Williams v. State

Decision Date21 May 2004
Docket NumberNo. 45S00-0306-SD-248.,45S00-0306-SD-248.
Citation808 N.E.2d 652
PartiesWILLIAMS, Darnell, Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Respondent.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

ORDER DENYING REHEARING IN CAPITAL CASE AND RULING ON MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

RANDALL T. SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

Introduction.

Since being convicted of murder and sentenced to death on the unanimous recommendation of a jury, Darnell Williams has had those convictions and the sentence reviewed on the merits once by a state trial court in the first post-conviction proceeding, twice by this Court on appeal, and by all three levels of the federal judiciary. The United States Supreme Court has three times declined to hear the case.

More recently, Williams petitioned for relief under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(k) (Supp.2003), which generally provides an avenue for a person sentenced to death to present previously undiscovered evidence that undermines the confidence in the conviction or death sentence. That petition also asserted claims outside the framework of what could reasonably be called previously undiscovered evidence, and we considered those claims as another request for successive post-conviction relief. We denied the relief requested in the petition.

Now pending before us is a request to reconsider the denial of that petition. For the reasons explained below, we deny the request for rehearing. To the extent that Williams has submitted additional evidence or raised additional claims for relief not raised in his earlier petition, we deny those requests for relief. Williams has also filed several requests to supplement the record with additional materials, all of which we grant. Williams has also filed a motion asking for funds to conduct additional investigation, which we deny.

Having disposed of all pending matters, we have entered a separate order today setting the date for execution of the death sentence for July 9, 2004, before sunrise.

Background.

Williams stands convicted of two counts of felony murder for two killings committed in the course of a robbery. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2) ("A person who ... kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit ... robbery... commits murder, a felony."). As the aggravating circumstances that made Williams eligible for the death penalty, the State alleged two intentional killings during a robbery and the multiple murders. See I.C. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G) & (8). The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty and the Lake Superior Court followed that recommendation by sentencing Williams to death. See I.C. § 35-50-2-9(e) (1986). Williams was tried with Gregory Rouster (who has changed his name to Gamba Rastafari). Rouster was also convicted of two counts of felony murder and sentenced to death, but he has since been found to be mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). See Rastafari v. State, Lake Superior Court case no. 2CR-133-886-531 (June 16, 2003 order of the post-conviction court). The victims, John Rease, age 74, and his wife, Henrietta Rease, age 59, had been foster parents to Rouster. They were found in the bedroom of their home on August 12, 1986, dead from gunshot wounds. The apparent motive was Rouster's belief that the Reases owed him money they had collected as his foster parents. Two others were also charged in connection with the killings and robbery. Theresa Newsome was acquitted. Edwin Taylor pled guilty to robbery, and he testified for the State, but the charges against him may have been dismissed later.

Williams has received the review of his convictions and sentence to which he is entitled as a matter of right. The convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in Rouster v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1342 (Ind.1992), reh'g denied, (Ind.1993). In the first post-conviction proceeding, Williams, represented by the same attorney as in this proceeding, alleged more than one hundred collateral errors in his case. Post-conviction relief was denied, however, and that denial was affirmed on appeal in Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149 (Ind.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1113, 120 S.Ct. 1970, 146 L.Ed.2d 800 (2000). The federal courts denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Williams v. Anderson, 174 F.Supp.2d 843 (N.D.Ind. 2001), aff'd, Williams v. Davis, 301 F.3d 625 (7th Cir.2002),

cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1002, 123 S.Ct. 1904, 155 L.Ed.2d 831 (2003).

In the time since then, Williams has filed several petitions in this Court. First, Williams tendered a successive post-conviction petition requesting that we order DNA testing for certain blood evidence. Although we acknowledged that DNA testing can provide important information in appropriate circumstances, we concluded that even a test result favorable to Williams would not raise questions sufficient to afford him relief on the murder conviction or the appropriateness of the death sentence given the other evidence in the case. We denied the request for DNA testing. See Williams v. State, 791 N.E.2d 193 (Ind. June 27, 2003)

(Order Concerning Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief In Capital Case), reh'g denied, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 300, 157 L.Ed.2d 208 (2003). Execution of the sentence was ordered for August 1, 2003.

Williams then filed a petition for relief citing a new statute that directs us to consider a capital prisoner's claim that "previously undiscovered evidence ... undermines confidence in the conviction or the death sentence." See I.C. § 35-50-2-9(k) (Supp.2003). The purported new evidence relates to the credibility of Derrick Bryant, a trial witness who places Williams inside the house during the shootings; to a statement by Elliott Streeter that was partially favorable to Williams; to testimony from Kimberly Epperson, the state serologist; and to statements about the death sentence by T. Edward Page, the magistrate who presided over the first post-conviction proceeding, Thomas Vanes, the former deputy prosecutor who tried the case for the state, and John Gnajek, a juror. Other claims were not based strictly on "previously discovered evidence," and we considered those under our rules governing successive post-conviction petitions. We denied the "Petition for the Consideration of New Evidence Pursuant to Indiana Code 35-50-2-9(k)." See Williams v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind. July 25, 2003)

(published order), reh'g pending.

Williams immediately petitioned for rehearing from that denial order, but before we ruled, Williams was granted a reprieve by then-Governor Frank O'Bannon, which reprieve was later extended by Governor Joseph E. Kernan, to conduct DNA testing on blood evidence. See Statement Regarding Darnell Williams (July 28, 2003); Statement Regarding Darnell Williams (Sept. 29, 2003). In light of the reprieve, we stayed enforcement of the order setting execution of the sentence for August 1, 2003. See Order, entered in this case July 29, 2003.

After the DNA testing authorized by the Governor as part of the clemency proceeding had been completed and the Governor's reprieve had expired by its own terms, we issued an order directing the parties to submit any additional materials they wanted us to consider before we took action on the pending petition for rehearing and further action on the State's motion to set an execution date.

In the time since we issued an order staying the execution and today, both sides have filed various documents, and we have considered them all.1

Request to supplement the record.

Williams has filed several motions requesting permission to supplement the record with various exhibits. See "Motion to Supplement Record for Consideration of New Evidence Pursuant to XX-XX-X-X(k)" filed July 29, 2003 (relating to Vanes' testimony); "Supplemental Record & Supplement to Motion to Reconsider Petition for the Consideration of New Evidence Pursuant to Indiana Code 35-50-2-9(k)" filed September 4, 2003 (containing documents marked Exhibits A (letter from T. Edward Page to the parole board), Exhibit B (testimony of former deputy prosecutor Vanes before the parole board), Exhibit C (letter from juror Gnajek), Exhibit D (affidavit of Vanes), Exhibit E (unsworn statement of Anita Kelly, the aunt of trial witness Derrick Bryant), Exhibit F (unsworn statement of Bertha King)); "Second Supplement to the Record" filed September 26, 2003 (containing records from Southlake Center for Mental Health about trial witness Bryant); "Request For Leave To Submit Additional Exhibit In Support of Supplemental Motion For Reconsideration of Petition For Relief Under I.C. XX-XX-X-X(k)" filed May 11, 2004.

Those requests are GRANTED. Various other documents have been attached to the papers Williams has filed in this cause. We have considered these.

In addition, Williams moved for leave to file a reply and simultaneously tendered a "Reply to State's Response in Opposition to Williams's Supplemental Motion For Reconsideration of His Petition for Relief Under I.C. XX-XX-X-X." The motion is GRANTED, and the Clerk is directed to show the Reply filed as of the date it was tendered. The State filed "State's Motion to File Oversized Response," which is also GRANTED. The Clerk has shown the response filed as of the date it was presented, April 23, 2004.

Request for additional investigation.

Williams has filed a motion, ex parte and under seal, requesting that we authorize funds for him to hire investigators and experts. Among other things, Williams desires to locate witnesses and gather evidence of his own mental capacity. See "Ex Parte Request For The Court's Assistance To Complete Investigation For Post-Conviction Proceedings By A Person Under A Sentence Of Death" filed March 29, 2004, and "Notice To The Court" filed April 2, 2004.

Indiana law provides legal representation and investigation funds to indigent defendants for trial and to indigent prisoners for prosecution of a first...

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