Williams v. State, 42359
| Decision Date | 29 October 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 42359,42359 |
| Citation | 255 Ga. 97,335 S.E.2d 553 |
| Parties | WILLIAMS v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Rickie L. Brown, Rickie L. Brown, P.C., Dalton (Court appointed), for Dennis Laron Williams.
Stephen A. Williams, Dist. Atty., Dalton, Stephen Harrison, Asst. Dist. Atty., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, J. Michael Davis, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant Dennis Laron Williams was indicted for the February 1983 and May 1984 felony murders of his infant sons, Richard and Jacob Williams. Williams was found guilty of each murder and sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment. 1 He appeals, and we affirm.
Both children died of head injuries. At trial, Dr. Brent Morris, a pediatrician who treated the children, testified that x-rays of Richard showed that he had suffered two rib fractures several weeks before his death. He said that the most likely mechanism of injury was a blow to the baby's side with a blunt object. In addition, Richard had suffered severe brain damage, which in Dr. Morris' opinion was caused by an "acceleration/deceleration injury" that was consistent with violent shaking of the infant.
As to Jacob, Dr. Morris testified that x-rays had revealed two lower leg fractures which had been caused by a torsional force. The fractures were less than a week old. Like Richard, Jacob had suffered severe brain injury resulting from an acceleration/deceleration injury consistent with a violent shaking. It was Dr. Morris' opinion that the injuries to Richard and Jacob had been caused by intentional abuse.
Dr. Walter Boehm, a neurosurgeon who treated Richard, opined that his eye and brain injuries were consistent with abuse and mistreatment by shaking.
Dr. James Metcalfe, a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy on Richard. He testified that the infant's broken ribs could have been caused by a blow to the chest or by a fall on a protruding object. Richard's brain injury could have been caused, according to Dr. Metcalfe, either by a fall on the head, a blow or blows to the head, or a shaking of the head.
Dr. Fred Gregg, an ophthalmologist, examined Jacob and found blood inside his eyes. He testified that this type of injury was consistent with an adult abusing the child by shaking.
Dr. Floyd James, a pathologist, performed an autopsy upon Jacob's body. He was of the opinion that Jacob's brain injury had resulted from an acceleration/deceleration type injury.
The appellant made several pretrial statements to investigators. Taken in sum, they contained his admissions that Richard had been injured while the appellant was babysitting. Williams said that Richard had been crying, and he had spanked the baby until he stopped breathing.
Appellant made similar admissions regarding Jacob's death. As with Richard, he said Jacob had cried while he was babysitting. Williams had shaken the infant to quiet him, whereupon the baby had stopped breathing and gone limp.
1. When considered in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence submitted at trial was sufficient to enable any rational trier of the facts to find Williams guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Williams contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance of trial of the felony murders. He argues that the offenses were joined only because they were similar, and that he was therefore entitled to severance. We disagree. Where joinder is based upon a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan, severance lies within the discretion of the trial judge. Cooper v. State, 253 Ga. 736(3), 325 S.E.2d 137 (1985); Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 804(16), 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983).
In this case two brothers of approximately the same age died within a fifteen-month period of similar injuries inflicted by their father under similar circumstances. The similarity of the two murders clearly reached the level of a pattern of fatal child abuse. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the offenses for trial.
3. Williams contends his pretrial statements to police investigators were not freely and voluntarily made, and that the court therefore erred in admitting them into evidence. We disagree.
Before the court allowed the introduction of the statements, it held a hearing pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), and determined, based on the evidence presented by the state (Williams offered no evidence during the Jackson v. Denno hearing), that Williams had been advised of his Miranda rights, that he had knowingly and intelligently waived them, and that thereafter he had voluntarily made his statements.
There is evidence to support the trial court's ruling. In reviewing Jackson v. Denno decisions, factual determinations by the trial court will be accepted unless the findings are shown to be clearly erroneous. Berry v. State, 254 Ga. 101(1), 326 S.E.2d 748 (1985). We find no error.
4. In his third enumeration of error Williams contends that the court erroneously admitted two photographs into evidence. One of the photographs, state's exhibit 16, depicted a small child in a hospital bed, attached to and surrounded by various pieces of medical equipment. The other photograph, state's exhibit 18, was a close-up of the same scene.
During the trial the following dialogue took place concerning these photographs:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hill v. State
...of the 1985 extrinsic-crime victim, which the jury properly considered at the sentencing phase of the trial. Williams v. State, 255 Ga. 97(4), 335 S.E.2d 553 (1985). 12. During closing argument, while the prosecutor was explaining to the jury that although Hill's motive for killing the vict......
-
Johnson v. State
...we find that Johnson did not raise this objection at trial, and therefore failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Williams v. State, 255 Ga. 97, 100(4), 335 S.E.2d 553 (1985); Muff v. State, 254 Ga. 45, 48(2)(a), 326 S.E.2d 454 (1985). Moreover, even assuming that Johnson raised a proper o......
-
Almond v. State
...of its discretion in ruling on the admissibility of photographs will not be reversed unless manifestly abused. Williams v. State, 255 Ga. 97, 101(4), 335 S.E.2d 553 (1985). We are aware of no authority, and appellant cites none, for the proposition that the procedure for admitting pictures ......
-
Holloman v. State
...absence of any such objection, his current argument regarding the authenticity of the messages has been waived. Williams v. State, 255 Ga. 97, 100(4), 335 S.E.2d 553 (1985). 4. Holloman contends that he received ineffective assistance because trial counsel failed to (a) object to the admiss......