Williams v. Williams
Decision Date | 22 April 2014 |
Docket Number | Nos. S14A0510,S14A0512.,s. S14A0510 |
Citation | 295 Ga. 113,757 S.E.2d 859 |
Parties | WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS. Williams v. Williams. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Christopher Carlton Folsom, Buford, Donald Robert Roch, II, Bowers and Roch, LLP, Canton, for appellant.
Will H. Pickett, Jr., Pickett, Pickett & Pickett, P.C., Jasper, for appellee.
The record shows that, following his divorce from Leanne Williams (Wife) on February 10, 2010, Christopher L. Williams (Husband) filed two motions: one to modify custody and reduce child support and another to hold Wife in contempt for violating Husband's custody and visitation rights as set forth in the parties' divorce decree. The motions were consolidated, and hearings were conducted on two separate dates. Following both hearings, the trial court, among other things, reduced Husband's child support obligations, made certain alterations to visitation, and awarded $2,000 in attorney fees to Wife.
In Case No. S 14A0510, Husband appeals the trial court's ruling in his post-divorce action for modification of child custody and support, contending that the trial court erred by: (1) unduly limiting his new wife's ability to drive his child from place to place, (2) failing to issue an amended parenting plan pursuant to OCGA § 19–9–1, and (3) failing to include in its order certain changes to the visitation schedule allegedly agreed upon by Husband and Wife. In Case No. S 14A0512, with regard to the contempt action, Husband argues that the trial court erred by awarding $2,000 in attorney fees to Wife in the absence of sufficient evidence and findings to support the award.
1. In its order regarding visitation, the trial court states: Husband maintains that this restriction runs counter to statements made by the trial court during the hearing on the matter.
When considering a dispute regarding the custody of a child, “[a] trial court has very broad discretion, looking always to the best interest of the child.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Autrey v. Autrey, 288 Ga. 283, 285(4), 702 S.E.2d 878 (2010). This Court “will not interfere unless the evidence shows a clear abuse of discretion, and where there is any evidence to support the trial court's finding, [we] will not find there was an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). The transcript indicates that Husband did request that his current wife be allowed to drive the parties' child on errands during visitation. Wife, however, objected on the basis that she believed that Husband's new wife might be under medication. As the trial court was orally explaining how it intended to rule at the end of the final hearing, Husband asked the trial court, “What about when [my child is] with us for a weekend or summer vacation, can he ride to the store with [his step-mother], to town or get something to eat?” The trial court responded, “I don't have any objection to that, but still any accident or moving violation will have to be reported immediately.”
In the trial court's written order, however, Husband's new wife is only allowed to drive his child to school on Monday mornings. As Husband recognizes, an oral pronouncement by a trial court during a hearing is not a judgment until it is reduced to writing and entered as a judgment. Williams v. City of LaGrange, 213 Ga. 241(1), 98 S.E.2d 617 (1957). An oral pronouncement of this type is not binding. It may provide insight on the intent of a later written judgment, but any discrepancy between the written judgment and oral pronouncement is resolved in favor of the written judgment. Blair v. Bishop, 290 Ga.App. 721(2), 660 S.E.2d 35 (2008).
Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court's limitation of the ability of Husband's new wife to drive the parties' child as discussed at the hearing appears to be an abuse of discretion. Although Wife testified that she had heard that Husband's new wife was taking medication and worried about her ability to drive, this testimony was speculation. And, while Husband testified that his new wife sometimes acted “crazy,” there was no evidence that her driving was impaired. None of this testimony constitutes actual evidencesupporting the trial court's decision. Furthermore, though the trial court indicated a desire to limit interaction between Wife and Husband's new wife, this concern has no bearing on the propriety of allowing Husband's new wife to drive the parties' child around town when there would be no interaction with Wife. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's broad limitation on the driving privileges of Husband's new wife, and remand the case for further consideration of this issue consistent with this opinion. Autrey, supra.
The dissent erroneously contends that, because the trial court's order does not mention step-mother's ability to drive the child on other days at other times, it can be construed to allow this expanded driving. The dissent fills in the purported “silence” by adding to the trial court's directive in the following manner: “[Step-mother] shall provide transportation for the minor child to school on Monday[s] only,” but disregards the explicit limitation of destination, namely school, and the limitation of day, namely Monday, in the first half of this sentence and include the ability to drive the minor child on other days of visitation to all other locations. This construction is logically inconsistent to the point of being untenable. The dissent's desire to defer to the trial court's ruling is laudable; however, its analysis cannot create the harmony that would be required to do so.
2. Husband contends that the trial court's order modifying visitation failed to include a parenting plan required by OCGA § 19–9–1. OCGA § 19–9–1(a) provides:
Except when a parent seeks emergency relief for family violence pursuant to Code Section 19–13–3 or 19–13–4, in all cases in which the custody of any child is at issue between the parents, each parent shall prepare a parenting plan or the parties may jointly submit a parenting plan. It shall be in the judge's discretion as to when a party shall be required to submit a parenting plan to the judge. A parenting plan shall be required for permanent custody and modification actions and in the judge's discretion may be required for temporary hearings. The final decree in any legal action involving the custody of a child, including modification actions, shall incorporate a permanent parenting plan.
Fatal to Husband's argument, the trial court's order explicitly states that “[a]ll the terms and conditions of the original ... Parenting Plan ... [entered in the underlying action for divorce] not modified herein, shall remain in full force and effect unless same conflicts with this order.” Therefore, contrary to Husband's argument, the trial court's ruling in this case does, in fact, contain a parenting plan.
3. Husband argues that the trial court omitted from its final order a change in weekend visitation mutually agreed upon by both parties. Specifically, Husband contends that he and Wife informed the trial court that, when their child was visiting Husband on weekends during the school year, Husband should be allowed to keep the child through Sunday night and drop him off at school on Monday mornings. This contention is supported by the transcript. In fact, both Husband and Wife testified that they were already following this schedule, and both parties wished to continue it. In line with this wish, the trial court's order indicates that the child's step-mother may drive him to school on Monday mornings. This provision makes little sense if the trial court was not contemplating that Husband would retain custody through Sunday...
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