Williams v. United States

• Decision Date: 30 January 2017
• Docket Number: CRIMINAL NO. 13-00213-KD-B-1,CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-0233-KD-B
• Parties: RAYMOND DONOVAN WILLIAMS, #13371-003, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

RAYMOND DONOVAN WILLIAMS, #13371-003, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

CRIMINAL NO. 13-00213-KD-B-1

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-0233-KD-B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

January 30, 2017

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 93), Petitioner's Motion to Amend and Add a Supplement (Doc. 95), Petitioner's Motion to Supplement (Doc. 96), the Government's Response in Opposition (Doc. 102), Petitioner's Reply to the Government's Response (Doc. 104), and Petitioner's Amended and Supplemental Memorandum in Support (Doc. 108). Having carefully reviewed the record, the undersigned finds that no evidentiary hearing is necessary for the disposition of this matter. ¹ Upon consideration, Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is DENIED, this action is DISMISSED, and judgment shall be entered in favor ofRespondent, the United States of America, and against Petitioner, Raymond Donovan Williams. Should Williams file a certificate of appealability, it should be denied as he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Raymond Donovan Williams was indicted on August 23, 2013 on one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(B). (Doc. 30). This indictment came after the arrest of Williams and a co-defendant at a truck stop, where they were involved in the transport and protection of a cocaine load. (Doc. 102 at 2). This arrest was made possible due to the cooperation of a cooperating witness (CW), who assisted law enforcement in a sting operation after his own arrest. (Id. at 1).

The CW told investigators that Williams and his co-defendant, a police officer from Prichard, had previously transported cocaine for him. (Id. at 2). Police recorded conversations between Williams and CW in which Williams agreed to pick up five kilograms of cocaine at a truck stop in Grand Bay for $15,000.00². (Id.) When Williams and the co-defendant arrived to pick up the cocaine as planned, both were arrested.(Id.; see also Doc. 30).

After a one-day trial, a jury found Williams guilty of conspiracy and possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). (Doc. 60). Williams was sentenced to a term of eighty-four (84) months imprisonment. (Doc. 75). Williams timely appealed his judgment. (Docs. 71, 73). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed his conviction in September 2014, holding that "there was more than sufficient evidence to infer that a drug trafficking conspiracy... existed." (Doc. 90 at 4).

Williams subsequently filed his § 2255 motion on April 28, 2015³. (Doc. 93). On May 8, 2015, the Court ordered Williams to sign the motion and re-file. (Doc. 94). Williams subsequently filed a Motion to Amend and add a Supplement on May 3, 2015⁴ and a Motion to Supplement on May 15, 2015. (Docs. 95, 96). The court granted these motions on June 1, 2015. (Docs. 97, 98). The Government filed a Response in Opposition on August 11, 2015. (Doc. 102). Williams replied to the Government's response on August 27, 2015. (Doc. 104). Williams filed an Amended and Supplemental Memorandum in Support on December 8, 2016. (Doc. 108).

II. HABEAS STANDARD

The limited scope of habeas relief is well established, as this Court has recognized:

Collateral relief is an extraordinary remedy which "may not do service for a [] [direct] appeal." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982); seealsoLynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Courts have long and consistently affirmed that a collateral challenge, such as a § 2255 motion, may not be a surrogate for a direct appeal."). A defendant who has waived or exhausted his right to appeal is presumed to stand "fairly and finally convicted." Frady, 456 U.S. at 164. Unless a claim alleges a lack of jurisdiction or constitutional error, the scope of collateral attack has remained extremely limited. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979). Consequently, "[i]f issues are raised and considered on direct appeal, a defendant is thereafter precluded from urging the same issues in a later collateral attack . . . A defendant is, of course, entitled to a hearing of his claims, but not to duplicate hearings. The appellate process does not permit reruns." Moore v. United States, 598 F.2d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 1979).

United States v. Evans, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59836, *8-9 (S.D. Ala. August 4, 2008) (quotation marks in original).

III. DISCUSSION

Williams raises many individual claims in the instant petition. The majority of these claims are brought under a principle claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Claims against his trial counsel can be found in his Motion to Vacate (Doc. 93), Motion to Amend (Doc. 95), Motion to Supplement (Doc. 96), Reply to the Government's Response (Doc. 104), and Amendedand Supplemental Memorandum in Support (Doc. 108). Additionally, he makes several claims that do not seem to be related to the conduct of his counsel, focusing instead on prosecutorial and judicial misconduct. Some of Williams' claims are subject to a procedural bar, as they were raised before the Eleventh Circuit in a direct appeal. Several of the claims fail for vagueness, as Williams did not specify the details of the offensive conduct or point to said conduct in the record. The rest fail on their merits.⁵

A. Procedural Bar

It is well-settled that a prisoner is procedurally barred from raising arguments in a motion to vacate that have already been raised and rejected on direct appeal. Stoufflet v. United States, 757 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014). Williams raised two issues on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit - that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence offered to establish that he conspired with another person to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his past possession of cocaine. (Doc. 90 at 1-2). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on bothissues. (Id. at 2). Therefore, to the extent that the claims in the instant petition relate to these issues, they are procedurally barred.

1. Counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the Government on a lack of evidence in the alleged conspiracy

Williams claims that counsel was ineffective because he "failed to challenge the government on the lack of evidence in the alleged conspiracy other than CW's allegations." (Doc. 93-1 at 4). This issue was raised on direct appeal. The Eleventh Circuit held:

"As the record shows, there was more than sufficient evidence to infer that a drug trafficking conspiracy between Williams, Edmond Kennies Burke, and [CW] existed - notably, before the August 2013 recorded conversations, when [CW]began acting as a government agent. To begin with there was testimony that [CW] repeatedly told investigators about their previous cocaine dealings. The recordings also revealed a pre-existing criminal relationship between Williams and[CW]. Additionally, given the evidence of Williams's extensive gambling activity over a period of months preceding the undercover operation, without legitimate income to sustain the activity, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Williams funded his gambling through the fees he earned delivering drugs with [CW]prior to August 2013. On this record, accepting all inferences in the government's favor, a reasonable jury could conclude that [CW] and Williams were participating in a conspiracy that pre-dated [CW's] becoming a government agent.

A jury also could have reasonably concluded that Burke and Williams were participating in a conspiracy, despite Burke's lack of knowledge of the other member of the conspiracy.... Moreover, the statements Williams and Burke made during thedelivery support the inference that Burke knew a drug transaction was about to occur. Thus, we conclude a reasonable jury could have found Burke to be a knowing participant in the conspiracy."

(Doc. 90 at 4). It is clear the Eleventh Circuit has already done a thorough analysis of this issue, and this claim should therefore be considered procedurally barred. See Stoufflet, 757 F.3d at 1242. To the extent that Williams argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the Government on this issue, it is clear that any such argument would be futile.

2. Counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 404(b) evidence presented at trial

Williams claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Motion to Suppress with regard to "404(b) evidence" of his prior cocaine charge. (Docs. 93-1 at 4; 108 at 22-26). The claims regarding Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) were raised on direct appeal. (Doc. 90). The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of the prior possession of cocaine:

"Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Williams's prior possession of crack cocaine. For starters, since Williams pleaded not guilty, raising a lack of knowledge or wrongful intent defense, he placed his intent at issue, thereby imposing a substantial burden on the government to prove his knowledge of the cocaine and his intent to participate in the drug conspiracy. In addition, the evidence from both Williams's sister and the officer who found the cocaine and money among Williams's belongings was sufficient to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams possessed the cocaine. Further, the prejudicial effect of theevidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value, given the government's need for evidence of

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