Williams v. Williams

• Citation: 56 S.E.2d 20,231 N.C. 33
• Decision Date: 02 November 1949
• Docket Number: 233
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

56 S.E.2d 20

231 N.C. 33

WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS.

No. 233

Supreme Court of North Carolina

November 2, 1949

Civil action to have defendant declared trustee for plaintiff as to an undivided one-half interest in certain land in Wayne County, North Carolina.

These facts appear to be uncontroverted: Plaintiff and defendant were intermarried in the year 1936. They were living together in October 1938 when a $2,500 policy of insurance on the life of defendant's father was issued by the New York Life Insurance Company. Defendant was named the beneficiary in the policy. The insured died 19 March, 1941, and the proceeds of the insurance policy, $2,512.10, was paid to defendant. Thereafter, by deed dated 10 July, 1941, T. A. Forrest and wife executed a deed to defendant by which the land in question was conveyed. The purchase price was $4,400; $900 of which was paid out of the insurance money, and the balance of $3,500 was paid with money borrowed contemporaneously from the Goldsboro Building and Loan Association, as security for which plaintiff and defendant as husband and wife gave a deed of trust on the land in question. The balance of the indebtedness secured by this deed of trust was paid on 8 March, 1946. Thereafter on 27 June, 1947, a decree of absolute divorce from the bonds of matrimony existing between plaintiff and defendant was entered in an action in Superior Court at Atlanta, Georgia.

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint, and on the trial in Superior Court offered evidence tending to show that in October 1938 an agent of the New York Life Insurance Company had several policies of insurance issued by that company on the life of defendant's father, in which a son of the insured was named beneficiary; that defendant's father had not requested the policies to be issued, but the agent had them issued in the hope that delivery would be accepted. Neither the named insured nor the named beneficiary accepted the delivery of a certain one of the policies; that defendant brought this fact to plaintiff's attention and after discussing the matter plaintiff and defendant, then husband and wife, 'agreed to accept delivery of said policy and to invest in it for the purpose of saving enough to buy a mutual home to be jointly owned by' them--it being specifically understood between plaintiff and defendant that in the event of the death of the insured the proceeds from the policy would be devoted to the purchase of a joint home that it was agreed at the time that in order to eliminate any question as to whether plaintiff had an insurable interest in the life of the assured, defendant alone should be named beneficiary, but with distinct understanding between them that no gift of the insurance policy was being made by plaintiff to defendant, except in so far as she would benefit by their mutual and joint purchase of a home as tenants by the entirety; that pursuant thereto plaintiff paid the initial annual premium of $204.55, less the agent's commissions, reducing the payment to $150, and the policy was delivered, and the defendant was named beneficiary therein in lieu of the son of the insured; and that plaintiff paid all premiums due on the said policy on a quarterly basis of $54.20 per quarter until the death of the insured. (The evidence of plaintiff provides the details as to payments).

Plaintiff further alleges in his complaint, and on the trial below offered evidence tending to show that after receipt of the proceeds of the insurance policy he and defendant, intending to carry out their agreement as aforesaid, negotiated for the purchase as a home a triplex unit in one apartment of which they then resided in Goldsboro, N. C.; that the owner agreed with them on purchase price of $4,400, and a deed was prepared conveying the property to plaintiff and defendant as tenants by the entirety, but that, on account of objections made by defendant's family to the title being so conveyed, he and defendant agreed for the deed to be made to her and that, when the 'furor should have subsided' defendant would convey the title, or cause it to be conveyed to plaintiff and defendant as tenants by the entirety; that the transaction was closed, and the owners conveyed the property to defendant, as set forth hereinabove in the uncontroverted facts; that thereafter two units of the triplex were rented out and he, plaintiff, paid all monthly installments of $51 each, falling due on the note to building and loan association so given as aforesaid for balance of purchase price and secured by the deed of trust and that sometimes he paid from his own earnings and sometimes from the rental income; that the payments were about 60% from his own funds, and about 40% from rents of the house; and that such payments were kept up until 8 March, 1946, when pursuant to a separation agreement between him and his wife, he paid from his own personal funds $1,272.44 and she paid approximately $200 from her personal funds in full of the note. (The details here are taken from evidence of plaintiff).

Plaintiff further alleges in his complaint, and on the trial offered evidence tending to show that the purchase of the property and the payment therefor, as well as the payment of the premiums on the life insurance policy were not intended to be a gift from plaintiff to defendant, but were made for the purposes stated 'and with the contract, agreement and intent that the title to the said lands should be conveyed to and held by plaintiff and defendant as tenants by the entirety'; but that defendant has failed and refused to comply with said...