Williams v. Williams

Decision Date20 November 1990
Docket NumberCA-CV,No. 1,1
Citation801 P.2d 495,166 Ariz. 260
Parties, 59 USLW 2447 In re the Marriage of Kathy Ann WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Claude K. WILLIAMS, Jr., Respondent-Appellant. 89-103.
CourtArizona Court of Appeals
OPINION

EHRLICH, Judge.

This is an appeal from a trial court order entered in dissolution proceedings. The husband has appealed from the decree of dissolution and the denial of his motion for new trial. He alleges that the trial court erred in its conclusion of paternity and in its determination of his earning capacity.

FACTS

Kathy Ann Williams and Claude K. Williams, Jr., were married on November 3, 1984. Prior to their marriage, they executed an antenuptial agreement as a part of which they agreed that all of the income received and obligations incurred during their marriage would be kept separate. They further agreed that in the event of divorce, neither would be entitled to an award of spousal maintenance.

The Williamses lived together from November 1984 until January 1986, when their relationship became estranged and the husband moved to Baltimore. In February 1986, the wife filed a petition for dissolution of their marriage. The following month, however, she visited her husband in Baltimore in a mutual effort to reconcile. After that visit, the wife discovered that she was pregnant. On November 23, 1986, she gave birth to a daughter.

The wife amended her petition for dissolution in July 1986 to include the fact of her pregnancy and a request for an award of child support. In the husband's response to the amended petition, he denied paternity of the child and denied that he had sufficient financial resources to support the child if, in fact, he was proven to be the child's father.

After the birth of the child, at the husband's request, and in order to resolve the paternity issue, the parties agreed to paternity testing at the husband's expense at the Genetics Center of the Southwest Biomedical Research Institute, located in Scottsdale. Tests were performed and the Genetics Center reported that there was a 99.93% probability that the husband was the father of the child.

The wife filed a second amended petition for dissolution, alleging that there was a minor child born of the marriage, that she was without sufficient funds to support herself and the child, and that she was unable to pay her attorney's fees and costs incurred in the action. The wife also requested that the court order the husband to pay child support and spousal maintenance.

The husband's counsel withdrew from representation and the husband filed his response to the second amended petition in propria persona. He again denied paternity of the child and requested that further tests be conducted to establish paternity conclusively. He also alleged that, according to the antenuptial agreement, the wife was not entitled to spousal maintenance and further, that he was without sufficient financial resources to pay his attorneys.

The husband made two subsequent requests that additional paternity tests be conducted, one request mailed directly to the trial court a month later, and a second request filed with the court another month later. These requests were denied by the court after oral argument.

The husband, still acting in propria persona, filed and served a request for production of documents upon the wife in which he asked that she produce certain documents at his office. Among the documents requested were those relating to the wife's financial situation, her health, the birth of the child, and the complications allegedly suffered by the wife as a result of the birth. The wife neither produced such documents nor timely objected to their production. Having earlier filed her list of witnesses and exhibits, the wife instead filed a motion to set and certificate of readiness alleging, as required by Maricopa County Local Rule 6.2. (a), that the parties had completed all discovery or had had a reasonable opportunity to do so. Trial of the matter then was set to begin on August 18, 1988.

On August 4, 1988, the husband, through his new counsel, moved the court to compel the wife to produce the documents previously requested and to continue the trial in order that discovery could be completed. The trial court denied the motion.

At the conclusion of the trial which then took place, the court held that the husband was the biological father of the child. It also found that the wife lacked sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs and that she was unable to support herself through appropriate employment. It concluded that the provision contained in the antenuptial agreement by which the parties had waived spousal maintenance was against public policy and thus unenforceable. Based upon these findings, the trial court ordered the husband to pay spousal maintenance to the wife in the amount of $850 per month for a period of eighteen months, and child support in the amount of $823 per month. The husband thereafter filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. He then timely appealed to this court.

SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE

The husband alleges that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay spousal maintenance to the wife because the antenuptial agreement executed by the parties specifically provided that both parties waived an award of spousal maintenance upon divorce. The trial court held that this provision of the antenuptial agreement was void as against public policy, citing Williams v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 544, 243 P. 402, 404 (1926).

Arizona recognizes the validity of certain antenuptial agreements: "Parties intending to marry may enter into agreements not contrary to good morals or law." A.R.S. § 25-201(A). Clearly this statute was intended to sanction antenuptial agreements as long as they do not violate public policy. Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz.App. 131, 137-38, 531 P.2d 176, 182-83 (1975).

The Arizona Supreme Court previously has held, however, in Williams, that an antenuptial agreement which purports to discharge a husband's duty of spousal support following divorce for a specific sum is contrary to public policy and void without reference to a particular agreement. The issue to be decided in this case, then, is whether the holding in Williams, that limitations on spousal maintenance contained in antenuptial agreements are against public policy per se, should be applied to void the waiver of spousal maintenance in this case, despite the changes in public policy regarding divorce that have occurred in Arizona in recent years. We agree with the husband's position that antenuptial agreements regarding spousal maintenance are no longer against public policy per se, and hold that such agreements must be considered individually to determine if the terms violate public policy.

The common law can and should be reformed when changed conditions and circumstances establish that it has become unjust or contrary to evolved public policy. Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 504, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (1983). Thus, this court is free to reevaluate previous decisions such as Williams in light of present facts and circumstances. Id.

The decision in Williams was based upon two premises: Antenuptial agreements waiving spousal maintenance were considered to be against public policy first because they could result in a situation where the husband was relieved of his legal obligation to support his wife, although it was due to his fault that the wife sought and was granted a divorce. Such agreements also were against public policy because of the state's interest in the adequate support of its citizens; therefore, the husband's duty to support his wife could not be the subject of a contract between the parties.

The rationale articulated in Williams is less valid in light of the advent of "no-fault" divorce in Arizona. Arizona adopted Parts III and IV of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in 1973. See A.R.S. §§ 25-311 through 25-339. In so doing, the legislature eliminated the concept of fault from divorce proceedings. Under the new statutory scheme, either party to a marriage may seek a divorce based upon their "irreconcilable differences," without assessing blame against the other spouse. A.R.S. § 25-312.

While the state still has an interest in enforcing the support obligations that accompany marriage, this principle no longer necessarily leads to the conclusion that all antenuptial agreements concerning spousal maintenance are invalid. While, in Williams, the spousal support obligation was strictly enforced against the husband pursuant to the common law, the obligation is now statutory in nature, having undergone significant changes in recent years.

Prior to the 1973 revisions of A.R.S. § 25-319, which describes the spousal-maintenance obligation, and A.R.S. § 13-803 (now A.R.S. § 13-3611), it was clearly the husband's duty to support his wife during their marriage. This obligation arose out of the relationship itself and existed irrespective of the wife's separate estate or independent means. Ivancovich v. Ivancovich, 24 Ariz.App. 592, 595, 540 P.2d 718, 721 (1975). In fact, according to A.R.S. § 13-803, as it existed prior to 1973, an able husband who refused or neglected to support his wife was guilty of a felony.

A.R.S. § 25-319 now says that either spouse may be ordered to pay maintenance to the other if certain contingencies are fulfilled. Additionally, A.R.S. § 13-3611 provides that it is a class six felony for an able spouse, regardless of gender, to refuse to support the other during marriage if the need arises. Thus, the spousal-support obligation, both during marriage and after divorce, today is borne equally by both parties.

The state still has an interest in the support of its citizens, however....

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