Williams v. Williams, 2017-CA-01476-SCT

• Decision Date: 17 January 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 2017-CA-01476-SCT,2017-CA-01476-SCT
• Citation: 264 So.3d 722
• Parties: Tracy Marie Miles WILLIAMS v. Brent Reid WILLIAMS
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

264 So.3d 722

Tracy Marie Miles WILLIAMS

v.Brent Reid WILLIAMS

NO. 2017-CA-01476-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

January 17, 2019

Rehearing Denied March 7, 2019

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JERRY WESLEY HISAW, VANESSA WINKLER PRICE, Southaven

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: LUTHER PUTNAM CRULL, JR.

BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ.

BEAM, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This appeal and cross-appeal arise from a judgment of divorce in the DeSoto County Chancery Court. At the trial of this matter, the chancellor granted Brent and Tracy Williams an irreconcilable-differences divorce and resolved the issues upon which the parties could not agree. At issue in the direct appeal is (1) whether the chancellor erred by not providing Tracy a set visitation schedule with their teenage son, (2) whether the chancellor erred in requiring Tracy to pay child support, (3) whether the chancellor erred in the valuation of the Williams's business interests, and (4) whether the chancellor erred in finding an airplane and a boat to be marital property. On cross-appeal, the issue is whether the chancellor erred by not ordering Tracy to make monthly payments to Brent on his $1 million judgment award. Finding no merit to the assignments of error on appeal or cross-appeal, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Brent and Tracy married on March 5, 1993, and separated on September 1, 2013. The parties had three children, two of whom are emancipated. The youngest child, Kendall Williams, was fourteen years old at the beginning of this matter and seventeen years old by the time the chancellor ruled. At present, he is eighteen years old, attending IMG Academy, an advanced multi-sport and educational institution in Bradenton, Florida, and is not living with either parent.

¶3. On October 3, 2013, Brent filed his complaint for divorce. Discovery ensued, and the matter was ultimately tried over the course of five days on January 9, 2015, May 8, 2015, July 2, 2015, August 31, 2015, and October 15, 2015. The chancellor ruled from the bench on January 9, 2017, and entered the judgment of divorce on February 1, 2017.

¶4. On February 9, 2017, Tracy filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and Brent filed a response and counter-motion the following day. On October 2, 2017, the chancellor denied the post-trial motions. Aggrieved, Tracy now appeals to this Court, and Brent cross-appeals.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

¶5. "This Court will not disturb a chancellor's judgment when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied." Chapel v. Chapel , 876 So.2d 290, 292 (Miss. 2004) (quoting Townsend v. Townsend , 859 So.2d 370, 371-72 (Miss. 2003) ). Under this standard of review, our purpose is to determine whether the chancellor's ruling was supported by credible evidence, not whether we agree with that ruling. Lee v. Lee , 798 So.2d 1284, 1290 (Miss. 2001). "However, we review the chancellor's interpretation and application of the law de novo." Marshall v. Gipson Steel, Inc. , 806 So.2d 266, 270 (Miss. 2002) (citing In re Will of Carney , 758 So.2d 1017, 1019 (Miss. 2000) ).

II. Whether the chancellor erred by not providing Tracy a set visitation schedule.

¶6. "The chancellor has broad discretion when determining appropriate visitation and the limitations thereon." Harrington v. Harrington , 648 So.2d 543, 545 (Miss. 1994) (citing White v. Thompson , 569 So.2d 1181 (Miss. 1990) ). "When the chancellor determines visitation, he must keep the best interest of the child as his paramount concern while always being attentive to the rights of the non-custodial parent, recognizing the need to maintain a healthy, loving relationship between the non-custodial parent and his child." Id. At the trial of this matter, the chancellor ruled,

Mom can have visitation with the child to be agreed upon between Mom and the child. The Dad is ordered not to interfere with the visitation, but, as I stated earlier, Mom's actions and her continued actions and interference with this child have caused this alienation. It is not Dad's fault, and so, I am not placing a burden – I'm not giving you a specific visitation schedule because I'm not placing a burden on Dad to make this child visit.

¶7. Tracy argues that the chancellor erred by allowing a child to set visitation at his discretion. While the chancellor acknowledged that her ruling on visitation was different from her normal practice, she found that Kendall's desires and wishes should be taken into consideration. Trial revealed that Tracy had removed Kendall's possessions, furniture, and rifle from the marital home, as well as his money jug containing $800. The court found that Kendall had viewed his mother's actions as a personal affront. Tracy refused to provide Kendall the necessary documentation to complete driver's education, to receive a passport so he could travel outside the United States with the USA baseball team, or to transfer from Magnolia Heights School to a DeSoto County school for better baseball opportunities. The chancellor stated, "Quite honestly, I think she's done some things that I think indicate that she's much more interested in getting her own way than in thinking about what's in the best interest of her child."

¶8. Tracy correctly stated that this Court has made it clear that the objective of visitation is that "the non-custodial parent ... and child should have as close and loving a relationship as possible, despite the fact that they may not live in the same house." Dunn v. Dunn , 609 So.2d 1277, 1286 (Miss. 1992) (citing Clark v. Myrick , 523 So.2d 79, 83 (Miss. 1988) ). However, this Court has also found that, while a non-custodial parent is presumptively entitled to visitation as stated in Griffin v. Griffin , that presumption can be overcome when "substantial evidence" justifies doing so. Griffin v. Griffin , 237 So.3d 743, 747 (Miss. 2018) (quoting Cox v. Moulds , 490 So.2d 866, 870 (Miss. 1986) ). Cf. Newsom v. Newsom , 557 So.2d 511, 517 (Miss. 1990) (emphasis removed) (holding "that the chancery court has the power to restrict visitation in circumstances which present an appreciable danger of hazard cognizable in our law").

¶9. In Griffin , the chancellor denied a mother visitation with her four daughters because visitation was not in the children's best interests. Griffin , 237 So.3d at 745-46. The mother was incarcerated in the Washington County Correctional Facility in Greenville, Mississippi, four hours away from where the daughters lived. Id. In order to exercise visitation, the daughters would have to be searched and exposed to the prison environment. Id. The chancery court held that the presumption of visitation had been overcome. Id. at 746. "The chancellor considered Nolana's circumstances and deemed phone visitation, for now, and possible future in-person visitation at Chad's discretion was the best possible balance between recognizing Nolana's constitutionally protected rights, encouraging the parent-child relationships, and protecting the girls' best interest." Id. at 749 (citing Harrington , 648 So.2d at 545 ). On appeal, this Court affirmed the chancellor's ruling.

¶10. Although the facts of this case differ, the principle that a presumption of visitation can be overcome with sufficient evidence remains the same. Kendall is eighteen years old and is living in Florida to pursue his baseball career. Although the chancellor had only become aware of Kendall's new schooling in Florida just before her ruling, the knowledge did not change her mind about visitation. She stated,

And there is a huge big rift to heal. And I know forcing him to come to your house every other weekend – which you can't do because he's living in Florida, anyway – is not going to fix that situation. And I want y'all to figure out some way – you know, as I said, maybe this time and distance will help fix it.

¶11. Based on the facts presented at trial, this Court finds that the chancellor did not err in declining to set a visitation schedule under these unique circumstances. Given the broad deference afforded chancellors in visitation matters, we affirm the chancellor's ruling. Tracy and Brent can travel to Florida any time to support and to visit Kendall while he pursues his baseball dreams.

III. Whether the chancellor erred in requiring Tracy to pay child support.

¶12. "This Court has said that an award of child support is a matter within the discretion of the chancellor and that determination will not be reversed unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong in his finding of fact or manifestly abused his discretion." Clausel v. Clausel , 714 So.2d 265, 266 (Miss. 1998) (quoting Gillespie v. Gillespie , 594 So.2d 620, 622 (Miss. 1992) ). Furthermore, "[t]he process of weighing evidence and arriving at an award of child support is essentially an exercise in fact-finding, which customarily significantly restrains this Court's review." Id. at 266-67.

¶13. At the trial of this matter, Tracy alleged her adjusted gross income was $1,010.87 in her Uniform Chancery Court Rule 8.05 financial statement, so $1,000 in child support would consume all of her income. Tracy owns a daycare, Kaco's Kids, and, according to the tax returns admitted into evidence at the trial, Tracy's 2013 self-employment earnings were $152,090; her gross earnings were $242,763 per year, or $20,230.25 per month, in 2013. She testified that she paid over $15,000 to pay off the note on Tennessee property that she and Brent owned. She purchased a new home in October 2015. She refused to allow Brent to sell timber on the Tennessee property in order to pay the Tennessee's property's remaining debt and instead paid the note herself. Tracy's daughter Kaitlyn testified that Tracy told her she had purchased an airplane and a boat.

¶14. While the standard for child support for one child is 14 percent of the...