Williams v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Institution, 8614
| Decision Date | 10 June 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 8614,8614 |
| Parties | d 283 Ida and James WILLIAMS, Plaintiffs, Ida Williams, Appellant, v. ZIONS COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE INSTITUTION, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Dean E. Conder, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
Plaintiff Ida Williams, appellant in this court, appeals from a judgment of dismissal with prejudice at the close of plaintiff's case. Appellant brought suit for damages sustained when the car she was driving was struck by defendant's truck. Plaintiff was proceeding south on B Street, a through street in Salt Lake City, at about 20 to 25 miles per hour. When plaintiff reached a point about 25 feet north of the intersection of Third Avenue and B Street, she saw defendant's truck stopped at the stop sign on the west side of B Street. Plaintiff then looked to the east for westbound traffic and then proceeded through the intersection. B Street north of Third Avenue is 42 feet wide, and south is 40 feet. Third Avenue is 30 feet wide west of B Street, and east is 40 feet; each street has two lanes of traffic.
When plaintiff was half way through the intersection she was struck by defendant's truck. The front end of defendant's truck struck the car driven by plaintiff on the right door and near the car's center. The automobile driven by plaintiff was in the southwest quarter of the intersection and only a short distance east of the west edge of the intersection when hit. On these facts the court held plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
With this ruling we cannot agree. The testimony establishes the following:
(a) Plaintiff was moving down B Street, a through street.
(b) When plaintiff reached a point approximately 25 feet north of the intersection of the two streets, she saw defendant's truck stopped at the stop sign on Third Avenue protecting B Street traffic.
(c) Plaintiff was moving down B Street and nearer to the intersection as she observed defendant's truck, and concluded that defendant would not start from dead stop and move into her.
(d) Plaintiff looked at the truck long enough to conclude that it was completely stopped and made no movement whatsoever.
(e) Plaintiff's car was in motion, shortening the distance between the car and truck during the time she observed the truck and concluded it would remain stopped.
(f) Plaintiff after satisfying herself that defendant was stopped, turned and looked to the east.
It must not be overlooked that both streets in question were relatively narrow. The entire distance traveled by plaintiff from the point where she saw defendant's truck stopped to the point of impact was approximately one-half the width of Third Avenue plus the 25 feet from the intersection to where plaintiff saw the truck, or 40 feet. We must view the testimony in the light most favorable to plaintiff in determining the correctness of the judgment of dismissal at the end of plaintiff's case. 1 Plaintiff was entitled to assume that defendant, stopped at the entrance to the through street, would use reasonable care for the safety of both drivers. Plaintiff certainly could not be held negligent as a matter of law in not anticipating that defendant would drive negligently or that defendant would fail to honor what she thought was her right of way.
The testimony fails to establish conclusively which entered the intersection first. The stop sign at which defendant stopped was at least 11 feet from the intersection. Defendant relies on two statements made by plaintiff and her witness, Mrs. Singleton.
Mrs. Singleton was asked the following question, and answered as indicated:
The statement of Mrs. Singleton is far from a statement that the truck pulled into the intersection before the plaintiff's car entered it.
Plaintiff testified as follows:
We cannot say that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law because she, after surveying the situation to her right, turned and looked east for traffic from that direction without looking again to her right before proceeding through the intersection. As heretofore observed, plaintiff had less than a second and a half to survey the defendant's position behind the stop sign and to observe, as she testified, that while she looked at the truck she did not observe it make any movement whatever, and to take a look to the east to ascertain if there was any westbound traffic.
Nor is the law such that the driver entering the intersection first necessarily has the right of way.
Section 41-6-74, U.C.A.1953, provides:...
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