Williams v. United States
Decision Date | 29 January 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 13119.,13119. |
Citation | 263 F.2d 487,105 US App. DC 41 |
Parties | Harry C. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Walter W. Woodside, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this Court) filed a brief on behalf of appellant and his case was treated as submitted thereon.
Mr. Harry T. Alexander, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., and Carl W. Belcher, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. Lewis Carroll, Asst. U. S. Atty., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before BAZELON, FAHY and DANAHER, Circuit Judges.
Because of the use of evidence obtained by an unlawful search we must again reverse a conviction, this time of housebreaking and larceny, which otherwise might be sustained. We restate the basic principles. The Fourth Amendment prohibits an unreasonable search.1 A search is unreasonable unless authorized by a valid search warrant, is incident to a valid arrest, or is made in other exceptional circumstances which dispense with the need for a search warrant. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436. And see Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503, and Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514. A search, either with or without a warrant, is also unreasonable when made merely for evidentiary material which "was not the instrument or means by which the crime was committed, the fruits of a crime, a weapon by which escape might be effected, or property the possession of which is a crime." Morrison v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C., ___, 262 F.2d 449. Evidence obtained by an unreasonable search may be, and when adequately objected to must be, excluded on the trial of the person whose right of privacy has been violated. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319; United States v. Jeffers, supra.
In the case before us none of the conditions for a reasonable search existed. There was no search warrant and no arrest. No exceptional circumstances are advanced to justify a search without a warrant. Moreover, the search was for evidentiary material within the meaning of Morrison v. United States, supra.
The evidence was that of a police officer obtained by his search of a clothes closet in an apartment. The apartment was described by the officer himself as appellant's home.2 A written motion to suppress was filed shortly prior to trial. On argument of the motion it developed that the officer was "admitted to the home" and would testify that he observed a coat from which there was missing a button which the prosecution claimed had been recovered at the scene of the crime.
The court refused to suppress the evidence, apparently on the ground that it was obtained visually and not physically seized.3 We are cited to no decision holding, and we can think of no reason why, such evidence is not subject to the rule excluding evidence obtained by an unlawful search. The purpose of the rule, see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455, 456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153, covers this case as though the coat itself with the missing button had been illegally seized and offered in evidence.
McGinnis v. United States, 1 Cir., 227 F.2d 598, 603. And see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra, 251 U.S. at pages 391-392, 40 S.Ct. at page 182.
The Government suggests on the appeal that the motion to suppress was properly denied because there was no dispute the officer was admitted to the apartment. Admittance to the apartment, however, did not carry with it consent to a search therein. The facts developed at the trial plainly fail to show such consent and it is not to be presumed. The officer testified that appellant's sister answered his knock at the door and admitted him when he stated, "May I come inside and talk to you * * * I don't want to discuss my business out in the hallway, let's go inside where its private." This "admittance" simply is not in fact or in law a consent to a search of the apartment.
The question arises whether after this admittance of the officer the sister went further and gave him permission to search the clothes closet. We need not resolve the question whether she had authority to permit a search of the closet where appellant kept his clothes, see, e. g., Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 S.Ct. 266, 65 L.Ed. 654, United States v. Blok, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 188 F.2d 1019, for the testimony fails to show permission to do so. Indeed, the officer did not say he was given permission to search the closet. On his direct examination he testified:
On his cross-examination the following occurred:
When the sister testified the following occurred:
Not only was it error to cut off counsel's efforts to develop the circumstances attending the search, but the evidence shows no such consent to any search in the apartment as meets the test laid down by this court in Judd v. United States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 66, 190 F.2d 649, 651, where it is said:
Nor will it do to say that the use on the trial of the illegally procured evidence must be overlooked because not the subject of an adequate objection. As we have seen, there was a formal motion to suppress the evidence. This motion was entertained by the court prior to trial in accordance with Rule 41(e) Fed.R.Crim.P., 18 U.S.C.A. Though the facts were not then developed as fully as desirable this must be attributed largely to the position taken by the prosecution, and adopted by the court, that the motion should be denied because no physical evidence was obtained by the search. Since this position was erroneous, and since the admittance of the officer to the apartment to continue his conversation with the sister did not constitute consent by her to a search, the motion was erroneously denied. Subsequent developments at the trial, as we have already seen, did not serve to cure the error. Moreover, when the prosecution at the trial first opened the matter of the search the following occurred:
Even if objections were not precisely and unambiguously made, they were sufficiently made. Indeed, since plain errors affecting substantial rights are involved, we should pass upon the issues even in the absence of any objection. Rule 52(b) Fed.R.Crim.P.
It is urged, finally, that the evidence had slight if any effect. This indicates no more than a conviction might well have been obtained by the use only of legal evidence. It does not follow that when evidence procured by the violation of a constitutional right is used the resulting conviction can be affirmed. To so hold would destroy the well settled rule under which such evidence is excluded in aid of the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145; Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 77 S.Ct. 828, 1 L.Ed.2d 876; Bynum v. United States, 104 U.S. App.D.C. ___, 262 F.2d 465.
Reversed and remanded.
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