Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 28 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | PD-0504-20 |
| Parties | APRIL LOREACE WILLIAMS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS GUADALUPE COUNTY
Slaughter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Richardson, Yeary, Keel, and McClure, JJ., joined. Newell J., filed a concurring opinion in which Keller, P.J., and Hervey, J., joined. Walker, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Does the temporary physical exclusion from a courtroom of a defendant's family member for the testimony of one witness at trial violate the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when the excluded individual was virtually included by permitting him to observe the witness's testimony via a live video feed from a neighboring courtroom? Under the specific facts of this case, we hold that it does not. But, we caution that courts should rarely exclude any member of the public from a courtroom during criminal case proceedings. And before doing so, the court must consider the factors under Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), to ensure that any such exclusion is justified. Nevertheless, under the narrow circumstances presented here, we conclude that the traditional Waller factors are not dispositive because, even assuming that the trial court's actions resulted in a partial closure of the courtroom, any such closure was so trivial or de minimis that it did not infringe on the values served by the Sixth Amendment. In so finding, we disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that Appellant's right to a public trial was violated. Accordingly, we reverse the lower court's judgment and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.
The Seguin Police Department organized a "controlled buy" of drugs wherein a confidential informant, Josh Brown,[1] purchased crack cocaine from Appellant. Based on her sale of drugs to Brown, Appellant was indicted for delivery of a controlled substance, Penalty Group 1, in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams.[2] At Appellant's jury trial, the State first called Detective Jaime Diaz as a witness. Detective Diaz testified that on the day in question, he provided Brown with $180 in cash and special sunglasses equipped with a hidden recording device. Diaz then dropped Brown off near Brown's house. Shortly thereafter, Diaz observed Appellant arrive at the house, stay for five to ten minutes, and then leave. Brown returned to where Diaz was waiting in his patrol car and gave Diaz a plastic bag with a white rock substance in it. Diaz field tested the substance, which indicated the presence of cocaine. A subsequent lab test confirmed the result.
Following Diaz's testimony, the State planned to call Brown as a witness. But before calling Brown, the State requested that a spectator, Appellant's brother Jerry Williams, be temporarily excluded from the courtroom during Brown's testimony. The State contended that it had "credible and reliable information" that Williams's presence would intimidate Brown, which would affect his testimony. The State also provided caselaw to the court "supporting closing the courtroom because of the intimidation factor." To minimize the effects of the closure, the State offered to set up a live video feed in another room of the courthouse so that Williams could watch Brown's testimony in real time.
Defense counsel objected to the State's request. Counsel asserted that the State had failed to provide any evidence supporting its claim of witness intimidation and that the State "has to provide specific facts to support that notion[.]" Defense counsel further asserted that Williams's removal would detract from the jury's ability to assess Brown's credibility because one of the ways the jury evaluates credibility is by evaluating the witness while he is "making his claims in open court subject to being observed by whoever [sic] is in open court." Thus, excluding Williams from the courtroom "would essentially give [Brown] the ability to testify in a consequence-free environment," thereby providing him an "advantage over any other witness." The State countered that only Appellant has a right to confrontation, which is not infringed when a member of the public is excluded from the courtroom. The prosecutor also indicated that, in her experience, confidential informants are often threatened or victimized as a result of their testimony.[3] And, in response to the assertion that the State failed to provide any evidence to support its intimidation claim, the prosecutor reiterated that the witness was a confidential informant. This statement suggested that the State could not (or would not) disclose any specific information regarding its claim of intimidation. The prosecutor emphasized that the State was "not saying that Jerry Williams cannot watch this person testify" and that it does not "violat[e] open court if we let him watch by Skype from another courtroom."[4]
The trial court granted the State's request and overruled Appellant's objection. In its oral findings made on the record, the trial court found that "the State's interest outweighs the defendant's right [ ] to public scrutiny;" that the exclusion of Appellant's brother was "necessary to protect the confidential informant from intimidation that would traumatize him or render him unable to testify;" and that the exclusion was only "temporary and only for the testimony of the confidential informant[.]" The court further found that it was a "reasonable alternative" for Williams to watch Brown's testimony on a live video stream from another room. After Williams left the courtroom, the State called Brown as a witness and he was brought into the courtroom through a back door "for his safety."
In his testimony before the jury, Brown stated that he had met Appellant through a friend, the two were "[l]ike family," and he loved her "like a sister." He acknowledged that he had purchased drugs from her on multiple occasions. On the date in question, Brown called Appellant and asked her to come over to his house. Upon arrival, she pulled out a white rock, broke it into pieces, and weighed out seven grams. Brown paid Appellant $180 for the substance and then she left. A video and audio recording of the entire transaction captured by Brown's recording device was also admitted into evidence.
After the close of evidence, the jury convicted Appellant of the charged offense, and the trial court assessed her punishment at twenty years' imprisonment.
On appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals reversed Appellant's conviction, holding that her Sixth Amendment right to a public trial had been violated by her brother's temporary exclusion from the courtroom. Williams v. State, No. 04-18-00883-CR, 2020 WL 2543308, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, May 20, 2020) (). The court first held that the trial court's actions constituted a partial courtroom closure, reasoning that "'[t]he exclusion of even a single person from court proceedings can violate a person's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.'" Id. at *2 (). The court proceeded to consider whether the closure was justified under the framework set forth in Waller, 467 U.S. 39. Id. at *2-3. Recognizing that the fourth factor under Waller requires the trial court to make findings adequate to support the closure, the court of appeals determined that this requirement was not met here. Id. at *3. Ultimately it concluded that the record "lack[ed] specific factual findings, or any other evidence, identifying how the exclusion of [Appellant's] family member from the courtroom serves the interest advanced by the State of preventing intimidation of the confidential informant." Id. Observing that the violation of a defendant's public-trial right is structural error that does not require a showing of harm, the court of appeals reversed Appellant's conviction and ordered a new trial. Id.
The State filed a petition for discretionary review, which this Court granted on three grounds to evaluate the court of appeals' analysis of this issue.[5]
In its petition for discretionary review, the State raises two broad challenges to the court of appeals' analysis: First, it contends that the lower court erred by failing to recognize that the physical exclusion of Appellant's brother from the courtroom while still permitting him to view the proceedings on a live video stream did not constitute a true "closure" of the courtroom for Sixth Amendment purposes. Thus, absent a showing that Appellant's trial was actually closed to any member of the public, the State suggests that her claim must fail on this basis. Alternatively, the State argues that, even assuming these circumstances did constitute a closure of the courtroom, they still do not amount to a reversible Sixth Amendment violation. The State notes that the traditional Waller test applied by the court of appeals is appropriate when considering a complete courtroom closure wherein the public is excluded entirely from a proceeding. But here, there was, at best, only a partial closure. Appellant's brother was the only person physically excluded, and he was virtually included and able to view the proceedings in real time via the live video feed. Thus, the State contends that these circumstances do not implicate the same secrecy and fairness concerns as a complete courtroom closure. Instead, it suggests that these circumstances call for a modified, less stringent Sixth Amendment analysis. Under that less stringent standard, the State contends that Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was not violated and that reversal...
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