Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 30 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 29A02-0209-CR-806.,29A02-0209-CR-806. |
| Parties | Larry R. WILLIAMS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Annette Fancher Bishop, Carmel, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Larry R. Williams appeals his sentence for Failure to Return to Lawful Detention,1 a class D felony, which the trial court imposed consecutively to his sentence in another case. Williams presents the following restated issue for review: Did the trial court properly determine that imposition of consecutive sentences was mandatory under Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-1-2(d) (West, Premise through 2002 1st Special Sess.)?
We remand.
In February 2002, Williams was being held in the Hamilton County Jail pending trial on two counts of class A felony dealing in cocaine. By order dated February 25, 2002, the Hamilton County Circuit Court granted Williams temporary leave to attend his father's funeral on February 26, 2002. Pursuant to the order, Williams was to "be released to Joe McCaslin on February 26, 2002, at 10:30 a.m. to return to the Hamilton County Jail on the same day, at 3:00 p.m." State's Exhibit 3. When Williams did not return as ordered, the assistant jail commander contacted Hamilton County Deputy Sheriff Todd Uhrick. Around 6:00 that evening, Deputy Uhrick located Williams in a motel room in Indianapolis with his girlfriend. Deputy Uhrick returned Williams to jail.
The State charged Williams with failure to return to lawful detention. Following a jury trial on April 11, 2002, the jury found Williams guilty as charged. The trial court set the case for sentencing on May 15, 2002. In the interim, Williams was convicted and sentenced to a total of thirty-six years in prison on the dealing in cocaine charges. He was sentenced on May 29, 2002, on the instant conviction, to the maximum sentence of three years in prison, to be served consecutively to the sentence in the dealing case. Williams now appeals, arguing that the trial court erroneously assumed that I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d) mandated the imposition of a consecutive sentence.
A trial court may not impose consecutive sentences absent express statutory authority. Dragon v. State, 774 N.E.2d 103 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. I.C. § 35-50-1-2 governs whether sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. This statute provides in relevant part:
(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e), the court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively. The court may consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in IC XX-XX-X-X.1(b) and IC XX-XX-X-X.1(c) in making a determination under this subsection. The court may order terms of imprisonment to be served consecutively even if the sentences are not imposed at the same time. However, except for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment, exclusive of terms of imprisonment under IC XX-XX-X-X and IC XX-XX-X-XX, to which the defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the presumptive sentence for a felony which is one (1) class of felony higher than the most serious of the felonies for which the person has been convicted.
(d) If, after being arrested for one (1) crime, a person commits another crime:
I.C. § 35-50-1-2. Thus, subsection (c) of the statute provides the trial court with discretion to determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively. Subsection (d), on the other hand, establishes circumstances in which the imposition of consecutive sentences is mandatory. Here, the trial court's statements at sentencing indicate that it regarded consecutive sentences as mandatory under I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d)(1).
The State concedes that at the time Williams committed the instant offense, he was not released on bond or his own recognizance2 nor had he been convicted and sentenced on the dealing charges. The State further acknowledges that Indiana courts, including our supreme court, have held on multiple occasions that I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d)(1) applies only if the person has already been sentenced on the first crime. The State asks that we reject this interpretation of the statute, arguing that such interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the statute and unwise as a matter of public policy.
In Dragon v. State, 774 N.E.2d 103, we were recently confronted with a similar request by the State. We denied the State's request, stating in part:
As this court stated in Newsome [v. State ], 654 N.E.2d [11,] 14-15, [(Ind.Ct. App.1995), trans. denied,] "[o]ur [s]upreme [c]ourt has spoken on the application of I.C. XX-XX-X-X( [d]3)(1), and it is well-settled that it `only applies if a defendant is on probation, parole, or serving a term of imprisonment at the time the other offenses were committed.'" (Citations and footnote omitted). Stated differently, our supreme court's interpretation of subsection ([d] )(1) is that "[a] defendant who has not been sentenced for offense one at the time he commits offense two does not fall under the mandatory sentences provision of the Code." Sides v. State, 490 N.E.2d 318, 320 (Ind.1986), rev'd on other grounds on reh'g, 507 N.E.2d 560 (Ind. 1986)
; see also Groff v. State, 488 N.E.2d 711, 712 (Ind.1986) (); Hutchinson v. State, 477 N.E.2d 850, 857 (Ind.1985) ()[.]
* * *
We are bound by the decisions of our supreme court. See In re Petition to Transfer Appeals, 202 Ind. 365, 376, 174 N.E. 812, 817 (1931). Supreme court precedent is binding upon us until it is changed either by that court or by legislative enactment. Id. While Indiana Appellate Rule 65(A) authorizes this Court to criticize existing law, it is not this court's role to "reconsider" supreme court decisions. Here, our supreme court has interpreted Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2( [d] )(1) on numerous occasions, and its interpretation of that provision has been unwavering. We find merit in the State's contention that this interpretation provides no disincentive for defendants who are incarcerated from committing additional crimes prior to being sentenced on their initial crimes.4 But applying our supreme court's interpretation of Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2( [d] )(1), we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined that subsection ([d])(1) required the imposition of consecutive sentences on Dragon's second offense.
Dragon v. State, 774 N.E.2d at 106-07 (citation omitted).5
Here, the trial court similarly erred. Because Williams committed the instant offense before he was convicted and sentenced on his dealing offenses, consecutive terms were not mandatory under ...
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