Williams v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.
| Docket Number | 4:21-cv-01049-MTS |
| Decision Date | 18 August 2022 |
| Parties | MARJORIE WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES d/b/a Affinia Healthcare, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This case is before the Court on Defendant United States of America's Motion to Dismiss, Doc. [9], for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The parties have fully briefed the matter at issue, and the Court heard oral argument and received supplemental briefing. After consideration, the Court concludes its subject matter jurisdiction exists in this case, and it therefore will deny the Motion to Dismiss.
The St Louis Dental Center (the “Center”) is a partnership, in the vernacular sense of the term, between A.T. Still University's Missouri School of Dentistry & Oral Health (“MOSDOH”), a private university, and Affinia Healthcare (“Affinia”), a Federally Qualified Health Center with multiple locations within the St. Louis metropolitan area. In October 2019, Plaintiff Marjorie Williams underwent dental work at the Center under the care of a MOSDOH student, Reid Higginbotham, and Dr. Clifton Whitworth, a dentist who worked for Affinia and also was approved by MOSDOH to serve as an adjunct faculty member. Plaintiff alleges that due to negligence in her care and treatment, she sustained a compound fracture to her jaw.
Plaintiff brought the instant suit asserting a negligence claim against the United States Department of Health and Human Services, doing business as Affinia, under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).[1] The FTCA acts as a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity; for tort claims, it makes the U.S. liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Thus, the U.S. generally would be liable if there is a “private analogue” under “the law of the place where the relevant act or omission occurred.” Sorace v. United States, 788 F.3d 758, 763 (8th Cir. 2015). Since Missouri law provides for a cause of action for medical negligence, see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 538.210, an individual can state a claim under the FTCA based on a cause of action for medical negligence under Missouri law.
Here, the government concedes that Affinia dentists are deemed federal employees covered under the FTCA when they perform dental services, and therefore the government would be liable for their negligence provided all other prerequisites of the FTCA are met, Doc. [10] at 2, but the government argues that Dr. Whitworth was under MOSDOH's sole control and was acting as an adjunct faculty member of MOSDOH during Plaintiff's treatment, not in his role as an Affinia dentist. The government maintains that though Dr. Whitworth continued to be an employee of Affinia, he was a borrowed servant under Missouri law because he was under the control of MOSDOH, not Affinia. See Bovier v. Simon Crane Serv., Inc., 381 S.W.3d 388, 390 (Mo.Ct.App. 2012) (). Alternatively, the government argues that Dr. Whitworth was MOSDOH's employee during Plaintiff's treatment. Doc. [23] at 8. And, lastly, the government argues that Dr. Whitworth was not an Affinia employee for FTCA purposes when he functioned as an adjunct faculty member for MOSDOH.
If any of the government's arguments are correct, Plaintiff's claim would fail, and the FTCA therefore would not waive sovereign immunity, which means this Court would have no jurisdiction in this case. Brownback v. King, 141 S.Ct. 740, 749 (2021) (). “The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction falls on the plaintiff.” V S Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000). Therefore, the Court will determine whether Plaintiff has established subject matter jurisdiction in this case or whether the government's arguments are well grounded.
A common law cause of action for injury caused by the negligence of a health care provider no longer exists under Missouri law. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 538.210.1 (). Instead, the Missouri General Assembly replaced the common law cause of action with a statutory cause of action. Id.; Ordinola v. Univ. Physician Assocs., 625 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Mo. banc 2021) (“Medical negligence actions remained a common law claim until the General Assembly amended certain statutes in 2015.”). The elements of the statutory claim are “that the health care provider failed to use that degree of skill and learning ordinarily used under the same or similar circumstances by members of the defendant's profession” and “that such failure directly caused or contributed to cause the plaintiff's injury or death.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 538.210.1.
Here, Dr. Whitworth and Affinia are “health care provider[s].” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 538.205(6).[2] The government does not dispute that conclusion. But Affinia could only be liable under § 538.210 for Dr. Whitworth's actions or omissions if Dr. Whitworth was Affinia's “employee.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 538.210.4. At one time, Missouri's statutory cause of action did not define “employee.” See Jefferson ex rel. Jefferson v. Mo. Baptist Med. Ctr., 447 S.W.3d 701, 709 (Mo.Ct.App. 2014). Missouri courts chose to define the term “according to common-law principles of agency.” Id. Before the events at issue here occurred, however, Missouri amended its statute and defined “employee” as “any individual who is directly compensated by a health care provider for health care services[3] rendered by such individual” and also “other nonphysician individuals who are supplied to a health care provider by an entity that provides staffing.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 538.205(3); accord J.B. ex rel. Bullock v. Mo. Baptist Hosp. of Sullivan, 4:16-cv-01394-ERW, 2018 WL 572026, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2018) ().
The government has not argued that Affinia did not directly compensate Dr. Whitworth for the health care services he provided to Plaintiff. That is, it has not argued that Dr. Whitworth was not Affinia's “employee” as defined under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 538.205(3) during Plaintiff's treatment. Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence that, without any refutation from the government, satisfies Plaintiff's burden of establishing Dr. Whitworth was Affinia's “employee” under § 538.210. This includes, for example, a copy of a billing statement for Plaintiff's treatment where Plaintiff is directed to make payments to Affinia for Dr. Whitworth's care. See, e.g., Doc. [22] at 9.
Though the government does not dispute that Dr. Whitworth was Affinia's employee as defined under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 538.205(3), see Doc. [23] at 6, it argues that Dr. Whitworth was MOSDOH's “employee” under the latter statutory definition-“other nonphysician individuals who are supplied to a health care provider by an entity that provides staffing,” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 538.205(3). It argues that “Affinia staffed MOSDOH's dental clinic with nonphysician Adjunct Faculty” since Affinia provided dentists, like Dr. Whitworth, to MOSDOH. Doc. [23] at 8. The Court is not convinced, though, that Affinia is “an entity that provides staffing.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 538.205(3). The statute does not define an employee merely as any nonphysician individual who is supplied to a health care provider. Rather, it covers only nonphysician individuals supplied to a health care provider by an entity that provides staffing. If the statute is read such that all nonphysician individuals supplied to a health care provider are employees, it would render “by an entity that provides staffing” mere surplusage. Piercy v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 583 S.W.3d 132, 140 (Mo.Ct.App. 2019) ; Brandsville Fire Prot. Dist. v. Phillips, 374 S.W.3d 373, 381 (Mo.Ct.App. 2012) (applying the canon against surplusage because courts presume that a legislature intended “each word, clause, sentence, and provision of a statute [to] have effect and should be given meaning” (quoting Bolen v. Orchard Farm R-V Sch. Dist., 291 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Mo.Ct.App. 2009))).
Additionally, even if Dr. Whitworth were MOSDOH's employee under the latter statutory definition, there is nothing to indicate that he could not also be Affinia's employee under the same definition. That is, the government has not explained how Dr. Whitworth simultaneously could not have been an Affinia employee at the time if he also was a MOSDOH employee since the term here is a statutorily defined one, not a term defined by common law. Cf. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2019) ().
Under Missouri law, where an employer-employee relationship exists the doctrine of respondeat superior holds the employer vicariously liable for injury-causing tortious conduct of the employee done within the course and scope of his or her employment. See Cluck v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 367 S.W.3d 25, 29 (Mo....
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