Williams v. United States
| Decision Date | 19 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:10-cr-13-MMH-MCR,Case No.: 3:14-cv-740-MMH-MCR |
| Parties | WALTER L. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This case is before the Court on Petitioner Walter L. Williams's pro se "Motion for Dismissal of Indictment with Prejudice Due to Grand Jury Irregularities," which the Court reconstrued as an Amended Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. 1; Amended § 2255 Motion) after having issued notification pursuant to Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003) (Crim. Docs. 90, 95).1 Williams also filed a Motion for Leave to Supplement, in which he asserts challenges to being sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). (Civ. Doc. 7-1 / Civ. Doc. 16; First Motion to Supplement). The United States has responded to both motions. (Civ. Doc. 6; Response). Williams then filed two reply briefs (Civ. Doc. 13; First Reply, Civ. Doc. 18; Second Reply), as well as a "Motion Seeking to DismissSuppression Hearing," which the Court construes as a second motion for leave to supplement (Civ. Doc. 17; Second Motion to Supplement).
The issues raised in this action have been briefed and are ripe for a decision. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings2, the Court has considered the need for an evidentiary hearing and determines that a hearing is not necessary to resolve the merits of this action. See Rosin v. United States, 786 F.3d 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2015) (); Patel v. United States, 252 F. App'x 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2007).3 For the reasons set forth below, Williams's request for § 2255 relief is due to be denied.
On January 14, 2010, a grand jury sitting in the Middle District of Florida returned a five-count indictment against Williams. (Crim. Doc. 1; Indictment). In Counts One through Three, the government charged Williams with distributing or possessing with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). In Count Four, the government charged Williams with possession ofcocaine with intent to distribute that substance, also in violation of §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). Lastly, in Count Five, the government charged Williams with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). Williams initially pled not guilty to the charges. (Crim. Doc. 13; Minute Entry of Arraignment).
Williams, through his first attorney (Susan Yazgi), moved to suppress evidence of a firearm, drugs, and other items that police obtained at the time of his arrest, allegedly in violation of Williams's rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. (Crim. Doc. 16; Motion to Suppress). A United States Magistrate Judge conducted an evidentiary hearing (Crim. Doc. 23; Suppression Hr'g Tr.), and afterward recommended that the Court deny the Motion to Suppress (Crim. Doc. 25; Report and Recommendation on Motion to Suppress). Williams objected to the Magistrate Judge's application of the law to the facts (Crim. Doc. 32; Amended Objections), but the Court overruled the objections, adopted the Report and Recommendation, and denied the Motion to Suppress (Crim. Doc. 48; Order Denying Motion to Suppress).
Two months later, now with new counsel (Noel Lawrence), Williams proceeded to a bench trial based on stipulated facts. (See Crim. Doc. 51; Minute Entry of Stipulated Bench Trial, Crim. Doc. 75; Bench Trial Tr.). Williams signed in open court a "Waiver of Right to Trial by Jury and Request for Specific Findings of Fact." (Crim. Doc. 52; Jury Trial Waiver). In advance of the hearing, Williams also signed a stipulation of facts, in which he admitted with respect to Counts One through Four that he knowingly distributed heroin and possessed heroin and cocaine with intent todistribute. (Crim. Doc. 53; Stipulation of Facts at 1-2). With respect to Count Five, Williams stipulated that he knowingly possessed a .45 caliber pistol after having been convicted of several felony offenses, including two prior convictions for the sale, manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver cocaine within 1,000 feet of a business, and one prior conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell. Id. at 3. Williams acknowledged that by agreeing to the Stipulation of Facts, he was "agreeing that the elements required to establish that he is factually guilty of the offenses of Counts One through Five of the Indictment pending before him are established." Id. at 4.
The Court reviewed each of the stipulated facts with Williams, and Williams acknowledged the government could prove each fact beyond a reasonable doubt if the case proceeded to trial. Bench Trial Tr. at 14-24. Williams also acknowledged that by stipulating to those facts, he was effectively stipulating to a finding of guilt as to each count. Id. at 24.4 Having determined that Williams's stipulation was knowledgeable and voluntary, id. at 9-14, 24-25, the Court accepted the stipulated facts and, after considering the elements of the respective offenses, adjudicated Williams guilty of the crimes charged in Counts One through Five, id. at 25-33.5
According to the final Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), Williams qualified to be sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) andU.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. PSR at ¶ 26.6 The Probation Office recommended the application of the ACCA enhancement based on two prior convictions for the sale, manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver cocaine within 1,000 feet of a business (the "2001 drug offenses"), and one prior conviction for the possession of cocaine with intent to sell (the "1996 drug offense"), each in the state of Florida. Id.; see also id. at ¶¶ 35, 38. In the PSR, the Probation Office calculated a total offense level of 31, consisting of a base offense level of 34 and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id. at ¶¶ 27-29. The Probation Office also recommended that Williams's Criminal History fell within Category VI, yielding an advisory sentencing range of 188 to 235 months in prison. Id. at ¶¶ 40, 56.
Williams objected to the application of the ACCA enhancement, arguing that the Court should not count the 2001 drug offenses as two separate ACCA predicates. (Crim. Doc. 57; Motion to Strike ACCA Enhancement), (Crim. Doc. 76; Sentencing Transcript at 4-8).7 Although Williams acknowledged that he committed the drug offenses two days apart in April 2001, he argued that both offenses were part of asingle criminal episode because both occurred during the same reverse sting operation. Sentencing Tr. at 6-7. Additionally, Williams argued that his 1996 drug offense should not count as an ACCA predicate because the state court withheld adjudication, although he admitted that United States v. Santiago, 601 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2010), foreclosed this argument. Sentencing Tr. at 18-20. The Court overruled both objections and sustained the application of the ACCA enhancement. Id. at 8, 21.8 The Court determined that the Probation Office correctly calculated Williams's advisory Sentencing Guidelines range at 188 to 235 months, based on a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of VI. Id. at 14. After hearing from the parties, the Court varied slightly below the Guidelines range and sentenced Williams to concurrent terms of 180 months in prison as to each of Counts One through Five, followed by a five-year term of supervised release. Id. at 25.
Williams appealed his convictions, "raising one issue: whether the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence the police found in a search of his vehicle following his arrest, to-wit: a Smith & Wesson .45 caliber pistol, heroin, and cocaine." United States v. Walter Williams, 476 F. App'x 373, 374 (11th Cir. 2012). As the search was conducted without a warrant, Williams "contend[ed] that none of the exceptions for warrantless searches applied." Id. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Williams's arguments and found that the denial of the Motion toSuppress was appropriate. Id. at 375. Thus, the court affirmed Williams's convictions and sentence.
Williams then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, but the Supreme Court denied the petition on October 1, 2012. Walter Williams v. United States, 568 U.S. 870 (2012). Less than a year later, Williams timely initiated the instant § 2255 proceedings.9
Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, a person in federal custody may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Section 2255 permits such collateral challenges on four specific grounds: (1) the imposed sentence was in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court did not have jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the imposed sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the imposed sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C §2255(a) (2008). Only jurisdictional claims, constitutional claims, and claims of error that are so fundamentally defective as to cause a complete miscarriage of justice will warrant relief through collateral attack. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184-86 (1979).
"Courts have long and consistently affirmed that a collateral challenge, such as a § 2255 motion, may not be a surrogate for a direct appeal." Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982)). "Under the...
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