Williams v. United States
| Decision Date | 06 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:16-cv-416-J-32MCR,Case No.: 3:10-cr-199-J-32MCR |
| Parties | DENNIS GRAY WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This case is before the Court on Petitioner Dennis Gray Williams's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. 1, § 2255 Motion)1 and Supporting Memorandum (Civ. Doc. 2, Memorandum), as well as Petitioner's Supplement to the § 2255 Motion (Civ. Doc. 8-1, Supplement) and his Second Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Pleading (Civ. Doc. 17, Second Motion for Leave to Supplement). The United States has responded to each. (Civ. Doc. 5, Response to § 2255 Motion; Civ. Doc. 13, Response to Supplement; Civ. Doc. 18, Response to Second Motion for Leave to Supplement). Petitioner has filed two reply briefs as well. (Civ. Doc. 7, Reply Concerning § 2255 Motion; Civ. Doc. 16, Reply Concerning Supplement). Thus, the matter is ripe for a decision.
Under Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, the Court has determined that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary to decide the petition. See Rosin v. United States, 786 F.3d 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2015) (). For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner's request for § 2255 relief is due to be denied.
On September 15, 2010, a grand jury returned a seven-count superseding indictment against Petitioner. (Crim. Doc. 19, Superseding Indictment). Counts One through Five charged Petitioner with passing false and fictitious documents (i.e., counterfeit checks) with intent to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 514. (Crim. Doc. 19 at 1-2). Count Six charged Petitioner with unauthorized use of an access device, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(5), 1029(c)(1)(B), and 2. (Id. at 2-3). Count Seven charged Petitioner with failing to appear for a revocation of supervised release hearing, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(a)(1) and 3146(b)(1)(A)(ii). (Id. at 4).2Petitioner pled not guilty to the charges and proceeded to trial. (See Crim. Doc. 23, Minute Entry for Arraignment).
Petitioner waived the right to a jury trial and requested that the Court make specific findings of fact. (Crim. Doc. 75). Thus, the Court conducted a bench trial on April 18 and 19, 2011. (See Crim. Docs. 74, 76). Afterward, the Court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which the Court found Petitioner guilty of all seven charges beyond a reasonable doubt. (Crim. Doc. 94, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).3 The Court incorporates the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by reference.
With respect to Counts One through Five, the Court found that on four occasions, Petitioner passed counterfeit checks that used the bank account number of Laurie and Mark Gelman (whose account was held at CNL Bank), and on a fifth occasion he passed a counterfeit check using the bank account number of the Florida Heathy Kids Corporation (whose account was held at SunTrust Bank). (See Crim. Doc. 94 at 3-4) (footnotes omitted). Petitioner manufactured each of the checks by using blank check stock and check-writing software. (See id. at 3 n.3; see also Crim. Doc. 80 at 156-57; Gov't Exs. 54-59). Petitioner (Crim. Doc. 94 at 5) (footnoteomitted). Rather, Petitioner's sole argument with respect to Counts One through Five was that his fraudulent conduct did not violate § 514 as a matter of law because the counterfeit checks were not "false or fictitious documents" within the meaning of § 514. (Id.); (see also Crim. Doc. 91 at 3). The Court rejected that argument, finding that wholly fake checks like the ones Petitioner manufactured and used - although resembling actual securities - fell within the meaning of "false or fictious documents" for purposes of § 514. (Crim. Doc. 94 at 10-11).
With respect to Count Six, the Court found that Petitioner used the Gelmans' bank account number and CNL Bank's routing number to make payments over the internet for such things as a Wal-Mart credit card, a cell phone bill, and a rented storage unit, and that the transactions totaled more than $11,000 over a 12-month period. (Id. at 12). Petitioner did not dispute that he "effect[ed] or cause[d] to be effected transactions from which he obtained money or property worth more than $1,000 in a 12-month period, that he did not act with the intent to defraud, or that his conduct did not affect interstate commerce." (Id. at 13). Rather, Petitioner's sole argument was that his conduct did not violate § 1029(a)(5) as a matter of law because the fraudulently-used bank account number was not an "access device" as that term is used in the statute. (Id.); (see also Crim. Doc. 91 at 4). The Court rejected this argument as well because § 1029(e)'s definition of the term "access device" includes account numbers and because the fraudulent transactions originated electronically. (Crim. Doc. 94 at 14-15).
Finally, with respect to Count Seven, the Court found that Petitioner was released on bail when he knowingly failed to appear before a judge for a revocation hearing. (Id. at 17-19). As the Court observed, "[t]he evidence at trial proved that the defendant, subsequent to an initial appearance for violating his supervised release, purposefully engaged in a course of conduct designed to prevent him from receiving notice of the final revocation hearing, including absconding to Tennessee in further violation of his release conditions." (Id. at 18-19).4
The Court concluded that "[t]he Government ha[d] proven defendant Dennis Gray Williams guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all counts." (Id. at 22). As such, the Court adjudicated Petitioner guilty of the offenses charged in Counts One through Seven of the Superseding Indictment. (Id.). The case proceeded to sentencing, where the Court sentenced Petitioner to a total term of 240 months in prison. (Crim. Doc. 159, Sentencing Tr. Vol. II at 16); (Crim. Doc. 150, Judgment). The sentence consisted of concurrent terms of 228 months as to Counts One through Six and a consecutive term of 12 months as to Count Seven. (Crim. Doc. 159 at 15-16); (Crim. Doc. 150 at 2).
Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioner raised three arguments: (1) that the counterfeit checks were not "false or fictitious instruments" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 514; (2) that his use of theGelmans' bank account and routing numbers to effect online transactions did not qualify as the use of an "access device" because the account number could have been found on ordinary paper checks; and (3) that violating the terms of supervised release was "not a sufficient predicate offense to support his conviction for failure to appear under § 3146." United States v. Williams, 790 F.3d 1240, 1242 (11th Cir. 2015).
The Eleventh Circuit rejected each argument. Regarding Petitioner's first argument, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 514(a) "unambiguously applies to Williams's conduct" and that in the context of § 514, the words "false" and "fictitious" "make[ ] clear that the statute applies to the passing of wholly fake checks such as the ones at issue here." Williams, 790 F.3d at 1245-46 (citing Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. United States, 455 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 2006)). Second, the court held that Petitioner's use of the Gelmans' bank account number to make online payments qualified as the unauthorized use of an access device because (1) § 1029(e)'s definition of "access device" includes account numbers and (2) the fraudulent online transactions were entirely electronic, so they fell outside a narrow exception in § 1029(e) for "transfer[s] originat[ing] solely by paper instrument." Williams, 790 F.3d at 1250. Finally, regarding Petitioner's third argument, the government conceded that violating the terms of supervised release, on its own, is not a predicate offense that can support a conviction for failure-to-appear under 18 U.S.C. § 3146. Id. at 1251. However, the Eleventh Circuit held that the original convictions underlying the term of supervised release (i.e., Petitioner's prior convictions for credit card fraud and check fraud) were sufficient predicate offenses to support a conviction for failure-to-appear. Id. at 1251-52. As such, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentence. Id. at 1252.
Petitioner filed a pro se petition for rehearing en banc and panel rehearing, accompanied by a motion for leave to file a pro se petition for rehearing. United States v. Williams, No. 13-13042-DD (11th Cir.), ECF Entries of July 17, 2015; (see also Civ. Doc. 2-1, Motion for Leave to File Pro Se Petition for Rehearing). The Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing, United States v. Williams, No. 13-13042-DD (11th Cir.), ECF Entry of Aug. 25, 2015, and issued the mandate, id., ECF Entry of Sep. 2, 2015. Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court denied the writ. Williams v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 918 (2016).
Petitioner timely filed the § 2255 Motion and accompanying Memorandum, in which he raises four arguments. First, in Ground One(A), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed "to challenge [the] government's improper influencing of the grand jury." (Civ. Doc. 1 at 4; Civ. Doc. 2 at 9-16). Second, in Ground One(B), Petitioner claims that appellate counsel gave ineffective...
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