Williams v. Vaughan, s. 43234

Decision Date10 November 1952
Docket NumberNos. 43234,43252,s. 43234
Citation253 S.W.2d 111,363 Mo. 639
PartiesWILLIAMS v. VAUGHAN. FIRST NAT. BANK OF CARROLLTON v. VAUGHAN.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Chas. L. Graham and Christian F. Stipp, Carrollton, for appellant.

John Franken, Carrollton, for respondent Williams.

D. D. Thomas, Jr., Carrollton, for respondent First Nat. Bank of Carrollton.

Daniel S. Millman, Kansas City, for First Nat. Bank of Kansas City, guardian and curator of the estate of Virginia Eleanor Flanagan, a person of unsound mind, amicus curiae.

TIPTON, Judge.

The Kansas City Court of Appeals reversed the judgments of the circuit court of Carroll County in the above entitled cases. The opinions of that court are reported at 248 S.W.2d 677 and 248 S.W.2d 685. This court ordered that they be transferred here for our review. For the purpose of argument and an opinion they were ordered consolidated.

Both cases grew out of the following facts:

Dr. Richard F. Cook, a resident of Carrollton, Missouri, was found to be a person of unsound mind by the probate court of Carroll County on October 18, 1948. Wade W. Maupin, an attorney of Carrollton, was duly appointed guardian of the person and estate of Dr. Cook on the same date. He qualified and filed an inventory of his ward's estate on December 6, 1948, which showed real estate of the value of $6,010 and personal property of the value of $3,848.07. The personal property consisted of $2,623.60 on deposit in the First National Bank of Carrollton, $4.47 found on the person of Dr. Cook, the remainder consisting of an automobile, household and office furniture and supplies, and 20 shares of Houston Oil Fields Co.

Prior to and at the time of the adjudication, Dr. Cook was in St. Luke's Hospital in Kansas City and his hospital, nursing and medical expenses alone exceeded $50 a day. A great number of bills had been incurred by Dr. Cook for his support, care and treatment prior to the date of the appointment of his guardian. Immediately after his appointment the guardian proceeded to pay the same. Due to Dr. Cook's illness the heavy expenses increased rapidly and the guardian became apprehensive about there being sufficient funds for his ward's care and maintenance, and on December 15, 1948, applied for and obtained an order of the probate court to sell the real estate. About this time Dr. Cook was transferred to the state hospital at Farmington, Missouri, where his care and maintenance would be less expensive. In the meantime, it was necessary for the guardian to obtain immediate funds to pay bills already incurred for the maintenance and care of his ward and on December 22, 1948, he orally applied to the probate court for and obtained an order authorizing him to borrow $1,500 to pay the bills accrued and for the future support and maintenance of his ward. The order to sell the real estate was never carried out because of Dr. Cook's death eleven days thereafter.

The guardian then went to Kansas City and wrote checks to pay his ward's hospital and nurses' bills and the ambulance bill for taking Dr. Cook to the state hospital at Farmington. He also paid a small mortgage on his ward's real estate. The guardian then went to the president of the First National Bank of Carrollton and executed a note signed by him as guardian of Dr. Cook, for $1,500, so that the checks he had written would be honored by the respondent bank.

On December 26, 1948, Dr. Cook died. Wade W. Maupin was appointed administrator of his estate on December 31, 1948. He made his final settlement as guardian on January 18, 1949, which was approved by the probate court. He was thereupon discharged as shown by his inventory and appraisement. He turned over to himself as administrator the balance of the unexpended funds of his ward which amounted to $68.39, and the property he inventoried as guardian.

The payment of the money borrowed from the First National Bank of Carollton is contested by the appellant, Jennie Vaughan, who is a sister of the deceased Dr. Cook and his only heir.

In the case of Williams v. Vaughan, No. 43,234, the facts in regard to Dr. Cook's being adjudged a person of unsound mind, the appointment of a guardian, et cetera, are the same as in the case of First National Bank of Carrollton v. Vaughan, No. 43,252.

Respondent Williams was a nephew of Dr. Cook's wife and spent a great deal of his time as a youth in the Cook home. Dr. Cook's wife died before he became insane. Apparently Dr. Cook was insane some time before he was adjudged so. Maupin wrote this respondent about Dr. Cook's condition and respondent sent Maupin $100 which was deposited to Dr. Cook's account in the bank. The evidence shows that this sum was used for Dr. Cook's support and maintenance after he was adjudged to be insane. Later respondent sent Maupin $400. He stated that the $100 and $400 were to be considered as an emergency advancement and loan, and that the same should be returned as soon as the property of the estate was converted into cash and made available for the use of the ward. As evidence of this agreement, the guardian executed a note in favor of respondent for $500.

The evidence in both of these cases clearly shows that all the money advanced or lent the guardian was used solely for the support and maintenance of his ward except a small amount that was used to pay a small note secured by a deed of trust on the real estate so that it might be sold to a better advantage.

Wade W. Maupin was appointed the guardian of the person of Dr. Cook and curator of his estate. As guardian it was his duty to take charge of his ward and to arrange for a suitable home, food, clothing and other necessaries, the reasonable value of which is a proper charge against the ward's estate. The curator is charged with the care and management of the ward's estate, subject to the superintending control of the probate court. It is his duty to collect the assets and to make proper investments thereof, and otherwise manage the estate. Whether the charge against the estate for necessaries furnished is reasonable is, under all circumstances, a question to be finally determined by the probate court. St. Vincent's Sanitarium v. Murphy, Mo.App., 209 S.W.2d 560.

In the case at bar, the hospital, nurses and medical care at Kansas City and the charges for ambulance transportation of Dr. Cook from Kansas City to Farmington were proper charges against his estate if, in the opinion of the probate court, these charges were reasonable. Since the final settlement of Maupin as guardian was approved by the probate court, these charges were reasonable. This question is not subject to collateral attack. 'Probate courts are courts of record, and their judgments and orders must be respected.' McKay v. Snider, 354 Mo. 674, 190 S.W.2d 886, loc. cit. 891. For the same reason, the propriety of paying the note secured by a deed of trust on the real estate is not subject to collateral attack.

We do not understand that the appellant contends that the above enumerated items are not proper charges against the estate but that her main contention is that the loans made by respondent First National Bank of Carrollton and respondent Williams are illegal because under the statute the only way for a guardian to borrow money is to mortgage the available real estate belonging to the ward. Chapter 458, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., does authorize a guardian to mortgage his ward's real estate under certain conditions. However, there is nothing in this chapter that prohibits a guardian from borrowing money needed for the ward's support and maintenance without giving a mortgage on the ward's real estate.

In the case of St. Vincent's Sanitarium v. Murphy, supra, 209 S.W.2d, loc. cit. 565, the St. Louis Court of Appeals said:

'Unless there is a statute to the contrary, the corpus of the personal estate may be intrenched upon to the extent that it may be necessary to the maintenance of the ward, without first obtaining permission from the court. Bliss v. Spencer, 125 Va. 36, 99 S.E. 593, 5 A.L.R. 619; Cross v. Rubey, Mo.App., 206 S.W. 413; Potter v. Berry, 56 N.J.L. 454, 28 A. 668; affirmed 57 N.J.L. 201, 33 A. 455; Lake v. Hope, 116 Va. 687, 82 S.E. 738; 25 Am.Jur., Guardian and Ward, Sec. 71, p. 47; 44 C.J. Insane Persons, Sec. 89, p. 238; See Annotations, 5 A.L.R. 632. We have no statute in this state requiring an order of court in such instances.'

For the purpose of these cases before us, we will assume that both loans in question were obtained without legal authority. However, the proceeds of these loans did pay lawful obligations owed by the estate of Dr. Cook, a person adjudged of unsound mind. As we have already pointed out, the money obtained from these two respondents was used to pay for hospital, nursing and medical care and ambulance transportation, and to pay a mortgage on real estate owned by Dr. Cook. This ward's estate was legally liable for these items and the persons who were paid these obligations had a lawful claim against his estate. The question before us is: Can these respondents be subrogated to the claims of the persons who received the money advanced or loaned by the respondents?

In the case of Berry v. Stigall, 253 Mo. 690, loc. cit. 696-697, 162 S.W. 126, 127, 50 L.R.A.,N.S., 489, Ann.Cas.1915C, 118, we said:

'That equity seeks to prevent the unearned enrichment of one at the expense of another is the motive for an important part of...

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8 cases
  • State ex rel. Emmons v. Hollenbeck
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    ...of death of the ward to the date of appointment of the administratrix [227 Mo.App. at 155, 50 S.W.2d at 675(2)]. In Williams v. Vaughan, 363 Mo. 639, 651, 253 S.W.2d 111, 116 (likewise not cited by counsel), our Supreme Court, en banc, said that, upon the ward's death, the 'guardian was wit......
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