Williams v. Weber

• Decision Date: 09 November 1891
• Citation: 28 P. 21,1 Colo.App. 191
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. WEBER, Sheriff.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

28 P. 21

1 Colo.App. 191

WILLIAMS v. WEBER, Sheriff.

Court of Appeals of Colorado

November 9, 1891

Error to district court, Arapahoe county; O.B. LIDDELL, Judge. Affirmed.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus by William F. Williams, who is in the custody of A.H. Weber, sheriff, by virtue of a warrant charging him with selling mortgaged chattels without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee. Petition denied, and petitioner brings error.

J.W Lewis, for plaintiff in error.

S.W Jones, Atty. Gen., and H. Riddell, for defendant in error.

BISSELL J.

Williams the plaintiff in error, having been taken into custody by the sheriff under a warrant issued by a peace-officer, sued out a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release, because, as he claimed, the detention was illegal. A complaint charging him with obtaining money under false pretenses was filed before a justice of the peace in Arapahoe county in July, 1889. At that time Williams was in Kansas, where he went after the alleged offense was committed. Upon the complaint and warrant an application was made to the executive for a requisition on the governor of Kansas for the arrest and return of the alleged fugitive from justice. The requisition was honored and Williams was arrested, and brought back to Denver for trial. After a hearing he was discharged, but was immediately rearrested on another warrant, issued on a complaint which charged him with an offense under the chattel mortgage act. The crime, if any was committed by the sale of mortgaged chattels without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee. It is probably true that the defendant had committed but the one offense, and that the acts done would not constitute a crime, unless they were adjudged to be a violation of the act relating to the disposition of mortgaged property. According to the view taken of the case, this matter is of slight importance. The offense for which he was rearrested was undoubtedly radically and legally different from that on which he had been brought from the neighboring state. It was insisted on his behalf that, under the constitution and law, he could only be tried for the crime wherewith he was charged according to the tenor of his extradition, unless he was granted time and opportunity to return to the jurisdiction whence he had been brought by the original proceedings against him. No other question is presented by the record or discussed by counsel. The cause was transferred from the supreme court by its order based on the statute and the stipulation of parties. Since the case comes to us under such circumstances and in this condition, we cannot well escape deciding the matter. Every court which has passed on the question must have been impressed with the diversity of judicial opinion on this subject. As may be gathered from the decisions, the differences between the courts do not seem to have arisen from the complexity or the difficulty of the inquiry. A tender, and hardly commendable, solicitude for the personal rights and liberties of those accused of crime has led many courts to be astute in the erection of barriers to the successful prosecution of crime. On the other hand, there are many tribunals which have not failed to recognize the justice and exact logic of the principles established by the common-law courts of England, and have adhered closely to the decisions which they have rendered. On the question presented by this record those decisions are uniform and concurrent, and are approved by the current of judicial authority in this country. At the common law, an individual could be tried and convicted for any crime known to the jurisdiction in which he was arraigned, regardless of the means used to bring him within that jurisdiction or of the circumstances under which he was found therein. Unless there were other grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction could be successfully assailed, or the proceedings were in some way irregular, the only available plea was "not guilty." When the matter was first presented, these courts unhesitatingly held that the prisoner could not be heard to defend on the ground that by force, fraud, or covin he had been gotten within the jurisdiction where he was being tried. According to the right reason of the case, the judges said that was a matter which concerned only the authorities of the country whence he had been brought. If the law of the country of the arrest had been outraged and violated, the guilty parties could easily be proceeded against under treaty...