Williams v. Wilkinson, No. 97-CV-213.

• Decision Date: 20 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 97-CV-213.
• Citation: 132 F.Supp.2d 601
• Parties: Kenneth WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. Reginald WILKINSON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

132 F.Supp.2d 601

Kenneth WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. Reginald WILKINSON, et al., Defendants.

No. 97-CV-213.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

February 20, 2001.

William A. Nolan, Jill S. Kirila, Squire Sanders & Dempsey, Columbus, OH, for plaintiff.

J. Eric Holloway, Ohio Atty. Gen., Columbus, OH, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

MARBLEY, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiff, Kenneth Williams, an inmate at the Madison Correctional Institute, brought suit against Defendants Curtis Wingard and Pat Sharpe, alleging that his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when he was not permitted to bring witnesses before the Rules Infraction Board. On December 7, 2000, the jury returned a verdict on the Plaintiff's legal claims, awarding the Plaintiff $2,107.22 in damages. This matter is now before the Court on the Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Injunctive Relief and to Set Hearing to Set Terms of Injunction, filed on December 15, 2000. For the following reasons, the Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Plaintiff, Kenneth Williams, is an inmate at the Madison Correctional Institute ("MaCI"). On February 13, 1996, Mr. Williams was given a conduct report stating that he had tested positive for marijuana. The Plaintiff states that he did not provide the urine specimen; rather, another inmate, Allen Williams, provided it. The Plaintiff was not permitted to call Allen Williams or Ms. Sharpe, the Substance Abuse Coordinator at MaCI, to testify before the Rules Infraction Board ("RIB"). The RIB concluded, without allowing Allen Williams to testify, that he would not be a credible witness. The Plaintiff proceeded to his hearing without either Allen Williams's or Ms. Sharpe's testimony and was found guilty. On February 7, 1997, this suit was filed by Mr. Williams; on June 26, 2000, this Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel.

On November 6, 2000, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Rule as a Matter of Law that Defendant Wingard's Policy Violated the Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Rights. In that Motion, the Plaintiff requested that this Court issue an injunction against Defendant Wingard in his official capacity, forbidding him from continuing the unconstitutional policy of denying witnesses at RIB hearings based on a predetermination of the witnesses' credibility. The Court, on November 29, 2000, denied the Plaintiff's Motion and stated:

If, following trial, it is determined that injunctive relief is necessary, this Court will conduct an additional hearing to explore the requirements outlined by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), including: what would constitute "narrowly drawn" relief, what would be the "least intrusive means," and what would be the "adverse impact on public safety." If necessary, the Court will at that time have the Defendants "come forward with a plan for the implementation of a new prison policy regarding requests for witnesses." Whitlock v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 380, 389 (7th Cir.1998).

On December 7, 2000, the jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiff, and against Defendants Wingard and Sharpe, in the amount of $2,107.22. On December 15, 2000, the Plaintiff filed his Renewed Motion for Injunctive Relief and to Set Hearing to Set Terms of Injunction. On January 8, 2001, the Defendants filed their Response. This Court conducted a hearing on this matter on January 17, 2001.

III. ANALYSIS

The Plaintiff requests that the Court enter an injunction against Defendant Wingard in his official capacity and order the following measures:

(i) Implement a written policy that any MaCI inmate defending himself in a Rules Infraction Board hearing, including but not limited to a hearing arising out of an alleged positive drug test of the inmate, shall be entitled to have the witnesses he requests be present at said RIB hearing absent an overriding security or institutional concern, which overriding concern shall not include (a) either a determination of MaCI personnel prior to said hearing that any such witness would not be credible or (b) a determination that testimony about a drug test is unnecessary because of the existence of documentation showing a positive drug test.

(ii) A copy of the completed Jury Interrogatories dated December 7, 2000, and Judgment dated December 11, 2000, in this case shall be placed and permanently maintained in any file maintained at MaCI or by MaCI personnel making any reference to Mr. Williams's conviction of a Rule II, Class 7 at the RIB Hearing conducted March 19, 1996.

(iii) There shall be no retaliation against Mr. Williams arising out of or relating to this lawsuit.

A. MaCI's Policies Under the Due Process Clause

The Defendants first argue that no blanket policy exists at MaCI that bars the calling of witnesses at disciplinary hearings, and that their policies comply with Wolff and the requirements of the Procedural Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Court found that prisoners are guaranteed certain procedural protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the context of disciplinary proceedings, prisoners are granted the right to call witnesses unless doing so would cause a security concern. Id. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963.

In this case, the Defendants may be correct — that the written policies of MaCI comply with the mandates of Wolff — however, the Court finds that the unwritten policies of MaCI do not. The written policies of MaCI's Inmate Disciplinary Manual provide: "It is improper to deny a witness merely because the RIB feels the testimony would not be beneficial or credible. Such determinations can be made only after the witness has testified." The Court finds that this written policy complies with Wolff and the due process clause.

In contrast, the testimony provided by Lieutenant Fisher, Chairperson of the RIB at MaCI, illuminated MaCI's unwritten policy with respect to witnesses requested by an inmate to appear before the RIB. In her deposition, Lieutenant Fisher was asked: "Has it ever happened that an inmate asked to call a particular witness and you determine that the witness was not permitted because the testimony that the inmate expected from the witness would not be credible?" Lieutenant Fisher responded: "If I don't think that it would be credible, I can deny based upon what he has stated, but I would do that on my own terms, I wouldn't do it by calling the person that he's requesting to testify."

And, at trial, Lieutenant Fisher stated: "I will deny a witness if I do not have anything to back up that the witness' statement would be credible to the charges." When Lieutenant Fisher was asked: "If you believe a witness' testimony is not credible, then it will not be admitted; is that true?" To which, she responded: "That is correct, I can do that." The Court finds that this unwritten policy is in sharp contrast to MaCI's written policy. The unwritten policy allows the denial of a witness because the RIB "feels" he or she would not be credible. Warden Wingard's deposition testimony concerning the "right to call" witnesses further demonstrates that MaCI's unwritten policy violates the procedural due process clause. Defendant Wingard testified that the inmate has a right to "call" a witness which he defined as the right to "request" a witness. That request, according to Defendant Wingard, does not have to be granted. During trial, Warden Wingard elaborated as to what he believed an inmate's "procedural due process right to call witnesses" included:

Q: Your interpretation that — that this sentence, "An inmate has a procedural due process right to call witnesses," you interpreted that to mean he has the right to request witnesses; isn't that right?

A: Oh, absolutely.

Q: And that was the practice under you at Madison; right?

A: That an inmate had a right to call or request witnesses?

Q: Request witnesses?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And that the inmate has a right to call them but not to have them?

A: The inmate has a right to request them.

Q: And not to have them?

A: Correct.

(p. 128-29). The Court concludes that MaCI's unwritten policy does not comply with the mandates of Wolff. As Lieutenant Fisher testified, this unwritten policy does not permit witnesses to testify if the RIB predetermines that they lack credibility. As Defendant Wingard stated, MaCI's policy that permits inmates to call witnesses does not mean the witnesses will actually testify — especially when Lieutenant Fisher believes they will not be credible. The Court therefore finds the unwritten policy at MaCI to be in violation of Wolff, and to be in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

B. Plaintiff Williams has Standing to Bring Suit

Having found that the Defendants' policy with regard to witnesses is unconstitutional, the Court will next consider whether Mr. Williams has standing to request injunctive relief. Relying upon Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff does not have standing to sue for injunctive relief. In Lyons, the plaintiff, Mr. Lyons, after being stopped for a traffic violation, was placed in a chokehold by a City of Los Angeles police officer. The chokehold rendered the plaintiff unconscious and caused damage to his larynx. Id. at 97, 103 S.Ct. 1660. The plaintiff brought suit against the City seeking injunctive and declaratory relief barring the use of chokeholds except in situations where the victim was threatening the immediate use of deadly force. Id. at 98, 103 S.Ct. 1660. By the time the case had reached the Supreme Court, the City had placed a moratorium on the use of chokeholds. Id. at 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660.

In Lyons, the Court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief, as...