Williams v. State, 68920

Decision Date20 November 1984
Docket NumberNo. 68920,68920
Citation324 S.E.2d 544,172 Ga.App. 682
PartiesWILLIAMS v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

J. Reese Franklin, Nashville, for appellant.

Lew S. Barrow, Dist. Atty., David C. Walker, Robert B. Ellis, Jr., Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.

CARLEY, Judge.

Appellant appeals from his conviction of aggravated assault and escape. His only enumeration of error is that the trial court failed to grant his motion for a mistrial based upon remarks made by the prosecuting attorney.

The evidence admitted at trial established that appellant, who was being arrested for a traffic violation, produced a gun and fired two shots at the arresting officer. After disabling the officer's patrol car by shooting one of its tires, appellant escaped in the car which he had been driving. There were two eyewitnesses to the incident, one of whom was the victim. The other eyewitness was appellant's cousin, who was riding with appellant when he was stopped for the traffic violation.

During his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor mentioned two specific instances wherein law enforcement officials had been killed while attempting to effect arrests. He further stated that "[b]ut for the grace of God," appellant would have been on trial for just such an offense. Appellant sought a mistrial upon the basis of these remarks, but the trial court denied his motion.

We find that the prosecutor's statements, which concerned matters which were not in evidence and which were not relevant to the guilt or innocence of appellant, constituted improper closing argument. "However, '[t]he trial court has a broad discretion in passing on motions for mistrial, and its ruling will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that there has been a manifest abuse of discretion and that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial.' [Cit.] What we must decide is whether the uncorrected argument of counsel in this case resulted in a miscarriage of justice. [Cit.] The proper standard for such a determination is the ' "highly probable test," i.e., that it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment.' [Cit.]" Sanford v. State, 153 Ga.App. 541, 542, 265 S.E.2d 868 (1980).

Our examination of the transcript in the instant case reveals that the evidence against appellant was overwhelming, particularly in light of the testimony of the two eyewitnesses. Accordingly, we conclude that it is highly probable that...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Davis v. the State.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 17, 2011
    ...604 S.E.2d 503 (2004) (citation omitted). 31. Byrum v. State, 282 Ga. 608, 613(10), 652 S.E.2d 557 (2007). 32. See Williams v. State, 172 Ga.App. 682, 324 S.E.2d 544 (1984) (although prosecutor's closing argument remarks—mentioning instances wherein law enforcement officials had been killed......
  • Cole v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 19, 2003
    ...was a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence. Although this court found a similar statement to be improper in Williams v. State, 172 Ga.App. 682, 324 S.E.2d 544 (1984), on which Cole relies, we find no basis for reversal here. In Williams, the prosecutor "mentioned two specific instan......
  • State v. Diltz
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • July 27, 2015
    ...where neither victim was a police officer and no officers were present at the time of the charged crimes); Williams v. State, 324 S.E.2d 544, 544, 172 Ga. App. 682 (1984) (prosecutor's reference to "two specific instances" of police officers being killed was improper because it was unrelate......
  • Gardner v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 20, 1984
    ... ... Under those circumstances, a finding that appellant did not retain a legitimate expectation of privacy in the automobile was authorized. Williams v. State, 171 Ga.App. 546 (2), 320 S.E.2d 389 (1984). That being so, appellant was not entitled to suppression of the evidence subsequently seized ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT