Williams v. The State Of Ga.

• Decision Date: 30 November 1847
• Docket Number: No. 64.,64.
• Citation: 3 Ga. 453
• Parties: William L. Williams, plaintiff in error. vs. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

3 Ga. 453

William L. Williams, plaintiff in error. vs. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.

No. 64.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

NOVEMBER TERM, 1847.

Indictment and conviction for murder. From Richmond Superior Court. Tried before Judge Holt. June Term, 1847.

This cause was tried upon a plea of not guilty.

After the arraignment was made and the usual preliminary steps taken, a panel of forty-eight jurors was presented to the prisoner, and several jurors were selected and sworn to try the cause, when John Barnes, one of the panel, was called, and by the State's attorney put upon the prisoner, who required him to be sworn upon his voire dire, and examined touching his competency; and having answered both questions prescribed by the statute negatively, voluntarily stated that he had conscientious scruples concerning the infliction of capital punishment, whereupon the Court below permitted the State\'s attorney to pass said juror upon a challenge for cause, to which the prisoner\'s counsel objected, insisting that the scruples so avowed by the juror, constituted no sufficient ground of challenge for cause, and that the State\'s attorney could riot legally object to said juror, after having offered him to the prisoner.

In the further progress of the selection of the jury, Shade S. Pardue, another of said panel, having been called, was by the State's attorney sworn upon his voire dire and examined touching his competency, and having answered the questions prescribed by statute negatively, was asked by the State's attorney whether or not he entertained conscientious scruples concerning the infliction of capital punishment; to which he replied that he did, before the defendant's counsel had time to object to the question; whereupon the State's attorney moved that said juror be passed upon a challenge for cause, the prisoner's counsel objecting both to the question and the alleged challenge for cause; when the State's attorney withdrew the question. The Court below held that the question was illegal, but nevertheless allowed the challenge for cause, the disclosure having been made.

And in the further progress of selecting the jury, Solomon L Bassford, another of said panel, was called and put upon the prisoner by the State's attorney, who required him to be put upon his voire dire and examined touching his competency. The juror having answered the first question prescribed by the statute negatively, to the second question, "Have you resting on your mind any bias or prejudice for or against the prisoner at the bar?" he responded, "I fear I have;" when the presiding judge below propounded the further question, "Mr. Juror, is your bias or prejudice against the prisoner, or the crime?" To which the prisoner's counsel objected, as unauthorized by law, but the Court overruled the objection, and the juror answering that his prejudice was against the crime, was put upon the prisoner.

To which several rulings and decisions of the Court below, the counsel for the prisoner excepted, and assigned the same for error.

Miller & Jenkins, for the prisoner.

Flournoy, Attorney General, for the State.

Miller & Jenkins, for the prisoner, made the following points:

That there was error in this, to wit, that the Court decided that the State's attorney was entitled to challenge for cause, a juror, who, after having been put upon the prisoner by the State's attorney, voluntarily stated that he entertained conscientious scruples concerning the infliction of capital punishments.

And further, there is also error in this, that the Court decided that the State's attorney was entitled to challenge for cause another juror, who stated that he had scruples in regard to the infliction of capital punishments, in answer to a question propounded to him by the State's attorney on his voire dire, additional to the questions prescribed by the statute in such cases provided.

And further, there is also error in this, that another juror having been examined on his voire dire, in manner and form prescribed by the statute in such cases made and provided, and not having answered the questions in such manner as to establish his competency, his honour, the judge, propounded to him a question not prescribed or authorized by said statute, and, upon his answer thereto, adjudged him competent.

And further, there is also error in this, to wit, that two of said jurors, to wit, John Barnes and Shade S. Pardue, having been put upon their voire dire, and having answered the questions prescribed by the statute in such manner as to make them competent, the court, for other causes, adjudged them incompetent, and permitted the State's attorney to challenge them for cause, without the intervention of triors.

And cited the following authorities: 1 Coke on Litt. 157, a; ib 157, b; 1 Kelly R. 571; Hotchk. 798.

By the Court.—Lumpkin, J., delivering the opinion.

This is a writ of error to a judgment of the Superior Court of Richmond county, whereby the plaintiff in error was convicted of murder.

When the venire in this case was called, John Barnes, one of them, was put upon the prisoner, who required him to be sworn upon his voire dire. He answered both questions prescribed by the statue negatively, and then voluntarily added, that he had conscientious scruples against the infliction of capital punishment; whereupon the Court permitted the Attorney General to challenge said juror for cause, the prisoner's counsel objectingthereto, and insisting that the juror was competent, notwithstanding said answer; and furthermore, that even admitting that the disclosure which he had made as to the state of his mind disqualified him, still the objection came too late. Shade S. Pardue being called, was examined upon his voire dire, touching his competency, and after answering both of the interrogatories propounded by the act of 1843 in the negative, he was inquired of by the Attorney General, whether or not he entertained conscientious scruples as to the infliction of capital punishment. He replied that he did, before the prisoner\'s counsel had time to object to the question. It was moved in behalf of the prosecution, to pass him upon a challenge for cause, and this was allowed by the Court, although it was conceded that the inquiry had been irregularly made.

Solomon L. Bassford, another of said panel, being sworn upon his voire dire at the instance of the prisoner, stated that, "he feared he had some bias or prejudice on his mind." The Court asked the juror whether it was against the prisoner or the crime; he answered against the crime, and he was thereupon pronounced qualified.

To all which decisions of the Court below, counsel for the accused excepted.

The point to be first settled is, whether or not a juror who states upon oath, that he is conscientiously opposed to the infliction of capital punishment, is competent to sit in a case of murder. If he is, the Court below erred in rejecting two jurors on that ground, and it is wholly unnecessary to inquire at what stage the objections occurred.

No adjudicated case has been produced from England, and it is urged that the very fact that there is no instance of such a challenge in the books, is conclusive against it; whether this inference is rebutted and this silence sufficiently explained by referring to the statute of 7th and 8th William III, ch. 21, as having obviated all question on the subject in England, by disabling Quakers from serving on juries, I will not undertake to say.

The question has been repeatedly made in the State and United States Courts, and so far as I am informed, been uniformly decided against the competency of the juror.

In The...