Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 16 May 2023
• Docket Number: S23A0203
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. THE STATE
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

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WILLIAMS v. THE STATE

No. S23A0203

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 16, 2023

ELLINGTON, Justice.

Brandon Williams appeals his convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Corey Coleman.^[1] Williams contends that the trial court erred when it did not allow him to show his left arm during the cross-examination of a detective, when it allowed testimony about a deceased person's out-of-court identification of Williams, when it failed to charge the jury on self-defense, and when it allowed introduction of Coleman's statements to his mother. Williams also contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finally, Williams contends that the cumulative errors created sufficient prejudice that he must receive a new trial. Because Williams has failed to show reversible error, we affirm.

The evidence submitted at trial shows the following. Coleman's mother testified that in late 2007, then 16-year-old Coleman moved out of her house to live with a friend because "he was scared." Near the beginning of May 2008, Coleman moved back to his mother's house but remained fearful, would not go out much, moved his bed away from the window, and asked about moving away again.

On the evening of May 10, 2008, Coleman attended a neighborhood party with his nephew and two friends. They eventually walked to another house and knocked on the door. A black man with light skin and dreadlocks, identified by Coleman's group as "B" or "Little B" or "Brandon," looked out the window and, with a gun in his possession, walked past Coleman's group out of the house as the group went in. Other witnesses confirmed that "B" or "Brandon" was present at the house that evening.

Once Coleman was inside the house, he pulled a black Hi-Point .380-caliber pistol out of his coat, began loading it, and placed it on a table in front of him. Soon afterwards "B" came back into the house and fired several rounds at Coleman from a chrome .380-caliber pistol with a black handle. No one saw Coleman pick up his pistol or point it at "B." Instead, Coleman began to run but was shot in the back and collapsed. The shooter ran out of the house. One of Coleman's friends, Andre Reese, took Coleman's pistol from the table, threw it into some bushes, and later sold it.

Coleman was transported to a hospital emergency room but died from a single gunshot that entered his left mid-back, "kind of on the side," and exited his right abdomen. The medical examiner testified that, when Coleman was shot, he could not have been facing the shooter, that Coleman was not shot at close range, and that he likely was not shot during a struggle. The police were not able to recover either pistol, but were able to recover three bullets and three cartridge cases from the floor and a table at the crime scene. Expert firearms and toolmark analysis showed that all of those bullets were .380-caliber and were discharged from the same pistol, but not from a Hi-Point pistol. All three cartridge cases were fired from one pistol, which was "very possibl[y]" the same pistol from which the bullets were fired.

Police showed Coleman's nephew and two friends a photographic lineup that included Brandon Nolan because Reese thought the shooter's last name might be something like Knowles or Knowley, but neither Reese nor anyone else was able to identify the shooter from that lineup. Reese then showed police the house where he said "the Brandon that shot [Coleman] used to live." Because Williams had been associated with the address of that house, he was included in a new lineup. Coleman's nephew and two friends identified Williams, quickly and with certainty, from that new lineup as the shooter. A warrant was issued for Williams's arrest, but he was not apprehended until, almost eight years later, he was arrested in North Carolina for an unrelated offense and officers there discovered his outstanding arrest warrant in Georgia.

1. Williams contends that the trial court violated his right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination when it did not allow him to show his left arm during the cross-examination of the lead detective. However, Williams failed to preserve this claim for ordinary appellate review with an offer of proof, and he failed to show that there was plain error.

One of Coleman's friends who was with him at the time of his murder, Shenard Shears, had seen the shooter about five months earlier walking on the street and told investigators that he believed the shooter had a tattoo on his left arm. The lead detective testified on cross-examination that he never verified whether Williams did in fact have a tattoo on his left arm. Defense counsel then requested permission for Williams to stand and show his arm, but the State objected at a bench conference that defense counsel was "basically trying to get her client to testify without testifying" in a way that would subject him to cross-examination. Defense counsel responded that Williams would "take off his jacket and roll up his sleeve" and she would just ask whether in fact the detective "does see a tattoo on my client's arm." The trial court denied the request "at this time." Defense counsel stopped questioning the detective about the tattoo and made no further request or offer of proof.

(a) A party cannot obtain ordinary appellate review of a trial court's ruling excluding evidence unless "the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by an offer of proof or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked." OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (2) ("Rule 103 (a) (2)"). See also McGarity v. State, 311 Ga. 158, 162 (2) (856 S.E.2d 241) (2021) ("To obtain ordinary appellate review of a trial court's ruling excluding evidence, 'the substance of the evidence (must have been) made known to the court by an offer of proof or (been) apparent from the context(.)'") (quoting Rule 103 (a) (2)). This rule requires that both the substance of the evidence in question and the reason for offering it be made known or be apparent to the trial court. See Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 147, 151 (2) (805 S.E.2d 873) (2017). This requirement cannot be met after trial. See United States v. Morrison, 833 F.3d 491, 505 (III) (A) (5th Cir. 2016) ("The offer of proof required by Federal Rule of Evidence 103 (a) (2) is meant to give the trial judge contemporaneous knowledge about the proposed evidence at the time it is offered. Presentation of an offer after the trial or on appeal does not help the trial judge, and is too late." (citation and punctuation omitted)).^[2] In this case, although Williams testified at the hearing on his motion for new trial that he did not have a tattoo on his left arm, he did not make the precise, specific content of the evidence known during trial. See Walker v. Kane, 885 F.3d 535, 539 (II) (A) (8th Cir. 2018) ("stress[ing] the importance of expressing precisely the substance of the excluded evidence by stating with specificity what he or she anticipates will be the witness'[s] testimony or, at the trial court's discretion, by putting the witness on the stand, outside the presence of the jury, and eliciting responses in a question and answer format" (citation and punctuation omitted)); United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1242 (A) (10th Cir. 2001) ("Specificity and detail are the hallmarks of a good offer of proof of testimony."); United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1372 (V) (B), n.27 (11th Cir. 1994) (an offer of proof serves the function of informing the court and opposing counsel of the "precise substance" of the evidence at issue).^[3] Nor was the substance of the evidence otherwise apparent from the context. To the contrary, what the evidence would show was not presented to or discussed with the trial court at any time before or during trial.^[4] Any assumption about the condition of Williams's left arm would have been purely speculative. The trial court therefore never had a chance during trial to make a ruling in light of the evidence to be offered. Accordingly, Williams is limited to appellate review of this issue only for plain error. See Walker v. State, 301 Ga. 482, 487 (3) (801 S.E.2d 804) (2017) (rejecting ordinary appellate review and relegating appellant to review for plain error where the substance of the excluded testimony "was not apparent from the discussion at trial, nor was it made known to the trial court by an offer of proof").

(b) To establish plain error, Williams must show that he did not affirmatively waive the error, that the error is "clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute," that it "affected [his] substantial rights," and that it "seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." McGarity, 311 Ga. at 162 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). "As to the second part of the test, an error is plain if it is clear or obvious under current law. An error cannot be plain where there is no controlling authority on point or if a defendant's theory requires the extension of precedent." Early v. State, 313 Ga. 667, 672-673 (2) (b) (872 S.E.2d 705) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). "To show that an error affected his substantial rights, [the appellant] must make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below." McKinney v. State, 307 Ga. 129, 135 (2) (b) (834 S.E.2d 741) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). "Satisfying all four prongs of this standard is difficult, as it should be. The Court need not analyze all of the elements of the plain error test when the appellant fails to establish one of them." Hooper v. State, 313 Ga. 451, 457 (2) (870 S.E.2d 391) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

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