Williams v. State
Decision Date | 14 April 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 97-2872.,97-2872. |
Citation | 736 So.2d 699 |
Parties | Denzil WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Cherry Grant, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Denzil Williams appeals the judgment and sentences entered against him after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder with a firearm, aggravated battery with a firearm, and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. We address only the first of Williams' eight issues on appeal, in which he alleges a violation of his right to a public trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution. We conclude error occurred, therefore we must reverse Williams' judgment and remand for a new trial. Our resolution of this issue renders Williams' other points on appeal moot.
The death qualifying phase of voir dire in Williams' two-week trial began on June 2, 1997. Two panels of eighteen potential jurors were questioned on this date, with a third panel of eighteen potential jurors questioned the next morning. Before breaking for lunch, the court and counsel discussed the logistics of seating forty-seven potential jurors in the courtroom during voir dire. The court noted there would be no room to seat observers:
THE COURT: But if either of you, either of the sides have folks who have been sitting in during the trial so far, please make sure they understand that we won't be able to have them present while we are using the pew for the jurors.
Williams posed no objection to the court's instruction.
When the entire venire panel was seated in the courtroom on the afternoon of June 3, 1997, the court held a sidebar conference to discuss the voir dire procedure. As the discussion concluded, the following exchange occurred:
Voir dire continued through June 4, 1997, and although the record does not reveal whether observers were allowed in the courtroom, Williams contends his family members were again excluded. Williams posed no express objection to the exclusion of his family members from the courtroom during voir dire.
The record reflects Williams is an African-American. The sole African-American member of the venire panel was not reached during the closed jury selection process. When Williams' family members were first allowed into the courtroom as the trial began, they observed that none of the twelve members of Williams' jury were of the same race as Williams.
We turn first to the question of whether the alleged error constitutes fundamental error such that it may be raised for the first time on appeal. We disagree with Williams' contention that his several requests to allow his family to sit in the jury box or in the back of the courtroom were equivalent to an objection on the basis of a potential Sixth Amendment violation. The above-quoted exchange between defense counsel and the court suggests the trial judge may have been unaware of Sixth Amendment implications, much less any formal Sixth Amendment objection having been raised by counsel. Rather, we conclude Williams posed no contemporaneous objection below, and raises a Sixth Amendment violation for the first time on appeal.
The United States Supreme Court has found "plain error," or fundamental error, affecting the substantial rights of the parties only in a very limited class of cases. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). Among this limited class are cases concerning the total deprivation of the right to counsel, the lack of an impartial trial judge, the unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of defendant's race, the right to self-representation at trial, the right to a public trial, and the giving of an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction. Id. at 467, 117 S.Ct. at 1549 (citations omitted). Such errors are considered "structural," or "defect[s] affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). "`Without these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.'" Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-578, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) (citations omitted)).
The fact that the denial of the right to a public trial concerns plain error cognizable for the first time on appeal is best understood with reference to the significance of this right. The right to a public trial has been recognized as arising out of "the distrust for secret trials ... variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and to the French Monarchy's abuse of the lettre de cachet." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-269, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). "[A]t the time of the adoption of the Sixth Amendment the common law concept of a public trial had come to be regarded as an essential guarantee against any attempt to employ the courts as instruments of persecution." United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir.1949). The several essential purposes served by the public trial guarantee include: "allowing the public to see that a defendant is fairly dealt with, encouraging trial participants to perform their duties more conscientiously, discouraging perjury, and bringing forth witnesses who might not otherwise testify." Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 532 (11th Cir. 1984).
Thus, we hold Williams' assertion that he was denied the right to a public trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is an issue that concerns fundamental error, which we will review on appeal despite the absence of a contemporaneous objection below.
The Supreme Court has extended the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial to voir dire proceedings. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). As the court in People v. Taylor, 244 Ill.App.3d 460, 183 Ill.Dec. 891, 612 N.E.2d 543 (1993) noted:
We find that even though the violation came during the jury selection process, it is impossible to separate that part from the rest of the trial. The sixth Amendment protects all of the trial component parts, and not simply the right to present publicly evidence and witnesses. If the sixth amendment right is to have any vitality, we may not selectively ordain which portions of a trial are insignificant and therefore eligible for closure.
Id. at 549 (citations omitted).
The principles applicable to the right to a public trial were discussed in Pritchett v. State, 566 So.2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), where the court stated:
As the court noted in Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir.1983), "[t]he United States Supreme Court has never specified whose presence, at a minimum, must be allowed to ensure a defendant a constitutionally guaranteed public trial." Id. at 1537.1 Often quoted as the most succinct definition of "public trial" are the words of Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Estes v....
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