Williams v. Williams, 3D05-5.
| Decision Date | 11 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 3D05-5.,3D05-5. |
| Citation | 904 So.2d 488 |
| Parties | Carol WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. Michael S. WILLIAMS, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Lauri Waldman Ross, Miami; and Paul G. Fletcher, Coral Gables, for appellant.
Dittmar & Hauser and Helen Hauser, Coconut Grove; Granoff & Kessler and Roy E. Granoff, Miami, for appellee.
Before CORTIÑAS and ROTHENBERG, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
The former wife, Carol Williams, appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage claiming that the trial court: (1) abused its discretion by denying her request for permanent periodic alimony and instead awarding bridge-the-gap alimony; (2) erred by failing to identify the mortgages on the marital home as marital liabilities and by failing to apportion these marital liabilities; and (3) erred by incorrectly calculating the former husband's child support payments. Further, she argues that upon remand, this court should order that the trial judge be disqualified based upon comments he made during the dissolution hearing. We agree in part.
The parties were married in November 1988. In 1992, the former wife became a full-time homemaker when she gave birth to the parties' first child. Thereafter, the parties had two other children, one in 1994, and another in 2000. The former husband has worked at Wal-Mart since 1992, is currently a store manager, and has been the family's sole bread winner since 1992. The evidence established that the parties lived well beyond their means, accumulating significant credit card debt, which they would pay with the annual bonus the former husband would receive. Additionally, they received financial assistance from their parents.
In June 2003, after approximately fifteen and one-half years of marriage, the former husband left the family home and moved in with his girlfriend. The former wife filed for divorce in February 2004, seeking permanent alimony, child support, designation as the primary residential parent, attorney's fees, and equitable distribution. The former husband answered and countered-petitioned seeking shared parental responsibility and equitable distribution of the parties' property. At the time of the dissolution hearing, they were both thirty-seven years old.
In August 2004, the former wife obtained a job at her children's school. She earns $7.50 per hour for twenty-five hours of work, but works only during the school year, approximately nine months out of the year. The former wife also works an extra ten hours per week in exchange for a reduced daycare fee for their youngest child. Therefore, the former wife is working a total of approximately thirty-five hours per week, but receives monetary compensation for only twenty-five of those hours. The former wife testified that she enjoys working at the daycare but would have to attend college to be a teacher at the daycare.
At the dissolution hearing, the former wife testified that she lives with the children in the marital home which is valued at $230,000.00; that the balance on the first mortgage is $149,000.00 with monthly payments of $1,299.88; and that the balance on the equity line is $21,466.00 with monthly interest-only payments of $80.00. The trial court awarded the marital home to the former wife and also awarded to the former wife the former husband's portion of the equity, which is approximately $30,000.00, as lump sum alimony. The former husband has not appealed these awards or the trial court's valuation of the marital home.
At the dissolution hearing, the former wife requested that the trial court award her permanent periodic alimony. The former husband argued that the former wife was not entitled to permanent periodic alimony, but conceded that she was entitled to rehabilitative alimony because she was capable of becoming self-supporting with the proper education and training. In fact, the husband even presented a rehabilitation "plan" where the former wife, who he characterized as intelligent, would finish high school and then go to college to obtain a degree in accounting because she is "good with numbers." The trial court, however, instead of awarding permanent periodic alimony as the former wife requested, or rehabilitative alimony as the former husband conceded was appropriate, awarded twenty-four months of "bridge-the-gap" alimony.
As stated earlier, the former wife has raised numerous points on appeal. However, prior to addressing these issues, we note that separating parties often must accept the reality that as a result of having to maintain two separate households, they will not be able to maintain the same standard of living that they enjoyed during the marriage. De Luca v. De Luca, 722 So.2d 947, 948 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) ( ); see also Rashotsky v. Rashotsky, 829 So.2d 275 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Austin v. Austin, 785 So.2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 800 So.2d 612 (Fla.2001).
The former wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request for permanent periodic alimony and by awarding bridge-the-gap alimony. Based upon the specific facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the former wife's request for permanent periodic alimony, but did abuse its discretion by awarding bridge-the-gap alimony as it is totally inappropriate in this case. We remand for an award of rehabilitative alimony as the former husband conceded below that the former wife was entitled to this type of alimony, and the record before us also demonstrates that this type of alimony is appropriate.
A trial court's decision to either award or deny alimony will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record demonstrates that the trial court abused its...
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