Williams v. Willis

• Decision Date: 15 March 2017
• Docket Number: A16A0990
• Citation: 340 Ga.App. 740,798 S.E.2d 323
• Parties: WILLIAMS v. WILLIS, III.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

340 Ga.App. 740

798 S.E.2d 323

WILLIAMS

v.WILLIS, III.

A16A0990

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 15, 2017

Genevieve Helen Dame, Atlanta, Hayes Michael Dever, for Appellant.

Ron L. Quigley, Mina Adel Elmankabady, Atlanta, Alexandra N. Vozza, for Appellee.

Miller, Presiding Judge.

Frederick L. Willis, III, sued Michael W. Williams in Georgia in 1990, alleging fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, arising from a joint real estate venture in Atlanta. In 1992, Willis raised nearly identical claims against Williams in a South Carolina suit, arising from the same real estate venture. Willis obtained a judgment against Williams in the South Carolina action in 1993 (hereinafter, the "South Carolina Judgment"). Several months later, Willis obtained a judgment against Williams in the Georgia suit (hereinafter the "Georgia Judgment"). In 2015, Williams filed an emergency motion to set aside the Georgia Judgment. Williams now appeals from the denial of that motion, contending that the Georgia Judgment is void under OCGA § 9-12-16. For the reasons that follow we find that the Georgia judgment is not void. Rather the Georgia Judgment was merely voidable, and Williams is bound by the Georgia Judgment because he failed to have it timely set aside. Consequently, we affirm the denial of Williams's emergency motion to set aside the Georgia Judgment.

In so holding, we emphasize that, rather than sleeping on his rights, Williams could have had the duplicative Georgia Judgment set aside, if he had brought a motion to set aside, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60, within three years after the judgment was entered.

Under OCGA § 9-12-16, a judgment of a court having no jurisdiction of the person or the subject matter or which is void for any other cause is a mere nullity and may be so held in any court when it becomes material to the interest of the parties to consider it. A void judgment is one that has a defect apparent on its face. Where jurisdiction exists both of the subject matter and of the parties, as well as jurisdiction to make the particular order in question, an order is not void, but voidable, however erroneous or irregular it may be.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kothari v. Tessfaye , 318 Ga.App. 289, 294 (1) (a), 733 S.E.2d 815 (2012). The determination of whether the Georgia Judgment is void or voidable is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo. Artson, LLC v. Hudson , 322 Ga.App. 859, 860, 747 S.E.2d 68 (2013).

Here, the limited record shows that Willis, a South Carolina resident, filed suit against Williams, a Georgia resident, in the State Court of DeKalb County, Georgia in April 1990, raising claims arising from his investment in an Atlanta real estate venture. In his Georgia complaint, Willis alleged that he sustained more than $500,000 in damages caused by Williams' intentional and fraudulent misrepresentations, fraudulent concealment, and breaches of fiduciary duty arising from Willis's purchase of shares in a limited partnership.

Williams answered the Georgia Complaint in April 1991.

In January 1992, Willis filed a state court suit against Williams in South Carolina raising similar claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation and civil conspiracy. These claims also apparently arose from Willis's purchase of shares in the same limited partnership. On November 22, 1993, the South Carolina trial court entered a final judgment in favor of Willis on his claims and awarded Willis more than $980,000 in damages and prejudgment interest.

On July 5, 1994—after providing notice to Williams—the DeKalb State Court held a bench trial on Willis's claims arising from his Georgia complaint. That same day, the DeKalb State Court entered judgment in favor of Willis on his claims and awarded Willis more than $1 million in damages, including $250,000 in punitive damages.

More than 20 years later, in September 2015, Willis apparently initiated Illinois collection proceedings by domesticating the Georgia Judgment in the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois. In response to this action, Williams filed an emergency motion to set aside the Georgia Judgment. At the hearing on Williams's emergency motion, Willis conceded that the South Carolina Judgment expired as a matter of law in 2003, and therefore is no longer enforceable. The trial court denied Williams's emergency motion, and this appeal ensued.

On appeal, Williams contends that the South Carolina Judgment was conclusive as to the issues between the parties, and therefore the Georgia Judgment is duplicative and void under OCGA § 9-12-16. We disagree.

It is well established that a trial court has no jurisdiction to change or modify a judgment outside the term of court in which the judgment was entered.... And, while a judgment which is void for lack of jurisdiction may be attacked at any time, all other motions to set aside a judgment must be brought within three years after the judgment was entered.

(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) De La Reza v. Osprey Capital, LLC , 287 Ga.App. 196, 197 (1), 651 S.E.2d 97 (2007) ; see also OCGA § 9-11-60 (f).

OCGA § 9-12-16 does not apply [where] there is no issue regarding the trial court's original jurisdiction and [where] the judgment at issue is not a void judgment. A void judgment is one that has a defect apparent on its face. Where jurisdiction exists both of the subject matter and of the parties, as well as jurisdiction to make the particular order in question, an order is not void, but

...