Williams v. United Credit Plan of Chalmette, Inc., 74-4114 Summary Calendar.

• Decision Date: 28 January 1976
• Docket Number: No. 74-4114 Summary Calendar.,74-4114 Summary Calendar.
• Parties: Edward WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED CREDIT PLAN OF CHALMETTE, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

526 F.2d 713

Edward WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED CREDIT PLAN OF CHALMETTE, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 74-4114 Summary Calendar.^*

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

January 28, 1976.

Patrick D. Breeden, Sherman F. Raphael, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

Roland C. Kizer, Jr., Baton Rouge, La., Ralph D. Dwyer, Jr., Samuel S. Dalton, New Orleans, La., for defendants-appellees.

Before WISDOM, BELL and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Edward Williams appeals from the district court's dismissal of his action against United Credit Plan of Chalmette, Inc. (United) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The transaction out of which this lawsuit arose occurred on September 6, 1972, when Williams contracted with Mark Sackett to have his home repaired and remodeled. Sackett then arranged to have United extend credit to Williams to finance the job. On the same day, Williams entered into a loan with United, securing the contract with a mortgage on Williams' home.

In his complaint filed September 5, 1973, Williams sought damages from United and Sackett and rescission of his contractual obligations to United. This latter relief was expressly based upon the Consumer Credit Protection Act (Truth-in-Lending) and Regulation Z. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.; 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 et seq. Plaintiff alleged the date the loan was executed, the parties involved and the fact that an unpaid subcontractor was threatening to take legal action against him. He did not specifically complain of a failure to disclose any certain item or term of the loan and no pertinent sections of the Act or Regulation Z were cited in the pleading.

The court heard oral arguments on defendant's motion to dismiss. At that time, Williams indicated that the disclosure statement furnished him by United failed to disclose certain statutory liens that arose as a result of the contracting agreement with Sackett. After taking the motion under advisement, the trial judge issued an opinion ordering dismissal. The court reasoned that, as a matter of law, a lender has no Truth-in-Lending duty to warn a borrower of the possible consequences that may result from dealings with other parties. Plaintiff moved the court to reconsider its judgment and allow plaintiff to amend his complaint by alleging new grounds constituting Truth-in-Lending violations. Stating that it was too late to raise new claims of defects in the disclosure statement, the court denied both parts of the motion.

In this court plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim and refusing to allow him to amend after dismissal was ordered. Finding the dismissal improper, we need not reach the question of the propriety of the court's refusal to permit post-dismissal amendments in this case. Cf. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962).

Before a court may dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), it must appear "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Neither "notice pleading" requirements (Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)) nor the standards which govern dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. Pretrial procedures such as summary judgment (Fed.R.Civ.P. 56) and the motion for a more definite statement (Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e)) are the appropriate devices to narrow the issues and disclose the boundaries of the claim and defense.

In Stefanski v. Mainway Budget Plan, Inc. 456 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1972), this court applied the liberal Conley test to a complaint seeking damages under Truth-in-Lending. Plaintiff in that case merely alleged that one of the two defendants named in her complaint arranged for the extension of credit, while the other defendant financed the sale. Citing the Truth-in-Lending Act, plaintiff requested damages for failure to make the required disclosures for a "credit sale." The district court characterized the transaction set...