Williams v. State
Decision Date | 21 September 1995 |
Docket Number | No. A95A1451,A95A1451 |
Citation | 462 S.E.2d 457,218 Ga.App. 571 |
Parties | WILLIAMS v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Gary M. Newberry, Savannah, for appellant.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Christine M. Sieger, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
In a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of selling cocaine in violation of Georgia's Controlled Substances Act. This appeal followed the denial of defendant's motion for new trial and amended motion for new trial. Held :
1. Defendant asserts the general grounds in his first two enumerations of error, arguing that he was just " 'playing a little game' " when he and an accomplice entered into an illegal drug transaction with a woman defendant knew to be an undercover law enforcement officer. Defendant indicates that he had no idea the accomplice would consummate the deal by actually delivering cocaine to the undercover officer.
Defendant's intent in agreeing to sell the undercover officer cocaine, whether real or feigned, is for the jury; and the jury's finding in this regard will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Rigenstrup v. State, 197 Ga.App. 176, 180(4), 398 S.E.2d 25. This is so because, Walker v. State, 214 Ga.App. 691, 692(1), 693, 448 S.E.2d 924. From this perspective, we find no clear error in the jury's finding that defendant was a willing participant in an illegal drug transaction. The undercover officer testified that she stopped her unmarked patrol car in a known drug-source area of Savannah, Georgia; that defendant approached the car and that she asked defendant for a quantity of cocaine. The officer testified that defendant then offered to share a sample of his illegal product and that, in doing so, defendant attempted to entice the officer out of her car. The officer explained that, when she refused to leave her undercover patrol car, defendant gave his accomplice the amount of cocaine the officer requested and instructed the accomplice to consummate the transaction. The officer testified that, after the accomplice delivered the cocaine and collected the money, defendant "approached the car [and said] see, I told you it's good." This evidence is sufficient to authorize the jury's finding that defendant is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of being a party to the sale of cocaine in violation of Georgia's Controlled Substances Act. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Wrease v. State, 214 Ga.App. 727, 728(1), 448 S.E.2d 911.
2. In defendant's final enumeration, counsel asserts that the trial court "committed harmful, prejudicial and reversible error by sustaining the prosecution's officious and unduly disruptive objection to defense counsel's opening statement, and by unjustifiably and sternly berating counsel in the presence of the jury at this most delicate, introductory stage of the trial." Specifically, counsel argues that "the spanking administered by the trial judge at the very beginning of the trial obviated any and all positive elements of [defendant's] defense, thereby denying him due process and a fair and impartial hearing." Counsel also argues that " '[t]he People' (through the prosecution) and the Judge ('the smartest lawyer in the courtroom') had delivered a knock-out punch before the first witness took the stand." And in conclusion counsel asserts the following: "Sustaining the prosecution's objections to [defendant's] opening statement (and, particularly, the imperious and unprofessional manner in which they were sustained) constituted a manifest abuse of the trial judge's discretion and sabotaged the defense case, resulting in an automatic conviction--clearly a 'positive injury.' "
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