Williams v. United States
Decision Date | 25 June 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 18406.,18406. |
Citation | 119 US App. DC 190,338 F.2d 530 |
Parties | Ronald WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Donald L. Morgan, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. John K. Mallory, Jr., Washington, D. C. (both appointed by this court), was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Daniel J. McTague, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker and Robert X. Perry, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before WILBUR K. MILLER, WRIGHT and McGOWAN, Circuit Judges.
Appellant was convicted of robbery. 22 D.C.Code § 2901 (1961). He asks reversal of his conviction on two grounds: (1) admission by the trial court of hearsay evidence from a policeman, and (2) disclosure in open court of the division of the jury during deliberation, followed by a coercive supplemental instruction to the jury. We reverse on the latter ground.
The Government's evidence showed that a wallet was picked from the pocket of a man on a crowded bus. A policeman was allowed to testify that a woman had told him she had seen the appellant with a wallet in his hand immediately after the victim's pocket was picked. The woman was also a Government witness, and in her testimony she affirmed the officer's hearsay. Pursuant to our prior opinions, we find no prejudicial error. Copes v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. ___, ___ F.2d ____, ____ (No. 18,131, decided May 21, 1964), slip opinion p. 6; Baber v. United States, 116 U.S. App.D.C. 358, 324 F.2d 390 (1963); Harrod v. United States, 58 App.D.C. 254, 29 F.2d 454 (1928). See also 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1130. For cases on both sides of this issue, see Annot., Extrajudicial Identification, 71 A.L.R.2d 449 (1960); see particularly id. at p. 485 n. 13 for collection of cases holding contra.
It should be noted, however, that the danger of prejudice from hearsay testimony has not disappeared simply because some courts and text writers have found it admissible under some circumstances. In the ascertainment of truth, cross-examination remains the chosen instrument of the common law, and hearsay, particularly in support of, or partial replacement of, another witness' testimony, tends to undermine its effectiveness. In spite of the storied resourcefulness of trial lawyers, none has yet demonstrated an acceptable means for cross-examining hearsay.
The jury here, after five hours of deliberation, was unable to agree. Its foreman asked the trial judge two questions: "If the defendant is involved beyond a reasonable doubt, he is guilty?" and "Can the two alternate jurors replace the minority voters?" The trial judge answered these questions in open court and then gave the jury his version of the so-called Allen1 charge. Shortly thereafter the jury returned to the courtroom with a verdict of guilty.
The jury's effort to replace its dissenting members made it unmistakably clear to the court, and to the public generally insofar as it was represented in the courtroom, that two jurors were hanging the jury. The pressure on this minority was further increased by the following colloquy between the court and the jury foreman:
Then, so that the "clear minority" would understand their duty as jurors, and over the objection2 of defense counsel, the following supplemental charge was addressed to them along with the rest of the jurors:
A long time ago, in Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 307-308, 25 S.Ct. 243, 250, 49 L.Ed. 482 (1905), with reference to the practice of inquiring into the division of the jury, the Supreme Court commented as follows:
* * *"
Some time later, in Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926), the jury having failed to agree after some hours of deliberation and the trial court having inquired how it was divided, the Supreme Court said:
It is true that in Brasfield the trial court asked, and was advised, how the jury was divided numerically. Here the jury's question disclosed the numerical division and, under the circumstances, the trial court's repeated reference to the "clear minority" on the jury was at least as coercive as the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Lowenfield v. Phelps
...628 F.2d 1044, 1048, n. 2 (CA8 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126, 101 S.Ct. 944, 67 L.Ed.2d 112 (1981); Williams v. United States, 119 U.S. App. D.C. 190, 193, 338 F.2d 530, 533 (1964). These courts have noted that when a jury poll is followed by an Allen charge, "the impression is inheren......
-
United States v. Sawyers
...States v. Meyers, 410 F.2d 693 (2nd Cir. 1969); United States v. Rao, 394 F.2d 354 (2nd Cir. 1968). 13 Accord, Williams v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 190, 338 F.2d 530 (1964). 14 Justice Udall, in his dissenting opinion in State v. Voeckell, 69 Ariz. 145, 210 P.2d 972, 980 (1949), esta......
-
U.S. v. McPartlin
...a conspiracy. If there had been any error in the instruction it would have been harmless. Fed.R.Evid. 103(a); Williams v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 190, 338 F.2d 530 (1964). Bull disagrees that there was independent evidence linking him to the conspiracy and asserts that the co-conspi......
-
U.S. v. Diggs
...held that there had been no double jeopardy since the mistrial properly had been granted. Floyd also points to Williams v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 190, 338 F.2d 530 (1964). There, the majority not only had reported disagreement but actually went on to ask the trial judge to replace ......