Williams v. State

Decision Date23 October 1972
Docket NumberNo. 3,No. 47541,47541,3
Citation193 S.E.2d 633,127 Ga.App. 386
PartiesJames L. WILLIAMS et al. v. The STATE
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. Kicking with a shoe-clad foot may constitute an assault with a deadly weapon, under Code, § 26-1302, depending upon the circumstances of the case.

2. In order to sustain a conviction of 'aggravated assault' based upon use of a shoe-clad foot in such manner as to constitute a deadly weapon the State must show details surrounding the footgear and the manner in which the foot is used to kick as well as the nature of the injuries received.

A. Quillian Baldwin, Jr., Charles E. Solomon, Jr., LaGrange, for appellant.

CLARK, Judge.

Are shoes per se a deadly weapon? That question is here propounded where the prosecuting witness was in a scuffle with several individuals during which he lost his footing due to the slipperiness of his new boots and then while on the ground was allegedly kicked by the two defendants. 1

1. This question arises for the first time in Georgia because our new Criminal Code 2 created a felony known as 'Aggravated Assault' the pertinent portion reading 'A person commits aggravated assault when he assaults . . . (b) with a deadly weapon.' Code Ann. § 26-1302. The indictment here charged defendants as having committed this offense 'with certain shoes, deadly weapons . . .'

Under a similar statute the supreme Court of Florida said in Bass v. State (Fla.) 172 So.2d 614, 617 (1965): 'Shoes come in all shapes, sizes, forms and materials-from the delicate creations of silk and leather, or satin and plastic (so dear to the hearts of the ladies), to the cleated, hobnailed, iron-toed boots and clodhoppers of the lumberjack, or the sharp-toed, leather-heeled boots of the cowboy-any one of which may be capable of inflicting grievous bodily harm or death. The records of medical science are replete with case histories of persons being seriously wounded or killed after being struck by the high heel of a woman's shoe, or having the 'boot put to him' by a strong man. It is a jury question as to whether or not a shoe or boot constitutes a deadly weapon, under all the circumstances surrounding the shoe or boot, its size, weight and construction, and the manner in which it was used.' Cases holding similarly are Medlin v. United States (1953) 93 App.D.C. 64, 207 F.2d 33, cert. den. 347 U.S. 905, 74 S.Ct. 431, 98 L.Ed. 1064; United States v. Barber (1969, D.C.Del.) 297 F.Supp. 917; State v. Bradley (1962) 254 Iowa 211, 116 N.W.2d 439, app. dismd. and cert. den. 374 U.S. 490, 83 S.Ct. 1886, 10 L.Ed.2d 1047; Jones v. Commonealth (1953, Ky.) 256 S.W.2d 520; State v. Born (1968) 280 Minn. 306, 159 N.W.2d 283, 33 A.L.R.3d 919; State v. Mathis (1968, Mo.) 427 S.W.2d 450; Smith v. State (1944) 79 Okl.Cr. 151, 152 P.2d 279; Pettigrew v. State (1967, Okl.Cr.) 430 P.2d 808; and Hay v. State (1968, Okl.Cr.) 447 P.2d 447.

Capable counsel for the defendants submitted to trial judge Hon. Lamar Knight a request which met with his approval and which we quote herein for the guidance of the bench and the bar: 'I charge you that our law provides that a person commits aggravated assault when he assaults another with a deadly weapon. I charge you further, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that the shoe-clad foot used in the act of kicking or stomping of a person is not a deadly weapon per se but may or may not be a deadly weapon, depending upon the circumstances of the case; that is, the size and weight of the shoe used, the manner in which the shoe was used to kick, and the extent of the injuries to the person attacked. Therefore, if you determine from the facts presented in this case that the defendants did kick and stomp Policeman Carmack as alleged in the indictment, then the issue for you to determine is whether the shoes on the defendants' feet used by them in kicking the prosecuting witness constituted deadly weapons within the meaning of the statute.

'I charge you further that, if you determine from the circumstances of the case, that is, the size and weight of the shoe used, the manner in which the shoe was used to kick, and the extent of the injury to the person attacked, that the shoes on the defendants' feet were deadly weapons within the meaning of the statute, then you may find the defendants...

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  • Shivers v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 1, 2010
    ...314 S.E.2d 235 (1984) (ceramic statue); Talley v. State, 137 Ga. App. 548, 550, 224 S.E.2d 455 (1976) (lamp); Williams v. State, 127 Ga.App. 386, 387-389, 193 S.E.2d 633 (1972) (shoes). For those items, the issue must be submitted to a properly instructed jury, and the failure to do so is e......
  • Harwell v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • March 1, 1999
    ...for the jury, which may consider all the circumstances surrounding the weapon and the manner in which it was used. Williams v. State, 127 Ga.App. 386(1), 193 S.E.2d 633 (1972). See also Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470(3), 265 S.E.2d 771 (1980). Cf. Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54(2), 464 S.E.2d ......
  • Eady v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 20, 1987
    ...287 S.E.2d 296 (1981) (overruled on a different point); Quarles v. State, 130 Ga.App. 756, 204 S.E.2d 467 (1974); Williams v. State, 127 Ga.App. 386, 193 S.E.2d 633 (1972). Here we cannot say as a matter of law that the way the pillow and sheets were used could not make them into deadly wea......
  • People v. Van Diver
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • December 22, 1977
    ...1969); Dickson v. State, 230 Ark. 491, 323 S.W.2d 432 (1959); Johnsen v. State, 249 So.2d 452 (Fla.App.1971); Williams v. State, 127 Ga.App. 386, 193 S.E.2d 633 (1972); State v. Calvin, 209 La. 257, 24 So.2d 467 (1945); Bean v. State, 77 Okl.Crim. 73, 138 P.2d 563 (1943); State v. Hariott, ......
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