Williams v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 14 April 1977
• Docket Number: No. 77,77
• Citation: 292 N.C. 416,233 S.E.2d 589
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Joseph D. WILLIAMS, II, minor by guardian ad litem, Joseph D. Williams v. WACHOVIA BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Executor of the Estate of John Waldrop Williams. Joseph D. WILLIAMS, Individually v. WACHOVIA BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Executor of the Estate of John Waldrop Williams.

Page 589

233 S.E.2d 589

292 N.C. 416

Joseph D. WILLIAMS, II, minor by guardian ad litem, Joseph D. Williams v. WACHOVIA BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Executor of the Estate of

John Waldrop Williams.

Joseph D. WILLIAMS, Individually v. WACHOVIA BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Executor of the Estate of

John Waldrop Williams.

No. 77.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 14, 1977.

James, Hite, Cavendish & Blount by Robert D. Rouse, III, Greenville, for plaintiff.

Gaylord, Singleton & McNally by Louis W. Gaylord, Jr., and Phillip R. Dixon, Greenville, for defendant.

BRANCH, Justice.

The initial question presented in this case is whether the family purpose doctrine is applicable to negligence actions arising from the operation of a motorcycle off the public highways.

The family purpose doctrine imposes liability upon the owner or person with ultimate control of a motor vehicle for its negligent operation by another when it is shown (1) that the operator was a member of his family or household and was living in his home, (2) that the vehicle was owned, provided and maintained for the general use, pleasure and convenience of his family, and (3) that the vehicle was being so used by a member of his family at the time of the accident with his express or implied consent. Lynn v. Clark, 252 N.C. 289, 113 S.E.2d 427; Watts v. Lefler, 190 N.C. 722, 130 S.E. 630. In this State the doctrine is a rule of law adopted by the Court as an extension of the principle of respondeat superior. Grindstaff v. Watts, 254 N.C. 568, 119 S.E.2d 784. Although the family purpose doctrine has been criticized as unduly straining this principle of law, our Court has long considered any shortcomings in legal reasoning to be outweighed by the doctrine's value as an instrument of social policy. In Grindstaff v. Watts, supra, Justice Moore, speaking for the Court, explored the genesis of the doctrine:

The family purpose doctrine "came into being as an instrument of social policy to afford greater protection for the rapidly growing number of motorists in the United States." 38 N.C. Law Review 252-3. Perhaps nothing has had so great an impact on the business and social life of this country during the past half century as the advent and ever increasing use of automobiles and trucks. It was probably inevitable that there should be an alarming number of collisions and accidents resulting in injuries, suffering and economic loss. This possibly justified the search of the courts for some device to impose a greater degree of financial responsibility. . . .

Defendant contends that because David Williams was operating a motorcycle in his neighbor's front yard, and not on the public highway, the family purpose doctrine should not apply. It is argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the family purpose doctrine is "an anomaly in the law" which should be extended only by legislative action. In support of the argument that the doctrine should not be extended to apply to the operation of motorcycles off the public highways, defendant strongly relies upon the following statement from Grindstaff v. Watts, supra: "In the absence of legislative action, this Court is not disposed to extend the family purpose doctrine in North Carolina to instrumentalities other than motor vehicles operating on public highways." (Emphasis added.)

It was held in Grindstaff that the family purpose doctrine did not apply to negligence cases arising out of the operation of motorboats on the waters of this State. This holding, however, was shortly thereafter overruled by the enactment of G.S. 75A-10.1 which specifically makes the doctrine applicable to such cases. Further, we interpret the crucial language in Grindstaff to be descriptive of the nature of the vehicle to which the family purpose doctrine is applicable, and not restrictive of the use in which the vehicle must be engaged at the time of the accident. In other words, Grindstaff only limited the application of the family purpose doctrine to motor vehicles of a type which are commonly used upon the public highways, as opposed to those of a wholly different design, in that case motorboats. With this distinction in mind, we do not think the application of the family purpose doctrine to the facts of instant case runs counter to the rationale of the Grindstaff decision.

Unquestionably a motorcycle is a motor vehicle for purposes of the family purpose doctrine. It is a self-propelled vehicle designed and intended for operation upon the public highways. G.S. 20-4.01(27) includes motorcycles within the definition of "passenger vehicles" so as to make them subject to the motor vehicle registration and driver's licensing laws of G.S. 20-50 and G.S. 20-7. In Meinhardt v. Vaughn, 159 Tenn. 272, 17 S.W.2d 5, the Tennessee Supreme Court indicated that the reasoning which forms the basis for the application of the family purpose doctrine to automobile accidents applies with equal force to accidents involving motorcycles.

We do not believe that the fact that an injury occurs as a result of the operation of a motor vehicle on private property defeats the application of the family purpose doctrine. In many instances, as here, the youth of the operator requires that the operation of the motor vehicle be restricted to private property. The legislature has wisely determined that persons under 16 years of age lack the discretion and maturity to operate motor vehicles safely upon the public highways. This policy determination should heighten a parent's sense of responsibility and increase his duty of...