Williams v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 16 July 1984
• Citation: 36 Cal.3d 441,204 Cal.Rptr. 700,683 P.2d 699
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 683 P.2d 699 Barry Glenn WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. L.A. 31817.

Page 700

204 Cal.Rptr. 700

36 Cal.3d 441, 683 P.2d 699

Barry Glenn WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent;

The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

L.A. 31817.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

July 16, 1984.

Bernard Gross, Hacienda Heights, Dennis A. Fischer, Fischer & Hill, Santa Monica, for petitioner.

Robert H. Philibosian, Dist. Atty., Los Angeles County, Los Angeles, for real party in interest.

No appearance for respondent.

BROUSSARD, Justice.

Petitioner is charged with five serious felony offenses, including two murder counts which carry special circumstances allegations. The charges stem from two separate and apparently gang-related incidents which occurred more than nine months apart. Respondent court denied petitioner's motion to sever one count of murder, alleged to have taken place in March 1982, from the remaining counts, which charge a murder, two attempted murders, and conspiracy relating to a shooting incident that occurred in June 1981. Petitioner now seeks a writ of mandate which would require separate trials for the two murder counts on grounds that a single consolidated trial would unfairly prejudice his defense. We will conclude that his severance motion should have been granted.

I.

One evening in June 1981, four persons were standing near a gymnasium at Green Meadow Park in Los Angeles when a burst of gunfire rang out. Two of the persons were wounded and another was killed by buckshot fired from a shotgun. Eyewitness testimony at a subsequent preliminary examination indicated that at least three assailants had been involved in the shootings and that multiple weapons were used. Several witnesses placed petitioner Williams in the group of assailants and saw him run from the scene along with others. However, there was no direct evidence that petitioner fired a weapon.

According to witnesses, there are two rival gangs--the "Green Meadow Park Boys" and the "89 Family Blood"--which frequent the area and have engaged in several shoot-outs. Petitioner is known to be a member of the 89 Family Blood gang, and two other persons placed at the scene are also known to be members of the "Bloods." The victims of the shootings were not known to be members of any gang but were friends with some of the Green Meadow Park Boys. Witnesses also testified that the murder victim did not know petitioner.

Nine months later, in March 1982, an eyewitness observed someone she later identified as petitioner driving a van containing at least two other occupants. The van stopped and backed up very rapidly, causing the vehicle in which the witness was riding to brake sharply. Looking into the driver's side window of the van, the witness saw the occupants laughing and heard one say, "Let's go back and fuck him up."

The van pulled up alongside a boy standing on the curb. The witness then saw an arm come out of the window on the driver's side holding an object that looked like a handgun. The boy on the curb began shaking his head and saying, "No, no, no." Shortly thereafter he was shot and killed. The eyewitness was not certain whether petitioner had been the one holding the gun, although the killer was wearing a garment with dark colored sleeves and the witness had noticed that the driver was wearing a dark colored jacket. Another eyewitness testified that he was not sure who had done the shooting but that he believed it was the driver.

Different weapons were used in the June 1981 and March 1982 homicides. There is no evidence that the victim of the latter shooting was a member of or associated with any gang; however, the boy was standing in the "territory" of the Grape Street gang when he was shot and was wearing a blue jacket, the color associated with the Grape Street gang. That gang is known to be a rival of the 89 Family Bloods. In addition, the People asserted by way of an offer of proof in their opposition to the motion to sever that they had a witness who could testify that petitioner had told him that he was being hassled in county jail about the murder by members of the Grape Street gang.

The procedural history of the case is somewhat intricate. Petitioner Williams was originally charged with only the June 1981 murder and attempted murders. He was arrested on these charges in April 1982, but moved successfully to dismiss the information pursuant to Penal Code section 995, based upon insufficiency of the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. On the very same day, the People filed a new complaint. This latter complaint charged the March 1982 murder in addition to the June 1981 shootings and also added special circumstances allegations to each murder count, alleging multiple murder. Following a preliminary hearing on the consolidated charges, petitioner again filed a motion to dismiss the charges stemming from the June 1981 incident. This time the motion was unsuccessful. ¹

Following the denial of his motion to dismiss, petitioner moved to sever the various counts relating to the June 1981 shootings from the March 1982 murder charge arguing inter alia that trial on the consolidated charges would unfairly prejudice his defense. ² In denying the motion to sever, the trial court relied almost exclusively on the case of People v. Rhoden (1972) 6 Cal.3d 519, 99 Cal.Rptr. 751, 492 P.2d 1143, observing that this court in Rhoden had characterized the defendant's motion to sever counts of an information as "frivolous," and suggesting that petitioner's argument was similarly "not well taken."

II.

Section 954 of the Penal Code sets forth the requirements for joinder of criminal charges. It provides in pertinent part: "An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or different statements of the same offense or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts .... [P]rovided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately or divided into two or more groups and each of said groups tried separately."

Petitioner, recognizing the well-settled case authority on this issue, ³ readily acknowledges that the initial requirements for joinder under section 954 have been satisfied in this case, conceding that the two counts of murder are "offenses of the same class" and that the four offenses alleged to have been committed on June 16, 1981, were "connected together in their commission," as prescribed by the statute. He therefore directs what is essentially a due process argument toward the second prong of section 954.

Since the statutory requirements for joinder were clearly met in this case, petitioner can predicate error only on clear showing of prejudice. (People v. Poon, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 55, 178 Cal.Rptr. 375; People v. Kemp (1961) 55 Cal.2d 458, 477, 11 Cal.Rptr. 361, 359 P.2d 913; People v. Meneley, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 52, 105 Cal.Rptr. 432.) If clearly established by defendant, prejudice may require severance, even though joinder is statutorily permissible under section 954. As was noted in Coleman v. Superior Court (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 129, 135, 172 Cal.Rptr. 86, certiorari denied 451 U.S. 988, 101 S.Ct. 2325, 68 L.Ed.2d 846, "[t]he determination that the offenses are 'joinable' under section 954 is only the first stage of analysis because section 954 explicitly gives the trial court discretion to sever offenses or counts 'in the interest of justice and for good cause shown.' 'Statutory permission to consolidate does not supply a complete answer, for section 954 gives the trial court discretionary power to order separate trials in the interests of justice. Refusal of severance may be prejudicial error if discretion is abused.' [Citing People v. Blalock (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 209, 222, 47 Cal.Rptr. 604.]"

We have previously noted that " '[w]here the consolidation meets the test of joinder,' ... 'the difficulty of showing prejudice from denial of severance is so great that the courts almost invariably reject the claim of abuse of discretion.' " (People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 39, 117 Cal.Rptr. 664, 528 P.2d 752, quoting Witkin, Cal.Criminal Procedure at p. 288; see also People v. Poon, supra 125 Cal.App.3d 55 69, 178 Cal.Rptr. 375; People v. Rhoden, supra, 6 Cal.3d 519, 525, 99 Cal.Rptr. 751, 492 P.2d 1143.) Such language, however, overstates the issue. We clearly do not wish to imply that principles of justice will never compel severance of charges or that appellate courts should never undertake to review a trial court's exercise of discretion in denying a party's motion to sever. Put simply, the joinder laws must never be used to deny a criminal defendant's fundamental right to due process and a fair trial.

The initial step in any review of a motion to sever is to examine the issue of cross-admissibility of evidence. Since cross-admissibility would ordinarily dispel any possibility of prejudice (see, e.g., People v. Matson, supra, 13 Cal.3d 35, 39-41, 117 Cal.Rptr. 664, 528 P.2d 752; People v. Poon, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d 55, 70-74, 178 Cal.Rptr. 375; People v. Jackson (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 620, 162 Cal.Rptr. 574), we must inquire, had the severance motion been granted, would the evidence pertinent to one case have been admissible in the other under the rules of evidence which limit the use of character evidence or prior similar acts to prove conduct (Evid.Code, § 1101, subds. (a) and (b)). ⁴

As we noted in People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 316, 165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883, "Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) expressly prohibits the use of an uncharged offense if the only theory of relevance is that the accused has a propensity (or disposition) to commit the crime charged and that this propensity is circumstantial proof that the accused...