Williams v. Williams

• Decision Date: 21 April 1982
• Parties: Daphne E. WILLIAMS v. Marion R. WILLIAMS.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 977

444 A.2d 977

Daphne E. WILLIAMS v. Marion R. WILLIAMS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued March 5, 1982.

Decided April 21, 1982.

Limberis & Macdonald, Christopher G. Limberis (orally), George P. Limberis, Bangor, for plaintiff.

Sandy & Sandy, Robert E. Sandy, Jr. (orally), Waterville, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and GODFREY, NICHOLS, CARTER and WATHEN, JJ.

CARTER, Justice.

The defendant, Marion Williams, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court, Penobscot County, vacating the judgment of the District Court. The District Court had granted the defendant's motion seeking reduction of the amount of alimony paid by him to his former wife, Daphne Williams. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

I.

The parties were married in 1951 and divorced by a District Court decree in 1971. The divorce decree which incorporated an agreement of the parties awarded custody of the four children of the marriage to the plaintiff. The decree also ordered the defendant to pay $100 per month for each child as child support and to pay $850 per month as alimony.

In August 1979, Dr. Williams brought a motion in District Court seeking reduction of the alimony award. He did not seek reduction of child support payments. ¹ Following a hearing, the District Court issued an order reducing, over a two year period, the alimony award from the original amount of $850 per month to $400 per month. ² Pursuant to Civ.R. 73(a), Mrs. Williams appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court, finding that the evidence did not support a modification of the divorce decree, vacated the District Court's order. This appeal followed.

II.

On this appeal, we attach no presumptive validity to the judgment of the Superior Court. When the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate tribunal, we traditionally review directly the initial determination of the adjudicatory body below rather than the decision of the Superior Court. See e.g., Driscoll v. Gheewalla, Me., 441 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1982) (Zoning Board of Appeals); State v. Ann Marie C., Me., 407 A.2d 715, 721 (1979) (Juvenile Court). Accordingly, as in other cases involving divorce related proceedings, we here review the action of the District Court. See Ziehm v. Ziehm, Me., 433 A.2d 725 (1981) (child custody order); Harmon v. Emerson, Me., 425 A.2d 978 (1981); Howell v. Howell, Me., 418 A.2d 181 (1980) (record insufficient for either Superior Court or Law Court to ascertain whether District Court abused its discretion); Bagley v. Bagley, Me., 415 A.2d 1080, 1084 (1980) (modification of agreement incorporated in divorce decree).

The modification of an alimony award rests with the sound discretion of the trial judge. ³ See Smith v. Smith, Me., 419 A.2d 1035, 1037 (1980); see also Capron v. Capron, Me., 403 A.2d 1217, 1218 (1979). As postured by the parties, the sole issue presented on appeal is whether the facts of this case establish a sufficient change of circumstances to justify the modification order.

A. Circumstances of the Payor Spouse

Dr. Williams is a 55 year old dentist who lives in California. Shortly after the divorce he retired from the Air Force and began working for the California prison system. In 1975, he became the chief dentist at the California Institute for Men.

The defendant testified that as a result of leaving the Air Force he incurred increased expenses for such items as housing, transportation, meals and continuing education. The increase is caused by the loss of certain military benefits, e.g., military subsidization of meals, and the costs of civilian life, e.g., transportation and clothing expenses. The increase in expenses as to housing and transportation amounts to approximately $330 per month.

With respect to income, Dr. Williams currently draws a salary from the State of California and a pension from the Air Force. In 1971, his take home pay from the Air Force was approximately $1,800 per month. At the time of the hearing, he received $2,273 per month from the state in take home pay and a pension of $1,511 per month.

The defendant's tax returns reflect the following information:

                      Adjusted Gross    Taxable
                       Income (AGI)   Income (TI)
                1974      52,492         34,194
                1975      60,065         38,550
                1976      63,705         40,764
                1977      48,782         40,520
                1978      49,579         45,010
                Note * Tax Table Income
                

From 1974 to 1978, Dr. Williams claimed three of the four sons from the prior marriage as exemptions. ⁴ The tax returns are filed as joint returns because Dr. Williams has remarried. His current spouse stopped working in 1976 because of medical problems.

The defendant testified that at the time of the divorce, his only outstanding indebtedness was his car loan. He estimated his current liabilities at approximately $17,000. Dr. Williams does not own his own home or have any other significant assets. He also provides some support for Michael, the youngest of the four sons from the prior marriage. That son attends college in California.

B. Circumstances of the Recipient Spouse

Mrs. Williams is 59 and a high school graduate. She has not remarried. The plaintiff has no professional skills and was not employed until just prior to the divorce.

She is currently employed by the Bangor School System as an aide. In 1971, she earned $61 per week for the 39 week term of employment. The plaintiff now earns $118 per week for a 42 week period. Mrs. Williams does not work during the summer months. The plaintiff also works part-time at McDonalds, a hamburger restaurant. She is paid by the hour, currently $3.60 per hour, and her hours are not consistent from week to week. Mrs. Williams estimated that she usually averaged $185 per month from her job with McDonalds but indicated that she only received $550 in the first nine months of 1979. From October 1978 to August 1979, Mrs. Williams received income of $120 in the form of rent from a boarder at her house.

The plaintiff's tax returns reflect the following data:

                       AGI       TI          Alimony
                                        (included in AGI)
                1971   8,605    5,326         6,800
                1972  12,467    9,097         9,600
                1973  13,029    7,324         9,600
                1974  13,295    7,551         9,600
                1975  13,863  unknown         9,600
                1976  13,445    8,294         9,600
                1977  15,426   15,426 *        9,600
                

Note * Tax Table Income

In 1973 and 1974, Mrs. Williams claimed her three sons as exemptions. From 1975 to 1978, she claimed two of her sons as exemptions.

Mrs. Williams owns a house in Bangor, formerly owned by both parties. Dr. Williams estimated the value of the house at $45,000. The balance remaining on the mortgage is $9,414 with eleven years left on the loan. Monthly payments are $173 and have increased since the divorce because of increased costs for insurance and taxes.

Mrs. Williams testified that she owed a department store $975 for appliances and two other stores approximately $300. She owes $634 for her automobile. The plaintiff testified that she suffered from hypertension and that her doctor told her to "take it easy."

C. Merits of the Appeal

As a general proposition, the financial circumstances of both the payor and the recipient of alimony should be taken into account by the trial court in deciding whether to modify an alimony award. Smith, 419 A.2d at 1037 (payor spouse); Mitchell v. Mitchell, Me., 418 A.2d 1140, 1143 (1980) (recipient spouse). Examination of both spouses' financial condition is in accord with the considerations involved in initially formulating an alimony award--the husband's ability to pay, the wife's station in life and her financial worth and income. See Bryant v. Bryant, Me., 411 A.2d 391, 395 (1980); Strater v. Strater, 159 Me. 508, 517-18, 196 A.2d 94, 98-99 (1963). In short, in order to reduce an alimony award, the moving party must show a change in the payor's ability to pay or the recipient's need for support or both. See Alibrando v. Alibrando, 375 A.2d 9, 15 (D.C.App.1977); 25 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation § 675-77 (1966). Inasmuch as the original alimony award should be based upon the circumstances of both spouses at the present and in the foreseeable future, Bryant, 411 A.2d at 395, a change of circumstances necessary to effect a modification must be substantial. See Smith, 419 A.2d at 1037 (substantial change in payor spouse's financial condition); Mitchell, 418 A.2d at 1144 (recipient's assets have not significantly increased; change of circumstances "illusory"); see generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 10 (1951).

The plurality of considerations involved in evaluating a motion for modification requires that the Law Court accord unusual deference to the findings of the trial court.

Where the question is one of the modification of alimony or support, however, an even more deferential standard of review is applicable: Absent a violation of some positive rule of law, this Court will overturn the trial court's decision of such a question only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.

Smith, 419 A.2d at 1038. Moreover, since neither party, in the instant case, requested specific findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Civ.P. 52(a), we assume that the trial court made all the findings necessary to support his decision. Id. Despite these restrictive standards guiding our examination of the question raised on appeal, we nevertheless affirm the Superior Court's vacatur because we find no evidence to indicate substantial change in the partys' circumstances justifying the modification order.

The defendant suggests that his remarriage, loss of military benefits, limited assets and substantial debts support the modification order. However, remarriage, change of jobs or increased indebtedness does not necessarily justify reduction of an alimony award, especially when the change of conditions were voluntarily brought about by the payor or do not affect his...