Williams v. Williams

• Citation: 18 S.E.2d 364,220 N.C. 806
• Decision Date: 23 January 1942
• Docket Number: 537.
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

18 S.E.2d 364

220 N.C. 806

WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS et al.

No. 537.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

January 23, 1942

Plaintiff alleged, in substance, that she was the holder of a deed of trust, a first lien, on certain lands which had been sold to the feme defendant by plaintiff in August, 1938, for $3,750--$250 in cash and the balance in secured notes; that upon delinquency in the first payment on the notes secured by this deed of trust, it was suggested by the feme defendant that she apply to the Federal Land Bank for a loan to be secured by a deed of trust on these lands, and that the proceeds from this loan be applied to the payment of the debt due the plaintiff, the balance to be paid by notes secured by a second deed of trust; that this was agreed to and such loan was obtained in the amount of $1,800, which sum, less expenses, amounted to $1,729.50, and was paid to the plaintiff, at which time plaintiff, relying on defendant's promise to execute notes for the balance and a second deed of trust securing them, relinquished possession of the notes and first deed of trust which she held so that they could be cancelled and thus make the deed of trust held by the Land Bank a first lien on the land; and that before the loan from the Land Bank was consummated the plaintiff had signed, upon defendant's representation to her that it was necessary for the completion of the loan, a paper the contents of which she was unaware, being illiterate.

The paper which plaintiff signed proved to be a release or discharge by her of the debt which defendant had owed her and further contained an agreement to accept in full satisfaction of the debt the proceeds of the loan, not to take any further notes, secured or unsecured, for the debt discharged or the balance remaining after payment on the debt of the proceeds from the Land Bank loan, and to cancel and mark paid "all instruments, papers, and records representing, evidencing and securing all indebtedness and obligations" owed to plaintiff by defendant. This is commonly known as a "creditor's agreement" or "scaledown agreement."

It was further alleged that plaintiff's signature on the release was obtained through the fraud and misrepresentation of the defendants, Mrs. D.C. Williams, and husband, and that the cancellation of the notes and deed of trust by the defendant Edwards, trustee, was done without authority, in that the cancellation was directed to be done only on the express condition that the feme defendant would first execute notes and second deed of trust for the balance due.

At the close of all the evidence, defendants renewed their motion for judgment as of involuntary nonsuit, which was granted, and judgment given accordingly. From this judgment plaintiff appeals.

Henry L. Strickland and W. C. Davis, both of Charlotte, for appellant.

G T. Carswell and Joe W. Ervin, both of Charlotte, for appellees.

SEAWELL Justice.

The main point at issue is whether there was evidence sufficient to submit to the jury on the question of fraud or misrepresentation practiced on the plaintiff by the feme defendant in obtaining plaintiff's signature to the "creditor's agreement" which was introduced in evidence.

If this signature was properly obtained, the case as to the defendants is disposed of, for the paper contains an agreement to do all those things from which plaintiff now seeks to be relieved--to discharge the debt of defendant and to cancel paper evidences thereof, and not to take notes or a second lien for the balance due.

Plaintiff contends that the evidence is susceptible of the inference either that through defendant's misrepresentations as to what plaintiff was signing, or through plaintiff's own mistake, her signature was obtained on the paper; or that through defendant's fraudulent inducements and promises to execute notes and a second mortgage, plaintiff was induced to sign the paper.

As to the first contention, all that the evidence shows is that Brown Bowlin, who, as may be inferred from the evidence acted as plaintiff's agent throughout the transactions between plaintiff and defendant, brought the paper out to Mrs. R. J. Williams' home and "said it would have to be signed before they could do anything with the Federal loan" (quoting from Mrs. R. J. Williams' testimony at the trial); that Bowlin was evidently in a hurry and told the plaintiff's daughter "to hurry up and sign it--that he had to go back" (quoting from testimony of Eunice Williams, plaintiff's daughter); that Mrs. Williams, the plaintiff, who could neither read nor write, told her daughter to sign the paper, and herself signed it with her mark, and at no time asked that the paper be read to her or its contents explained; that Bowlin himself, who we assume had been acting as her agent throughout the transactions, did not read the paper, nor ask the person from whom he got it (it is not clear from the evidence who this was) to explain its contents to him. There is no evidence whatever of any attempt on the part of anyone to keep the contents or significance of the paper from the plaintiff or to deceive her with respect thereto.

In this state it is held that one who signs a paper-writing is under a duty to ascertain its contents, and in the absence of a showing that he was wilfully misled or misinformed by the defendant as to these contents, or that they were kept from him in fraudulent opposition to his request, he is held to have signed with full knowledge and assent as to what is therein contained. Dellinger v. Gillespie, 118 N.C 737, 24 S.E. 538; Griffin v. Roanoke R. & Lumber Co., 140 N.C. 514, 519, et seq., 53 S.E. 307, 309, 6 L.R.A.,N.S., 463; Colt Co. v. Kimball, 190 N.C. 169, 129 S.E. 406; Furst & Thomas v. Merritt, 190 N.C. 397, 402, 130 S.E. 40, 43; Breece v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N.C. 211, 189 S.E. 498. If unable to read or write, he must ask that the paper be read to him or its meaning explained. School Committee v. Kesler, 67 N.C. 443. This the plaintiff or her agent did not do, according to the evidence, although they were not deprived of the opportunity therefor. This being true, plaintiff...