Williams v. United States, 1:05-cr-00443-3
| Decision Date | 22 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:05-cr-00443-3,1:05-cr-00443-3 |
| Parties | TERRANCE WILLIAMS, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Kane)
Presently before the Court is an amended motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed by Petitioner Terrance Williams on September 22, 2014. (Doc. No. 2218.) For the reasons provided herein, the Court will deny Petitioner's Section 2255 motion.
On October 12, 2007, Petitioner Terrance Williams was convicted by a jury on the following counts: (1) conspiracy to: (a) transport women for prostitution purposes (18 U.S.C. § 2421), (b) coerce and entice (18 U.S.C. § 2422), and (c) engage in interstate travel in aid of racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1952), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1); (2) interstate travel in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Count 2); (3) sex trafficking of children in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (Count 8); and (4) transportation of minors for prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (Count 10). (Doc. No. 1131.) On December 8, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced by this Court to a 540-month term of imprisonment, a fine of $2000, special assessments totaling $400, and a lifetime term of supervised release. (Doc. No. 1681.) The aggregate sentence of imprisonment consisted of a term of 60 months for Count One, 60 months for Count 2, 540 months for Count Eight, and 360 months for Count Ten, to be served concurrently. (Id.)
Through his trial counsel Timothy J. O'Connell, Petitioner timely appealed his conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. (Doc. No. 1713.) On May 23, 2011, the Third Circuit issued a certified judgment affirming Petitioner's conviction on all counts, but remanded his case for resentencing on Count Eight of the indictment and vacated his sentence on Counts Two and Ten of the indictment. (Doc. No. 1986.) Shortly thereafter, the Third Circuit recalled its certified judgment as premature due to its discovery that Petitioner had timely requested a rehearing of his appeal on June 15, 2011. (Doc. No. 1996.) On November 27, 2012, the Third Circuit reissued its earlier certified judgment affirming Petitioner's conviction on all counts, vacating his sentence on Counts Two and Ten of the indictment, and remanding his case for resentencing on Count Eight of the indictment.1 (Doc. No. 2055.)
Adhering to the Third Circuit's mandate, the Court resentenced Petitioner on April 12, 2013, to a concurrent sentence of 480 months' imprisonment on Counts One and Eight. (Doc. No. 2116.) Petitioner did not appeal his resentence. Rather, on March 27, 2014, he filed a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 2144.) Upon receipt of Petitioner's Section 2255 motion, the Court issued Petitioner a notice of election form that Petitioner completed and submitted on September 19, 2014. (Doc. No. 2166.) Together with his completed notice of election form, Petitioner filed a motion to amend his Section 2255 motion and attached a proposed amended Section 2255 petition. (Doc. No. 2167.) On September 22, 2014, the Court withdrew the March 27, 2014 Section 2255 motion at the request of the Petitioner and granted his motion to amend, refiling the proposed amended Section 2255 petition as a separate docket entry. (Doc. Nos. 2169, 2218.)
The Government filed its brief in opposition to Petitioner's Section 2255 motion on October 14, 2014.2 (Doc. No. 2178.) On November 20, 2014, Petitioner filed a reply brief. (Doc. No. 2181.) On March 6, 2015, Petitioner supplemented his reply by filing a "Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts." (Doc. No. 2196.) On June 30, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion to expedite the disposition of his Section 2255 motion. (Doc. No. 2214.) Having been fully briefed, Petitioner's Section 2255 motion is ripe for disposition.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), a federal prisoner may file a motion requesting that the sentencing court vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on the basis "that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). However, Section 2255 does not afford a remedy for all errors that may have been made at trial or during sentencing. United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 977 n.25 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979)). Rather, Section 2255 is implicated only when the alleged error raises "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 185. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a petitioner has one year from the time his conviction becomes final to file a Section 2255 motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
Further, Section 2255(b) advises that a prisoner may be entitled to a hearing on his motion. The decision to hold a hearing is wholly within the discretion of the district court.Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989). When the record affirmatively indicates that a petitioner's claim for relief is without merit, the claim may be decided on the record without a hearing. See Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1075 (3d Cir. 1985). If the record conclusively negates the factual predicates asserted in support of a Section 2255 motion, or, if the movant would not be entitled to relief as a matter of law even if the factual predicates as alleged in the motion are true, the trial court may elect not to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Nicholas, 759 F.2d at 1075.
Petitioner has presented the Court with a 52-page Section 2255 motion that advances twelve (12) grounds for relief. (Doc. No. 2218.) Several of these grounds for relief contain sub-issues that detail a litany of alleged errors at trial and during resentencing that Petitioner insists individually or collectively entitle him to reversal of his conviction. In an effort to accord Petitioner a liberal construction of his Section 2255 motion and to facilitate the review of Petitioner's claims, the Court categorizes Petitioner's challenges into: (1) claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, Timothy J. O'Connell; (2) claims of ineffective assistance of counsel appointed to represent Petitioner at resentencing, Jeffrey Conrad; and (3) a claim of actual innocence. The Court addresses each of these grounds for relief herein, grouping specific alleged instances of misconduct within these broader categories where appropriate.
Principally, Petitioner argues that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel were violated by his court-appointed defense attorney at trial, Timothy J.O'Connell ("Attorney O'Connell"), and his court-appointed counsel at resentencing, Jeffrey Conrad ("Attorney Conrad").3
A Section 2255 challenge to a conviction or sentence based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is evaluated under the two-pronged test articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the seminal case of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). George v. Sively, 254 F.3d 438, 443 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (). Under the two-prong Strickland test, a petitioner challenging his conviction on a theory that he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel bears the burden of demonstrating both (1) deficient performance by counsel and (2) prejudice resulting from that deficient performance. 466 U.S. at 687.
Under the first Strickland prong, counsel's performance is measured against an objective standard of reasonableness, defined by prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687. Counsel's representation will be found deficient only upon a showing that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 688. Judicial scrutiny of an attorney's performance under this prong is highly deferential. Id. at 689. The court must embrace a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls within the widerange of reasonable professional assistance. Id. In evaluating whether the petitioner has established deficient performance, the reviewing court must endeavor to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id.
Under the second Strickland prong, a petitioner "must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's errors." Id. Specifically, the petitioner's burden is to show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. "Reasonable probability" is defined as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
As both Strickland prongs must be satisfied to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of counsel claim, a court's finding that a petitioner failed to make the requisite showing on one prong negates the need for the court to consider the other prong. Id. at 697 (). Applying the two-prong Strickland standard, the Court turns to Petitioner's particular claims.
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