Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 21 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. S13G0178.,S13G0178.
• Citation: 293 Ga. 883,750 S.E.2d 355
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

293 Ga. 883
750 S.E.2d 355

WILLIAMS
v.
The STATE.

No. S13G0178.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 21, 2013.

[750 S.E.2d 357]

Craig M. Childs, Frank H. Childs, Jr., County Attorney, William H. Noland, Childs & Noland, Macon, for the appellant.

Otis Lee Scarbary, Solicitor–General, Rebecca Holmes Liles Grist, Solicitor–General, Macon, Cynthia Trimboli Adams, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the appellee.

NAHMIAS, Justice.

[293 Ga. 883]Appellant James Kemp Williams was charged with driving under the influence and violation of the open alcohol container law after he was stopped and arrested by Bibb County Sheriff's officers at a vehicle checkpoint. Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his stop on the ground that the roadblock violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion, and on interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. See Williams v. State, 317 Ga.App. 658, 732 S.E.2d 531 (2012). We granted Appellant's petition for certiorari, posing the question: “Did the Court of Appeals employ the correct legal analysis in assessing whether the decision to implement the roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than field officers, for a legitimate primary purpose?”

In Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787, 750 S.E.2d 148, 2013 WL 5708015 (Case No. S12G1287, decided Oct. 21, 2013), which posed the same question and which we also decide today, we discuss in detail the legal analysis that Georgia courts should use in evaluating a constitutional challenge to an initial stop at a police checkpoint. See id., 293 Ga. at ––––, 750 S.E.2d at 154–60, 2013 WL 5708015, *4–10. Applying that analysis here, we defer to the trial court's factual finding that the sergeant who authorized the checkpoint at which Appellant was stopped properly made the decision to implement that roadblock in advance as a supervisor and not while acting as an officer in the field. However, the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to suppress, because the State failed to prove that the Bibb County Sheriff's Office roadblock program had an [293 Ga. 884]appropriate primary purpose other than advancing “the general interest in crime control,” as required by City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000). See Brown, 293 Ga. at ––––, 750 S.E.2d at 155–58, 2013 WL 5708015 at *6–8. It follows that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's ruling.

1. At the suppression hearing on July 11, 2011, Appellant introduced into evidence a two-page excerpt from the Law Enforcement Operations Manual of the Bibb County Sheriff's Office (“BCSO”) that contains the following provision:

Vehicle roadblocks—Vehicles may also be stopped at general roadblocks which serve legitimate law enforcement purposes. If evidence of a crime is observed, an officer has the right to take reasonable investigative steps.

Captain Harry Colbert, the BCSO's commander of specialized operations, testified without contradiction that this provision of the operations manual was the BCSO's “official policy” regarding checkpoints and that the BCSO had no other written policy, procedure, memorandum, or order concerning checkpoints. In addition to Captain Colbert, the State presented the testimony of two of

[750 S.E.2d 358]

the three officers who participated in the checkpoint at which Appellant was stopped, Sergeant Bruce Jordan and Deputy Robert Scarborough. The trial court also reviewed a recording of Sergeant Jordan's interaction with Appellant at the checkpoint that was made by audio-visual recording equipment in Sergeant Jordan's police car. Appellant cross-examined the State's witnesses but did not present any witnesses of his own.

Captain Colbert testified that in September 2009, Jordan was promoted to the rank of sergeant and put in charge of the state-subsidized Highway Enforcement of Aggressive Traffic (“HEAT”) Unit, which consisted of three officers, including Sergeant Jordan. At that time Captain Colbert verbally delegated to Sergeant Jordan the authority to implement checkpoints. The captain said that he instructed Sergeant Jordan not to implement checkpoints on the interstate or during rush-hour traffic but otherwise placed no limitations on Sergeant Jordan's authority to implement roadblocks anywhere in Bibb County anytime during his shift. Captain Colbert also said that Sergeant Jordan was not required to seek prior authorization for particular checkpoints or to document after the fact the checkpoints that he implemented, and Sergeant Jordan confirmed that he did not do so. Captain Colbert described Sergeant Jordan, whose usual shift was 7:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m., as a “field supervisor” who was “on patrol,” drove a marked car, wrote traffic citations, and spent most of his working hours in the field.

[293 Ga. 885]Captain Colbert also testified, as did Sergeant Jordan, that the BCSO has a form for roadblocks that lists the purpose, time, location, and officers present, but the form normally was used only for large-scale operations or joint operations with other law enforcement agencies, and it was up to Sergeant Jordan to decide whether to use the form for a checkpoint conducted solely by the HEAT Unit. Captain Colbert and Sergeant Jordan said that decisions regarding the date, time, location, duration, staffing, and number of checkpoints were left to Sergeant Jordan alone. According to Sergeant Jordan and Deputy Scarborough, for at least a year, the sergeant and his HEAT Unit conducted multiple checkpoints in Bibb County each week, sometimes several in a single night.

Regarding the checkpoint at which Appellant was stopped, Sergeant Jordan testified that on the evening of November 26, 2010, which was a Friday, he decided at the beginning of his shift or right as he was coming on shift to have his unit conduct a sobriety and license checkpoint in downtown Macon on Washington Avenue at Orange Street. According to both Sergeant Jordan and Deputy Scarborough, at least an hour before the checkpoint began, Jordan contacted Scarborough and the other deputy in the unit by cellphone and instructed them to meet him at that location. Sergeant Jordan said that he did not consult with the deputies before making the decision about where and when to conduct the checkpoint, which started at around 12:30 a.m. on Saturday, November 27, and ended at around 3:00 a.m. when Sergeant Jordan left the scene.

Sergeant Jordan and Deputy Scarborough testified that the checkpoint was identified with a sign for drivers coming from the direction of the bars in downtown Macon as well as three parked patrol cars with their blue roof lights illuminated but not flashing. According to Deputy Scarborough, Sergeant Jordan and the two deputies wore bright yellow police jackets with reflective tape on them. Sergeant Jordan and Deputy Scarborough testified that Jordan acted as the on-scene supervisor and that the deputies acted as screeners, asking drivers for their license and proof of insurance. Sergeant Jordan said that every vehicle that passed through the checkpoint was stopped briefly, while Deputy Scarborough clarified that every vehicle was stopped unless traffic backed up, in which case Sergeant Jordan would temporarily shut down the checkpoint and allow the traffic to clear before restarting the checkpoint.

According to Deputy Scarborough, around 2:00 a.m., Appellant approached the checkpoint in his pickup truck and rolled down his window. Deputy Scarborough greeted him and asked to see his driver's license and proof of insurance, which Appellant produced. Deputy Scarborough smelled the

[750 S.E.2d 359]

odor of alcohol coming from inside [293 Ga. 886]the truck and asked Appellant to blow on a portable breath tester, but he declined. Deputy Scarborough then instructed Appellant to pull over to the shoulder of the road and exit the vehicle so that he could determine whether the odor of alcohol was coming from Appellant's person or from the passenger compartment of the truck, and Appellant complied.

Other vehicles were waiting to be screened, so when Appellant told Deputy Scarborough that “he had had a couple of beers,” the deputy walked Appellant over to Sergeant Jordan to perform field sobriety tests to determine if Appellant was safe enough to drive; Deputy Scarborough then went back to screening. Sergeant Jordan testified that he initiated field sobriety tests, which Appellant eventually refused to continue, at which point Sergeant Jordan placed him under arrest. According to Sergeant Jordan, Appellant's arrest was the only one made at the checkpoint.

On November 3, 2011, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant's motion to suppress. The court found that the State met its burden to show that the checkpoint at which Appellant was stopped complied with this Court's decision in LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 497 S.E.2d 367 (1998), which identified five minimum requirements that a particular checkpoint must satisfy to be upheld as constitutional. See id. at 253, 497 S.E.2d 367. The court also found that the checkpoint at which Appellant was stopped was carried out for “a legitimate law enforcement purpose, that is, a sobriety checkpoint,” and that the checkpoint was “reasonable under the Fourth Amendment” in view of “the totality of the circumstances.” On November 14, 2011, the trial court issued a certificate of immediate review, and on December 13, 2011, the Court of Appeals granted Appellant's application for interlocutory appeal. After the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order denying suppression, see Williams, 317 Ga.App. at 658, 732 S.E.2d 531, we granted Appellant's petition for certiorari.

2. As we explain in Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787, 750 S.E.2d 148, 2013 WL 5708015 (Case No. S12G1287, decided Oct. 21, 2013), “where a defendant challenges his initial stop at a police checkpoint by way of a motion to suppress, the State bears the burden of proving that the seizure was...