O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, State of Utah

• Decision Date: 27 August 1991
• Docket Number: No. 890187,890187
• Citation: 821 P.2d 1139
• Parties: Derran O'NEAL, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, STATE OF UTAH, and Dick Hill, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 1139

821 P.2d 1139

Derran O'NEAL, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, STATE OF UTAH, and Dick Hill,

Defendants and Appellants.

No. 890187.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Aug. 27, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 7, 1992.

Robert L. Moody, Thomas S. Taylor, D. Eugene Thorne, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.

R. Paul Van Dam, Linda Luinstra-Baldwin, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:

The State Division of Family Services ("DFS") appeals from a jury decision in favor of plaintiff Derran O'Neal. DFS argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred when it refused to dismiss O'Neal's negligence action against DFS for damages resulting from sexual abuse O'Neal suffered while in the custody of a DFS-approved foster parent. DFS contends that O'Neal's claim was barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the applicable statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-12, 78-12-25 (1991). We agree, vacate the judgment, and order the action against DFS dismissed.

In reviewing a denial of a motion to dismiss, we consider the facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 85 (Utah 1981); Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 55, 348 P.2d 337, 338 (1960); Williams v. Z.C.M.I., 6 Utah 2d 283, 285, 312 P.2d 564, 565 (1957). We recite the facts accordingly. Myers, 635 P.2d at 85; Davis, 10 Utah 2d at 55, 348 P.2d at 338. During 1973, Derran O'Neal, then thirteen years old and living with his divorced mother, was experiencing emotional problems and having difficulty at home and school. Dick Hill, a DFS-approved foster parent, became acquainted with O'Neal and ultimately became O'Neal's custodian. The custody arrangement was facilitated by DFS and entered into with the consent of O'Neal's mother. She hoped O'Neal would benefit from an association with a male adult role model. O'Neal remained in foster care at the Hill home until 1976, when he moved out. The formal custody arrangement terminated in 1977, when O'Neal turned eighteen.

While O'Neal was living with Hill, DFS monitored the custody arrangement. From 1973 through 1974, Hill sexually abused O'Neal. Although the sexual abuse ended in 1974, O'Neal was subjected to rejection, ridicule, and emotional abuse by Hill until he left the Hill home in 1976. O'Neal contends that he suffered severe emotional damage as a consequence of Hill's abuse.

In March 1986, O'Neal first told his mother Hill had sexually abused him. O'Neal asserts that until that date he had been psychologically unable to reveal the abuse, although he had always been aware of it. On August 21, 1986, O'Neal, through his mother as guardian ad litem, filed a complaint against Dick Hill and DFS. O'Neal could not locate Hill to serve him, and the case proceeded against DFS on a negligent placement and supervision theory.

DFS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations of section 78-12-25 of the Code and by O'Neal's failure to comply with the notice requirement of section 63-30-12 of the Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-25, 63-30-12 (1991). O'Neal conceded that he brought the suit after the statute of limitations had run and that he filed his notice of claim after the period provided for by statute, but he maintained that the action was properly before the court for two reasons. First, he contended that both the relevant statute of limitations and the Governmental Immunity Act's notice requirement were tolled because the abuse had rendered him "incompetent," as that term is used in section 63-30-11(4)(a), to reveal the fact of the abuse from the date of the abuse until April 1986. Alternatively, O'Neal claimed that the "discovery rule" allowed him to file his action after the running of the two statutory periods because he was unable to "discover" the abuse and bring an action upon it while he was psychologically unable to reveal it.

The trial court did not pass on the "incompetence" claims, but did deny defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that "exceptional circumstances" justified giving O'Neal the benefit of the discovery rule. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict for O'Neal. The trial judge granted plaintiff's motion for an additur, doubling the damage award.

On appeal, DFS argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred when it refused to dismiss the complaint as barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the applicable statute of limitations.

In reviewing the trial court's ruling on the motion to dismiss, we accord the trial court's conclusions of law "no particular deference, but review them for correctness." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990). However, we will also endeavor to uphold a trial court's ruling, even if we must consider alternative grounds on which the court below did not rely. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); City Elec. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1984). There were two possible bases for denying the motion to dismiss and holding that O'Neal was entitled to avoid the limitation period: (i) O'Neal was incompetent; or (ii) he had not "discovered" his claim. Although the trial court passed on only the second, we will consider both since if either had offered a basis to allow O'Neal to proceed with his claim, we must affirm the trial court.

We first address the disability claim. The Utah legislature has recognized that the mechanical application of statutorily fixed limitations periods may unjustly penalize people who are unable to bring or maintain an action because of disability. To address this problem, the legislature has provided for the tolling of statutes of limitations during a plaintiff's disability. Both statutes at issue contain tolling provisions that operate to toll the statutory period during times of, inter alia, "mental incompetency."

The first of these, section 78-12-36 of the Code, is a general disability provision applicable to all statutes of limitation. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1991). It provides: "If a person entitled to bring an action ... is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action." Id. (emphasis added). A similar provision is found in the Governmental Immunity Act: "If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(4)(a) (emphasis added). The tolling provisions in both statutes operate similarly so that if O'Neal qualifies for a disability extension under one, he also qualifies under the other. See Blum v. Stone, 752 P.2d 898, 899-900 (Utah 1988); Scott v. School Bd. of Granite School Dist., 568 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah 1977).

We have not had occasion to construe the term "mentally incompetent" under these two provisions of the Code. However, an examination of the policy underlying the statute suggests that O'Neal does not come within the scope of the tolling provision. Tolling statutes based on mental incompetency are enacted to relieve from the strict time restrictions people "who are unable to protect their legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society." McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 435 N.E.2d 1072 (1982); see also Sobin v. M. Frisch & Sons, 108 N.J.Super. 99, 103-04, 260 A.2d 228, 231-32 (Super.Ct.App.Div.1969), certification denied, 55 N.J. 448, 262 A.2d 702 (1970). In determining what sort of lack of ability and capacity to protect one's legal rights qualifies for disability protection, courts generally hold that a person is incompetent for the purposes of a provision tolling a statute of limitations "when the disability is of such a nature to show him [or her] unable to manage his [or her] business affairs or estate, or to comprehend his [or her] legal rights or liabilities." 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 187 (1970). In construing the probate code, we followed a definition of incompetence that made it somewhat easier to determine that the person was competent. See In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah 1981). That competency determination focused on a person's ability to care for his or her personal safety and provide basic human needs such as food, shelter, and clothing.

O'Neal does not meet the requirements under either definition of incompetence such that the tolling provisions found in sections 78-12-36 and 63-30-11 are applicable. The facts show that from 1977 until 1986, when he revealed the abuse to his mother, O'Neal was able to care for his personal safety and provide himself with necessities such as food, shelter, medical care, and clothing. The record indicates that between 1977 and 1981, O'Neal received his general education degree and attended classes at Utah Technical College. He also worked at a number of odd jobs while living with his mother or with roommates. Since 1981, he has lived either alone or with a roommate and has worked at Rocky Mountain Helicopters. While working at Rocky Mountain, O'Neal has been promoted from driving truck to negotiating the recovery of warranty damages from suppliers for the failure of covered parts.

Our conclusion that O'Neal has not shown himself to be incompetent is consistent with the decision of our court of appeals in Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct.App.1990), where the plaintiff raised the same incompetence argument. In Whatcott, the court rejected the claim that repression and psychological trauma caused by sexual abuse...