Williams v. Walsh
| Decision Date | 09 January 1912 |
| Docket Number | No. 79,79 |
| Citation | 32 S.Ct. 137,56 L.Ed. 253,222 U.S. 415 |
| Parties | J. H. WILLIAMS, Plff. in Err., v. J. E. WALSH, Sheriff and Ex-Officio Jailer of the County of Crawford, Kansas |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Charles Blood Smith and D. B. Holmes for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. John S. Dawson, Fred S. Jackson, S. N. Hawkes, and O. T. Boaz for defendant in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 416-418 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:
A statute of Kansas provides as follows:
'It shall be unlawful for any individual, firm, or corporation to sell, offer for sale, or deliver for use at any coal mine or mines in the state of Kansas, black powder in any manner except in original packages containing 12 1/2 pounds of powder, said package to be securely sealed; said powder to be delivered by the company to the miner at its powder house, not more than 300 feet from pit head, unless hereafter otherwise provided by contract; provided, however, this act shall not be construed as in any manner conflicting with any existing contract of sale of black powder.'
Plaintiff in error was convicted of violating the statute by selling and delivering to one John Thomas black powder which was not in an original package of 12 1/2 pounds, securely sealed, there being no existing contract to sell between the parties. He was condemned to pay a fine of $50 and the costs of the case, and stand committed to the county jail until he should pay the fine or be discharged by law.
In a petition to the supreme court of the state in habeas corpus to be discharged from custody, he alleged the illegality of his conviction, and that the statute was null and void because in conflict with the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the commerce clause, and also with the Constitution of the state of Kansas.
His contentions were not sustained, and he was remanded to custody. 79 Kan. 212, 98 Pac. 777.
Some of the contentions which were made in the state court are abandoned here. 'We admit,' counsel say, 'that the Kansas legislature had the right to determine that the local conditions in the state required that black powder should not be sold and delivered for use in any coal mines in the state except in packages containing exactly 12 1/2 pounds, no more nor less; that precisely that amount of powder was required to be sold to protect the miners that are employed in the coal mines of the state, and that the mere fact that courts or judges may differ as to the wisdom of such legislation would afford no ground for judicial interference, unless the question was in excess of legislative power.' It is, however, insisted that there is a limitation of the power of the state, and that the law in question transcends the power of the state in that (1) it denies to plaintiff in error and other citizens the equal protection of the laws, and (2) is in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.
We shall consider these objections in their order:
(1) The discriminatory effect of the statute comes, it is urged, from its 1st section, which directs that it shall not be construed to conflict with existing contracts. 'The act thus recognizes,' it is said, 'the fact at the time it took effect, May 27, 1907, of the existence of contracts' for the delivery of powder in other than the described packages. 'It is thus made unlawful,' it is said, 'for some persons to sell or buy black powder otherwise than in 12 1/2 pounds in original sealed packages, while others may lawfully do the same thing.'
We might, indeed, hesitate to assume, as counsel does, from the possibility of the existence of a fact, its actual existence, if by doing so we should have to regard a state law as unconstitutional, but as we do not think the result will follow, we shall assume the existence of the fact. The purpose of the statute is to provide for the safety of coal mining operations, and if it may be said that whatever danger can come from packages of powder will come from them regardless of the date of the contract under which they may be delivered, there are nevertheless other considerations to be taken into account. The statute is criminal. A retrospective operation of it was to be avoided, might, indeed, be illegal. At any rate, it was a matter properly to be considered by the legislature in distinguishing between contracts made before the passage of the law and those made after its passage. The former might not be numerous, their evil would be temporary; and certainly legislation which makes acts criminal which are done after they are forbidden, and assigns no penalties to acts done in pursuance of obligations legally incurred, is not arbitrary classification. It is not necessary to do more than repeat what we have said many times, that a classification which is not arbitrary is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. We may add that 'the 14th Amendment does not forbid statutes and statutory changes to have a beginning, and thus discriminate between the rights of an earlier and later time.' Sperry & H. Co. v. Rhodes, 22o U. S. 502, 505, 55 L. ed. 561, 562, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490.
(2) To make good the contention that the statute of Kansas offends the commerce clause of the Constitution, plaintiff in error refers to an amendment to his petition that the powder sold and delivered by him was inclosed in an original unbroken package, containing 25 pounds of powder, imported from the state of Missouri by the Central Coal & Coke Company, of which company he was the agent and representative in selling and delivering. And it is further alleged that black powder has been and is put up by manufacturers thereof, and sold and transported among the states in original packages containing 25 pounds.
It is, however, admitted that proof of such facts was not attempted to be made in the justice's court. The case was submitted in that court upon a stipulation that the powder, at the time of...
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