinion.

"MR. STAFFORD: So you are telling me and my client that you could not in any situation put your feelings aside in regard to your feelings toward capital murder and follow the instructions that the Court gave you in regard to these questions?

"MRS. GUYTON: No, I couldn't put my feelings aside in regard to capital punishment.

"MR. STAFFORD: I have nothing else."

Prospective Juror Ewing:

* * *

* * *

"MR. HENDERSON: In other words, you just have a disagreement with the law to the point of not being able to follow it with regard to the death penalty?

"MR. EWING: Just the death penalty, yes.

"MR. HENDERSON: And if just because the law might say if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that these questions should be answered 'yes,' you must answer them 'yes,' are you saying you just would not be able to do that because of the way you feel?

"MR. EWING: Yes.

"MR. HENDERSON: And even if the Court instructed you to do that, are you saying you would answer them 'no' anyway, regardless of what the evidence showed?

"MR. EWING: Yes.

"MR. HENDERSON: And even if the evidence showed you or proved to you beyond a reasonable doubt that they ought to be answered 'yes,' are you saying you would answer them 'no' anyway?

"MR. EWING: If it has to do with the death penalty, yes.

"MR. HENDERSON: Now, what is going to happen--you would know what is going to happen if you answered the three questions 'yes.'

"MR. EWING: Yeah, definitely.

"MR. HENDERSON: The judge is going to sentence the defendant to death.

"MR. EWING: Yeah.

"MR. HENDERSON: We can do whatever we want to about saying you are just answering questions, but you know if those three questions are answered 'yes,' the Judge is going to sentence a defendant to death. There is no getting around that. Essentially you are making the finding.

"Knowing that, are you saying that you just couldn't follow the instructions that might be given to you by the Court with regard to what you needed to do in a particular situation in deciding these questions?

"Am I making myself clear?

"MR. EWING: Yes.

"MR. HENDERSON: So, are you telling the Judge, then that you just couldn't follow the law that might be instructed to you to do, that particular law being--'That I just could not for that particular law, being that if I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the answers should be "yes," that I would answer them "yes." ' You are saying you just couldn't do that because of the way you feel about the death penalty?

"MR. EWING: Yes.

"MR. HENDERSON: And knowing that if you answered them that way, that the person was going to be sentenced to death?

"MR. EWING: Yes."

* * *

* * *

Prospective Juror Jahnke:

"MR. STAFFORD: Are you telling me that you would answer one of the questions 'no' in a fact situation like that so the gentleman would not die? Even though you know--

"THE COURT; Let him answer the question, please, Counsel.

(The Court addresses the juror:)

"Your answer?

"MR. JAHNKE: Yes.

"MR. STAFFORD: I have no other questions.

"I suggest there is not cause.

"THE COURT: Your last 'yes' answer, sir, was the Court to understand that you said that you would answer one of the questions 'no' so that the death sentence would not be assessed?

"MR. JAHNKE: Well, I can't say 'possible,' so I have to say 'yes' or 'no'; so I have to say 'yes.' It is very possible, yes.

"THE COURT: Can you base your answers strictly on the evidence without considering the results of those answers?

"MR. JAHNKE: No.

"THE COURT: Knowing the results of the answers and taking them under consideration, can you strictly base your answers on the evidence and your interpretation of that evidence?

"MR. JAHNKE: No."

The grounds of error are overruled.

Two other grounds of error are based on rulings by the trial court denying appellant's challenge for cause. Appellant contends prospective juror Hamilton was subject to challenge for cause because of her personal acquaintance with the deceased and his widow and children. The record reflects the following on this subject:

"Q. You stated that you had never met Mr. Shirley yourself or have you had--

"A. I have never been introduced to him, no.

"Q. Did you see him in church?

"A. I am sure I have. I cannot recall him ever at a point. Our church is quite large. It is 5,000 membership and we have two church services and two Sunday School services, so it is very easy not to have seen him.

"Q. Okay.

"A. His wife, yes, I have seen.

* * *

* * *

"Q. Okay. Having that exposure and having the relationship with the wife, I question in my mind how you can sit there and presume my client to be innocent.

"A. I did not have a relationship with the wife. I said I knew her. I would not consider myself a close friend or anything to her. I just knew her.

"Q. Okay. Let's talk about--how did you know her? In what capacity?

"A. Okay. In our church, there is like--our Sunday School department, at one time, and I don't remember the year or anything, she was the in-service member of our Sunday School department which means that she does not come to our Sunday School department, but she is on our row and that is how I know, you know.

"Q. What's her first name?

"A. Donna.

"Q. Donna. Well, Donna may testify in this case. Do you know her? She may be on that witness stand right where you are there.

"A. Yes.

"MR. HENDERSON: We object to that, Your Honor. She is not on the subpoena list.

"THE COURT: Sustained. Please keep it abstract, counsel.

"MR. STAFFORD: Well, Your Honor, I think hypothetically, I need to ask her in the event she testifies--

"THE COURT: Then ask her that.

"MR. STAFFORD: Okay.

BY MR. STAFFORD:

"Q. Let me phrase it this way. In the event she testifies, you as the prosecution has already told you, are going to be the judges of the credibility of the witnesses. And I am trying to think in my mind how you, knowing the lady, are going to start her off on the same level with the other witnesses. That it would appear to me that you would tend to give her more credibility and automatically believe her just because you know him.

"A. Just because I know who somebody is doesn't mean I am going to give her any preference over somebody else. I know her, but when it comes to close friends or somebody you have done something with, I could say yes, but as far as knowing who she is, you know, I do not know her personally.

"Q. You know she is the widow or the grieving widow in this situation, do you not?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And you saw the publicity on the television and you knew the--

"A. All I saw was where a police officer was shot. I never read anything else about it.

"Q. That's what I am saying. But you knew a police officer was shot?

"A. Right.

"Q. And you are active in the church, and I gather that his wife is somewhat...

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