Williams v. State, 02A04–1409–CR–412.
| Decision Date | 04 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 02A04–1409–CR–412.,02A04–1409–CR–412. |
| Citation | 35 N.E.3d 316 (Table) |
| Parties | Renald WILLIAMS, Sr., Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Paul Stephen Miller, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Eric P. Babbs, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
ROBB
, Judge.
[1] Following a bench trial, Renald Williams, Sr., was convicted of dealing in methamphetamine as a Class B felony and possession of chemical reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture as a Class D felony. He received an aggregate sentence of nineteen years.
[2] Williams appeals, raising the following five issues for our review: (1) whether he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his constitutional right to a jury trial; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search; (3) whether his convictions violate federal and state constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy; (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him; and (5) whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.
[3] Concluding that Williams validly waived his right to a jury trial, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence, and that Williams's convictions do not violate double jeopardy principles, we affirm his convictions. Further concluding that the trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion and that Williams's sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm his sentence.
[4] On September 13, 2013, the Fort Wayne Police Department received an anonymous tip regarding a suspected methamphetamine lab at 1131 Summit Street in Fort Wayne. Three police officers responded to the call around midnight. Upon arrival, the officers knocked on the front door of the house. When Thomas Hempel answered the door,1 the officers informed him that they were conducting a drug investigation and asked if they could come inside to speak with him. Hempel agreed and invited them inside.
[5] Hempel spoke with the officers in the entryway between the living room and the kitchen. Hempel told the officers that he lived in the apartment, and when the officers asked if there was anyone else currently in the apartment, he said that his girlfriend was in the bedroom. He also said they were “free to look around.” Transcript of Trial at 12. As the officers were speaking with Hempel, they noticed a pile of salt, latex gloves, and plastic bottles in the kitchen trashcan—items consistent with the production of methamphetamine. Suspecting methamphetamine production somewhere in the apartment, they asked Hempel if they could speak to his girlfriend.
[6] Hempel walked through the kitchen to the bedroom door and pushed the door slightly open, only “wide enough that he could speak to whoever was inside.” Id. at 28. Detective Marc Deshaies followed and stood behind him. As Hempel attempted to tell his “girlfriend” to come out, Detective Deshaies detected the odor of methamphetamine production and saw that the entire bedroom was filled with white smoke. Mindful of the dangers of an active methamphetamine lab, the officers entered the bedroom. A woman was standing near the doorway, and Williams was crouched in the middle of the room. Williams was holding a vapor-filled bag, and the smoke appeared to be coming from his immediate area. A third individual was sitting in an armchair to the right of Williams.2
[7] The officers promptly evacuated the house, called the fire department, and requested assistance from the methamphetamine cleanup team. Detective Robert Kirby interviewed Hempel, who stated that he was renting the apartment and was the only person named on the lease. When Detective Kirby asked for consent to search the apartment, Hempel consented to the search. The search revealed the following items in the bedroom where Williams was found:
;
Id. at 39–48. Officers found a second “one pot meth lab” in the freezer in the kitchen and another hydrochloric gas generator in the kitchen trashcan. Id. at 49.
[8] During an interview a few days after his arrest, Williams admitted that he “was cooking in the back room” and that he “told Mr. Hempel that he had a female in the back bedroom to keep Mr. Hempel out of the room.” Id. at 71. Williams provided “a very detailed description of how he manufactures meth,” id. at 70, and admitted to selling methamphetamine.
[9] Williams was charged with dealing in methamphetamine as a Class B felony and possession of chemical reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture as a Class D felony. During a hearing on March 27, 2014, the following exchange took place:
Transcript of Hearing at 7–8. Williams did not sign a written waiver.
[10] The parties agreed to set the matter for a combined suppression hearing and bench trial on April 9, 2014, and the trial court instructed defense counsel to file a written motion to suppress prior to that date. On July 8, 2014, following several continuances, Williams sent a letter to the trial court and filed a pro se motion to suppress. The letter stated in relevant part:
[My attorney] has failed to file the suppression that I've asked him to do.... The suppression was supposed to be filed prior to our original trial date of April 9, 2014. That was one of the reasons why I waived my jury trial rights on March 27, 2014. I wanted to place myself completely under your discretion versus 12 jurors whom may be ignorant or incompetent to the law.
[11] The combined suppression hearing and bench trial took place on July 14, 2014. After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied the motion to suppress and found Williams guilty on both counts. The trial court sentenced Williams to nineteen years for dealing in methamphetamine, with seventeen years executed in the Department of Correction and two years suspended to probation, to be served concurrently with a three year executed sentence for possession of chemical reagents or precursors. Williams now appeals.
[12] The right to trial by jury is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and by Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution
. Coleman v. State, 694 N .E.2d 269, 278 (Ind.1998). A defendant's waiver of the right “must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances surrounding its entry and its consequences.” O'Connor v. State, 796 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (citation omitted). Williams contends that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial.
[13] Denying a defendant a jury trial in the absence of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver is fundamental error. Johnson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 491, 496 (Ind.Ct.App.2014)
. A valid waiver requires affirmative action by the defendant, O'Connor, 796 N.E.2d at 1233, and “must be elicited personally from the defendant, either orally in open court or in writing.” Reynolds v. State, 703 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). This court has determined:
A voluntary waiver occurs if the conduct constituting the waiver is the product of a free will; a knowing waiver is the product of an informed will; an intelligent waiver is the product of a will that has the capacity to understand; and a waiver is personal if it is made by the defendant.
Id. (citation omitted).
[14] Williams argues that his waiver was not an informed decision for two reasons. First, at the time of the waiver, Williams told the trial court that he had “not fully” discussed his rights with counsel. Tr. of Hearing at 8. Second, following Williams's statement that he had “not fully” discussed his rights, the trial court did not conduct an oral advisement of rights. Id. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Williams did not understand his right to a jury trial and the consequences of waiving that right. Although the defendant's personal desire to waive the right must be apparent from the record, there is no requirement that a trial court orally advise a...
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