Williams v. Stoddard
| Decision Date | 30 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. PC 2012-3664 |
| Parties | DANIEL WILLIAMS v. LEAH STODDARD f/k/a LEAH WILLIAMS, PAUL M. MARTELLINI, in his capacity as Acting Chief of Police of the North Providence Police Department, NORTH PROVIDENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT, and THOMAS MASSARO, in his capacity as The Finance Director of the Town of North Providence |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
Before this Court is Plaintiff Daniel Williams' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. Defendants North Providence Police Department, North Providence Acting Chief of Police Paul M. Martellini, North Providence Finance Director Thomas Massaro, and Leah Stoddard (collectively, Defendants) have objected to Plaintiff's motion.
At all times relevant to this matter, Plaintiff Daniel Williams (Plaintiff or Mr. Williams) was employed as a police officer with the North Providence Police Department (Department). (First Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) From 2009 to 2010, Mr. Williams was married to Defendant Leah Stoddard (Ms. Stoddard). See id. at ¶ 10. Sometime in 2009, unbeknownst to Mr. Williams, Ms.Stoddard installed a spyware program on a laptop computer that Mr. Williams frequently used.1 See id. at ¶ 11. The spyware program tracked and recorded, inter alia, Mr. Williams' internet activity, log-in data, passwords, email account usage, and online conversations with third parties. See id. at ¶ 16.
In or around October 2010, Ms. Stoddard provided the Department with certain information about Mr. Williams' online activities that she had obtained through use of the spyware program. See First Am. Compl. at ¶ 21. Sometime thereafter, the Department initiated an investigation of Mr. Williams. See id. at ¶ 22. On March 28, 2012, the Department filed an internal affairs complaint against Mr. Williams based, at least in part, on evidence it had garnered directly and indirectly from the information received from Ms. Stoddard. See id. at ¶¶ 24-25. In the complaint, the Department charged Mr. Williams with conduct unbecoming an officer, incompetence, violation of user rules of behavior, insubordination, and conducting personal business while on duty. Id. at ¶ 26. The Department suspended Mr. Williams and relieved him of his duties as a police officer. Id. at ¶ 27.
Mr. Williams invoked his right to a hearing under § 42-28.6-4(a) of the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBOR). See First Am. Compl. at ¶ 28. As required by § 42-28.6-5(c), North Providence Acting Chief of Police Paul Martellini (Chief Martellini) notified Mr. Williams on April 3, 2013 of the evidence and testimony that the Department intended to introduce at the LEOBOR hearing. Id. at ¶ 29. In particular, Chief Martellini notified Mr. Williams that the Department intended to introduce evidence of Mr. Williams' internet activity. (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Obj. to Pl.'s Mot. 2.)
On July 17, 2012, Mr. Williams filed a complaint in Superior Court naming Ms. Stoddard, the Department, and Chief Martellini as defendants. The initial complaint asserted eight counts against Ms. Stoddard for violations of various federal and state statutes (Counts I-VII) and sought to recover damages from Ms. Stoddard pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-1-2, which provides civil liability for criminal conduct (Count VIII). See Compl. at ¶¶ 29-62. In particular, Count VIII of the initial complaint alleged that Ms. Stoddard is civilly liable to Plaintiff under § 9-1-2 for violations of G.L. 1956 §§ 11-52-3 and 11-52-4.1, and 18 U.S.C. § 2701. See Compl. at ¶¶ 63-64. Mr. Williams also alleged that the Department and Chief Martellini unlawfully intercepted electronic communications in violation of § 12-5.1-1 (Count IX) and § 18 U.S.C. 2511 (Count X). Id. at ¶¶ 63-69. The initial complaint sought compensatory, statutory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. Mr. Williams further requested that this Court: (1) issue an injunction to prevent the Department and Chief Martellini "from using, disclosing, and offering into evidence" at the LEOBOR hearing any information that Ms. Stoddard had gained from use of the spyware program and any evidence that the Department had discovered as a result of the information that Ms. Stoddard provided (Count XI); and (2) grant him declaratory relief (Count XII). Mr. Williams' LEOBOR hearing was stayed pending resolution of his legal claims. (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Obj. to Pl.'s Mot. 5.)
Mr. Williams moved for leave to file an amended complaint on January 4, 2013. His First Amended Complaint added Finance Director for the Town of North Providence Thomas Massaro as a defendant. See Mot. to File First Am. Compl. at 1. No objection having been filed, Plaintiff's motion was granted on January 13, 2013, pursuant to Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3).2
On August 6, 2013, Mr. Williams filed the instant Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. Mr. Williams' proposed Second Amended Complaint does not contain any new factual allegations but asserts an additional cause of action against Ms. Stoddard under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (Count IX). See Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 65-69. Mr. Williams also seeks to alter Count VIII to hold Ms. Stoddard civilly liable under § 9-1-2 for three additional statutory violations: § 11-52-2, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, and 18 U.S.C. § 1343. See id. at ¶ 63. Defendants Chief Martellini, the Department, and Thomas Massaro have filed an objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. See Defs.' Obj. to Pl.'s Mot. to Amend, Aug. 6, 2013.
This Court heard oral arguments on Plaintiff's motion to amend on August 14, 2013. Ms. Stoddard indicated at the hearing that she objects to Plaintiff's proposed amendments and wishes to incorporate the arguments made by the Department, Chief Martellini, and Thomas Massaro in opposition to Plaintiff's motion. See Tr. 2, 12, Aug. 14, 2013.
Rule 15 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure governs amendments to pleadings. Pursuant to Rule 15(a), a party is permitted one amendment "as a matter of course atany time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar . . . within 20 days after [the pleading] is served." Super. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Thereafter, any amendments are "only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party[.]" Super. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Rule 15(a) further instructs that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Super. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
A "liberal interpretation of Rule 15(a) encourages the allowance of amendments in order to facilitate the resolution of disputes on their merits rather than on blind adherence to procedural technicalities." Inleasing Corp. v. Jessup, 475 A.2d 989, 992 (R.I. 1984). Nonetheless, "the final decision whether to allow or to deny an amendment rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice." Mainella v. Staff Builders Indus. Servs., Inc., 608 A.2d 1141, 1143 (R.I. 1992) (citing Dionne v. Baute, 589 A.2d 833, 835-36 (R.I. 1991)) (additional citations omitted). Among the reasons for which a proposed amendment may be denied are "undue prejudice, delay, bad faith, and failure to state a claim." Id. (citing Faerber v. Cavanagh, 568 A.2d 326, 329 (R.I. 1990)) (internal citation omitted).
Defendants argue that Mr. Williams' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint should be denied because: (1) Defendants would suffer undue prejudice if the amendments are granted; and (2) the proposed amendments would be futile because they fail to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The Court will address each of Defendants' arguments in seriatim.
The issue of prejudice to the nonmoving party "is central to the investigation into whether an amendment should be granted." Faerber, 568 A.2d at 329. "The burden rests on the party opposing the motion to show it would incur substantial prejudice if the motion to amend were granted." Wachsberger v. Pepper, 583 A.2d 77, 78-79 (R.I. 1990) (citing Babbs v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 507 A.2d 1347, 1349 (R.I. 1986)).
In support of their objection, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's excessive delay in seeking to amend his complaint will cause them substantial prejudice if Plaintiff's amendments are granted. They claim that Plaintiff's new causes of action will require them to undertake additional discovery. In response, Mr. Williams argues that Defendants will not be unduly prejudiced because the proposed amendments do not introduce any new factual allegations.
Our Supreme Court has repeatedly propounded that "'mere delay is an insufficient reason to deny an amendment.'" Harodite Indus., Inc. v. Warren Elec. Corp., 24 A.3d 514, 531 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Wachsberger, 583 A.2d at 79) (additional citation omitted). Rather, this Court must find that "such delay creates substantial prejudice to the opposing party." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Delay may be grounds for denying a proposed amendment if "'the opposing party will not have an adequate opportunity to prepare his [or her] case on the new issues raised by the amended pleading.'" Vincent v. Musone, 572 A.2d 280, 283 (R.I. 1990) (). "'An addition of a new claim close to trial when discovery is essentially complete and trial strategy already planned invariably delays the resolution of a case[.]'" Faerber, 568 A.2d at 330 (quoting Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 139 (1st Cir. 1985)). Thus, to determine theexistence of possible prejudice, this Court considers delay, proximity to trial, and any additional preparation that the nonmoving party may need to undertake to address the proposed amendments. See Harodite Indus., 24 A.3d at 532 (discussing ...
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