Williams v. W. Travelers' Accident Ass'n
| Decision Date | 04 December 1914 |
| Docket Number | No. 17865.,17865. |
| Citation | 97 Neb. 352,149 N.W. 822 |
| Parties | WILLIAMS v. WESTERN TRAVELERS' ACCIDENT ASS'N. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court.
A mutual accident association could limit the time within which suit might be brought against it “on any claim based upon its policies or certificates of membership * * * to a period of less than one year from the time such right of action accrues,” under section 17, c. 53, Laws 1903. The defendant's by-laws provided that no right of action should accrue “within ninety days after the receipt of proof of loss at the office of the association.” Under the circumstances in this case, stated in the opinion, it became a question of fact for the jury to determine as to when the proofs of loss were received by the company.
In such case, when no special instruction or finding is requested as to when proof of loss should be considered as received by the association, and the evidence is substantially conflicting as to the receipt of such proofs at a time within one year before the commencement of the action, a general verdict for the plaintiff will not be set aside on the ground that the cause of action accrued more than one year before the commencement of the action.
Ordinarily one who receives and signs a written instrument is presumed to know and agree to its contents, and mere negligence or carelessness on his part will not relieve him of this responsibility. But one who knows that the party with whom he is dealing will probably be careless in examining papers presented for signature, and purposely attempts to induce such carelessness, and so obtains the signing of the papers, which would not be signed if fully understood, will not be allowed to urge the carelessness of such party who signs the papers without knowing the contents thereof.
The defendant's by-law provided that, for “death resulting from cerebral hemorrhage * * * or heart failure caused by accidental injuries,” the amount payable shall be limited to $500. Held, that the evidence, indicated in the opinion, is sufficient to support a general verdict, which includes the finding that death was not the result of either of those causes.
It is also considered that, under the circumstances in this case, the plaintiff could maintain this action without returning the amount advanced by defendant before suit was brought.
This case requires the application of the rule, so often announced, that the verdict of a jury upon substantially conflicting evidence will not be reversed as unsupported, unless, upon the whole record, it appears to be clearly wrong.
Appeal from District Court, Douglas County; Day, Judge.
Action by Lucy W. Williams against the Western Travelers' Accident Association. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Brome & Brome, of Omaha, for appellant.
Stewart, Williams & Brown, of Lincoln, and L. R. Slonecker, of Omaha, for appellee.
The defendant is a mutual accident insurance company, organized under the laws of this state. It issued its policy of insurance upon the life of one Dan N. Williams. Afterwards, in January, 1910, Williams died in the city of Portland, Or. This action was brought by his widow, Lucy E. Williams, in the district court for Douglas county, upon the certificate of membership. The plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment in the sum of $5,462.10. The defendant has appealed.
The defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict; that the action was barred by the contract of limitation, not having been begun within one year from the time of making of proof of death; that the claim was settled and adjusted by the defendant before the commencement of the action; that the trial court erred in giving certain instructions to the jury, and also erred in refusing to give an instruction requested by the defendant.
[1] 1. The certificate of membership was issued in July, 1902. At that time agreements in contracts as to the time in which actions might be brought were contrary to public policy and void. This had been declared in several decisions of this court. Miller v. State Ins. Co., 54 Neb. 121, 74 N. W. 416, 69 Am. St. Rep. 709. In the following year the Legislature enacted a statute regulating such companies, which provided:
“Any corporation, association or society organized or operating under this act may limit the time within which suit may be brought against it on any claim based upon its policies or certificates of membership, and after the expiration of the time thus limited shall not be liable thereon: Provided such limitation shall be incorporated in, and form a part of the contract between the company, association or society and the assured or its members: And provided further that such limitation shall not be limited to a period of less than one year from the time such right of action accrues.” Laws 1903, c. 53, § 17.
The act also provided that corporations, associations, or societies before that time incorporated and doing business in the state might avail themselves of the provisions of the act by filing a certificate with the auditor of state, with the following proviso:
“Provided this act shall not relieve any corporation, association or society now doing business in this state from the fulfillment of any contract heretofore entered into with its members under its policies or certificates of membership, nor shall any member be relieved thereby from his or her part of the contract.” Laws 1903, c. 53, § 3.
The defendant company availed itself of these provisions, and afterwards, in 1907, amended its by-laws by adding the following provision:
“And no legal proceedings for recovery under any certificate of membership shall be brought within ninety days after the receipt of proof of loss at the office of the association, nor at all, unless begun within one year from the time that right of action accrues, as above stated.”
It is contended that this amendment of the by-laws was unreasonable as to the insured and not binding upon his beneficiary, but, without deciding this question, we prefer to place our decision upon the construction of the by-law, as amended, and its application in this case.
This action was begun in July, 1911, about 18 months after the death of the insured. The by-law, as amended, provided that no action could be begun more than a year after the cause of action accrued. It also provides that no action should be begun “within ninety days after the receipt of proof of loss at the office of the association.” The controversy upon this point is as to the time when the proof of loss was received at the office of the association, within the meaning of this contract.
The defendant's by-laws provide that it should be the duty of the executive board to “decide on all proofs of accident and of death by accident.” It seems that the secretary was not empowered to decide those matters. The plaintiff claimed that the death of the insured was caused by an accidental fall while alighting from a street car, on the 25th day of December, 1909, and that he died on the 3d day of January, 1910. The company's by-laws required that written notice of the accident must be received at the office within 15 days from the date of the accident, and that proof of death should be filed in that office within 30 days from the date of death. On the 18th of January, 1910, the plaintiff sent the defendant a formal statement showing the death of the insured. This statement was upon a blank furnished by the company and was entitled “Claimant's Preliminary Statement,” and stated that it was “made for the purpose of giving information to the said association to obtain benefits therefrom under final proofs to be hereafter furnished by me.” Several affidavits were also submitted with the statement with a letter referring to the papers as “Claimant's Preliminary Statement,” and requesting the defendant to correspond concerning the matter with Lee Meyers, of Portland, Or., who was plaintiff's nephew. Upon receipt of this letter Mr. Butts, the defendant's secretary, wrote to Mr. Meyers, stating that he had received a letter...
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