Williams v. Texas Co.
Decision Date | 12 March 1943 |
Docket Number | 15514. |
Citation | 24 S.E.2d 873,202 S.C. 333 |
Parties | WILLIAMS v. TEXAS CO. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Woods & Woods, of Marion, for appellant.
McEachin & Townsend, of Florence, and S. H. Schoolfield, Jr., of Marion, for respondent.
I find myself unable to concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice FISHBURNE to the effect that the Circuit Judge should have granted the respondent's motion for a direction of verdict on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to show the authority of the agent, Dowdle, to make the contract upon which the appellant relies. Because of the recognized ability of Mr. Justice FISHBURNE and the confidence in his views which his opinions always impel, I am reluctant to express a dissent in this case; but after a most painstaking study of the record, I am unable to reach any other conclusion than that the appellant made out a prima facie case that entitled him to go to the jury. In this light, the appellant's exceptions in my view include reversible error which should result in the granting of a new trial.
Paragraphs two, three, four and six of the complaint of the appellant allege:
*****
(Emphasis added.)
The answer of respondent to the above allegations of the complaint was a general denial; and further answering, and by way of affirmative defense, the respondent alleged that it did not admit that any contract or agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and defendant, but that such negotiations and conversations as were had in regard to the matters and things set forth in the complaint were between appellant and J. W. Dowdle who had no authority to employ appellant, or any other person to purchase real estate for its account or to make any contracts to lease real estate acquired by appellant or any other person, and that respondent was informed and believes that this fact was known to the appellant, or that he was in possession of facts from which he must have known that the said J. W. Dowdle had no such authority; further that if such a contract as was set forth in the complaint was entered into between appellant and an agent of the respondent, said contract was of and concerning an estate or interest in, to or out of lands, and was not evidenced by memorandum, deed or note in writing signed by respondent, or by its agent authorized to sign such an instrument, and the statute law of South Carolina is pled in bar of the right of appellant to maintain the action.
The complaint clearly makes out a case of alleged employment of the appellant by the respondent through Dowdle, an agent of respondent, and the expenditure by the appellant of $500 for the purpose of accomplishing the stated object of the agency and employment.
As Mr. Justice FISHBURNE points out, the Statute of Frauds is not involved in that situation, and in my opinion there is testimony sufficient to go to the jury on the alleged employment of the appellant if the employment was effected by an authorized agent of the respondent.
It may be conceded, in my view of the case, that the agent of the respondent, who handled this matter with the appellant, had no authority to sign the name of the respondent to a lease or to a contract for the purchase of real estate. But the matter of finding suitable locations, and of initiating negotiations with owners for the purchase or lease of such locations was admittedly within the authority of the respondent's agent, Dowdle, and of his successor, Neeley. These men were not ordinary agents. They were zone managers, with jurisdiction over a considerable number of counties in the State. An essential part of their business consisted of doing the very thing which the appellant says was done in this case, to-wit, selecting locations and doing whatever was necessary to put the respondent in position to act on the purchase or lease of the locations. As a practical matter, in the real estate field it is frequently indispensable to employ brokers or others to find and tie up locations for corporate organizations, pending consideration of the locations through the devious channels of the corporate setup. Certainly the respondent would not want to spend the time of its organization in considering a purchase or lease involving substantial expenditures unless a situation has been created in which the owner of the property has definitely agreed to sell or lease in the event that the corporation finally approves the proposed transaction.
It would be within the contemplation of the respondent that Dowdle would follow the usual course of seeking aid from others in carrying on his duties, and in paying for such aid on any reasonable basis. If his authority extended to employment of others for that purpose, would it not extend to legitimate disbursements made by the persons employed, when such disbursements are made at Dowdle's specific request?
In other words, does the case not finally resolve itself into the proposition that the appellant claims that he was employed by Dowdle and directed by Dowdle to advance money within the scope of the employment, and that Dowdle acted in these connections under an admitted scope of authority so wide as to territory and so highly executive and important in character and extent, that it would be unreasonable to deny to him as a matter of law the implied authority to do what the appellant says was done in this case.
The dictum so often expressed that one deals with an agent at one's peril, from the standpoint of the agent's authority, might be all right in dealings between individuals relating to their personal affairs; but in the complex business structure of today, where gigantic corporations operate in thousands of communities through regional and other executives who of necessity deal in their particular areas with the business of their principals, it seems to me that an executive agent of a large corporation should be held to have such authority as may be reasonably deduced from the scope of his activities, and that the protection of the corporation must come, not from subjecting the public to the risk of dealing with such men at their peril, but from the employment of agents who have the integrity to notify the people with whom they deal of any actual limitations on their authority.
The general principles I have stated find some support in the case of Barrett v. Texas Co., 174 S.C. 45, 176 S.E. 874, and Swift & Company v. Callaham, 133 S.C. 353, 131 S.E. 146.
In 2 C.J.S., Agency, § 95, pp. 1203, 1204, the rule is thus stated:
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