Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 05 May 1966
• Docket Number: No. 23429,23429
• Citation: 149 S.E.2d 449,222 Ga. 208
• Parties: Venson Eugene WILLIAMS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 449

149 S.E.2d 449

222 Ga. 208

Venson Eugene WILLIAMS v. The STATE.

No. 23429.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 5, 1966.

Rehearing Denied May 27, 1966.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 10, 1966. See 87 S.Ct. 184.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The trial court did not err in overruling defendant's motion for a change of venue based on the ground that the publicity in the news media of the county where the trial was held was prejudicial to him and prevented a fair trial since such publicity in newspaper reports alone does not establish that a fair trial could not be had and there were affidavits to the contrary from citizens of the county introduced by the State.

2. Special grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of defendant's motion for a new trial based on the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to discover and produce certain State's evidence were properly overruled.

3. The trial court did not err in excusing 37 persons called for jury service because they stated they were conscientiously opposed to capital punishment, and the defendant was not denied due process of law as a result of their being excused.

4. The trial court did not err in seating 13 jurors at defendant's trial where they stated that they had heard or read of defendant's past criminal record but had also stated that such knowledge would not effect their verdict.

5. It was not error to refuse a change of venue after the court allowed the 13 jurors to hear the case.

6. Under our ruling in Division 2, the denial of defendant's motion for discovery of certain evidence was not error.

7. Where counsel for the defendant first brought the fact that defendant had a past criminal record before the jury, he was not entitled to a mistrial when counsel for the State pursued the same subject.

8. Under the ruling in Division 2, it was not error to refuse defendant's motion to produce certain State's evidence.

9. It was not error for the trial court to refuse to direct a verdict of acquittal.

10. The 31st ground of defendant's motion for a new trial not having been argued orally or by brief is considered as abandoned.

11. The court's charge to the jury to-wit: 'I charge you also that the testimony of one accomplice if satisfactory to the jury is sufficient corroboration, of another accomplice in a felony case,' was a correct statement of the law and authorized by the evidence.

12. It was not error for the court to refuse to charge the jury to the effect that they should give no weight to the testimony of an accomplice who had been granted immunity from prosecution by the State because to do so would be an incorrect statement of the law and would invade the province of the jury.

13. The court did not err in failing to charge the jury that conviction of a crime of moral turpitude goes to the credibility of a witness where there was no request to charge on the circumstances in which a witness may be impeached.

14. It was not error for the court to overrule defendant's motion for a new trial on the general grounds because the testimony of the accomplice was sufficiently corroborated by other evidence to connect the defendant with the crime of murder and support his conviction.

James W. Dorsey, Lynn A. Downey, Atlanta, M. M. Armistead, Decatur, Nall, Miller, Cadenhead & Dennis, Atlanta, for appellant.

Reid Merritt, Sol. Gen., Buford, Luther C. Hames, Jr., Marietta, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Rubye G. Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

ALMAND, Justice.

Under an indictment returned at the April term, 1965, of the Gwinnett Superior Court charging Venson Eugene Williams and Alex S. Evans with murder in that they on April 17, 1964, did kill one Jerry S. Everett by shooting him with a pistol, in the separate trial of Williams, he was found guilty on October 7, 1965, and sentenced to death on October 8, 1965. His motion for a new trial on the general grounds and 33 special grounds were overruled on January 28, 1966. Notice of appeal was timely filed, and the appeal is before us in which the appellant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial if error be found in any one of his 33 enumerated grounds of error. Our sole duty being to review the trial in the court below to ascertain if an error of law was committed, we have reviewed each enumeration of error and render our opinion and judgment on each one seriatim.

1. Motion to change venue. It is asserted that the court erred in not sustaining defendant's motion for a change of venue because 'of the excitement and the inflamed state of public opinion that has existed since the homicide, which was calculated to poison the minds of the jurors of said county, a large portion of the jurors have formed an opinion as to petitioner's guilt, or have become prejudiced or biased against him either from having read or heard accounts of the murder and indictment of this defendant in the newspapers and various publications or over the television or radio, or from having heard statements of others and of relatives and friends of the decedent which are exceedingly damaging to petitioner and prejudicial to a correct termination of the issues involved in the case. The public mind has been so poisoned and prejudiced by exaggerated rumors and by accounts in the newspapers, local press and other news media that petitioner will be unable to get a fair trial by an impartial jury in said county, the sort of trial that he is entitled to under the laws of the land, the State of Georgia, and the Constitution of the United States of America, particularly Section One, Fourteenth Amendment.'

On the hearing of this motion, the defendant's evidence consisted entirely of newspaper articles of general circulation in the county which carried reports of the slaying of three Gwinnett County police officers and particularly the accounts in the newspapers that 'Gwinnett Murders Solved,' in which the defendant was named as one of the participants. It was contended by the defendant that these newspaper reports contained the names of those indicted and the past criminal record of the defendant was given. It was contended that this wide publicity as to the indictment of the defendant and his prior criminal record made it impossible to obtain a fair trial in Gwinnett County. In support of his motion, defendant offered no opinionative evidence.

As a countershowing, the State introduced in evidence the affidavits of 30 citizens of Gwinnett County in which they swore that in their opinion the defendant could receive a fair trial in Gwinnett County.

The trial judge did not err in denying the motion for a change of venue. This ruling follows our ruling in Morgan v. State, 211 Ga. 172, 84 S.E.2d 365, where it was held that the court did not err in overruling a motion for a change of venue based solely upon grounds of newspaper reports published in the county in which the charges against the defendant were published were inflammatory and rendered it impossible to obtain a fair trial. This court in an unanimous opinion said: 'The mere fact that newspapers had carried items and editorials that the defendant had confessed the crime for which he stood indicted, or had published articles in regard to the defendant which were inflammatory in nature, would not of itself be sufficient to establish the fact that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in Richmond County, without further alleging that the jurors who had been summoned to try the case had read the articles and formed a fixed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant from reading such articles. As to whether any juror empaneled for the defendant's trial had read the articles or formed any opinion therefrom, the right of the defendant in the selection of a fair and impartial jury was protected by the right of challenge to the poll, to have the voir dire questions propounded, and to have peremptory challenges. From the fact that two local newspapers gave a large amount of publicity to the case, it does not follow that such prejudice existed in the whole county as to make a fair and impartial trial impossible.' 211 Ga. at 175-176, 84 S.E.2d at 368. See also Blevins v. State, 108 Ga.App. 738, 134 S.E.2d 496.

2. Prior to the trial, the defendant filed a motion praying that the court order and direct the State to produce certain alleged (a) names and addresses of all those persons whose testimony 'was in substance related to the grand jury'; (b) 'a full, exact and complete copy of any statement or affidavit' in the control of the solicitor general of those persons who would be called as a witness; (c) the names and addresses of the officers who questioned the wife of the defendant in April, 1964; (d) the minutes of the grand jury which indicted the defendant; (e) all witnesses for the prosecution to be made available to the defendant for the purpose of taking the depositions of those persons and (f) the written agreement, if any, made to Wade L. Truett for immunity.

In denying these motions for discovery or production of evidence, error is alleged in grounds 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. This court in Blevins v. State, 220 Ga. 720(2), 141 S.E.2d 426, held: 'There is no statute or rule of procedure of force in this State which requires a solicitor general or other prosecuting officer to make his evidence, documentary or otherwise, available to the accused or his counsel before trial * * *' Id. at 723, 141 S.E.2d at 429. See also Walker v. State, 215 Ga. 128, 109 S.E.2d 748, 927. It has never been the practice in this State for a court to engage in the investigation as to whether the evidence before a grand jury was sufficient to warrant an indictment. Buchanan v. State, 215 Ga. 791, 113 S.E.2d 609. Under these prior rulings, which we follow and approve, these grounds are without merit.

3. We come now to alleged error number 9 which charges that the court erred in excusing 37 persons called for jury service on the grounds that in response to the question given to them on...