Williams-White v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club
Docket Number | ENSC-CIV-2022-00001 |
Decision Date | 01 December 2022 |
Parties | NADA WILLIAMS-WHITE, Plaintiff, v. INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE OF THE AUTOMOBILE CLUB, Defendant. |
Court | Maine Superior Court |
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court are Plaintiff Nada Williams-White's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, both pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56. The central issue before the Court is whether Williams-White can recover under the underinsured motorist coverage provision in her own insurance policy for injuries she sustained while in a vehicle not covered by the policy. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Williams-White, the facts show that, as a matter of law, the "other-owned vehicle" exclusion and the "named driver" exclusion in her insurance policy unambiguously excludes her from recovering for this accident. Additionally, these exclusions do not contravene Maine's insurance statutes nor well-established Maine precedent. Therefore, Williams-White is not, entitled to summary judgment and her Motion is DENIED, and Interinsurance Exchange's Cross-Motion is GRANTED.
This case stems from a motor vehicle accident which resulted in Plaintiff Nada Williams-White ("Williams-White") suffering significant injuries. Williams-White sought to recover monies through an insurance policy she held with Defendant Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club ("Interinsurance"). 'The following facts are taken from the Summary Judgment record and are undisputed, being taken from a joint Statement of Undisputed Material Fact ("Joint S.M.F.”) to which both parties stipulated.
On July 10, 2019, Williams-White was riding as a passenger on a three-wheeled motorcycle driven by Calvin White ("Calvin") when he lost control, and the motorcycle crashed (the "Crash"). (Joint S.M.F. ¶¶ 1-5.) The Crash occurred due to Calvin's negligence, and Williams-White is legally entitled-to recover from him for her damages. (Joint S.M.F. ¶ 6.) Williams-White suffered injuries caused by the Crash, and her damages exceed $100,000. (Joint S.M.F. ¶¶ 8-9.) Calvin was the owner of the motorcycle and carried an insurance policy ("Motorcycle Policy") on the motorcycle with a policy limit of $100,000. per occurrence (Joint S.M.F. ¶¶ 7, 10.) Williams-White was not a named insured under the Motorcycle Policy, and the Motorcycle Policy's insurance carrier paid Williams-White the policy limit of $100,000. to compensate her for the damages resulting from the Crash, thereby exhausting the limits of all insurance policies held by Calvin related to the motorcycle. (Joint S.M.F. ¶¶ 11-13.)
Williams-White carried an automobile insurance policy ("Interinsurance Policy") with Interinsurance that provided uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of up to $250,000. per person and $500,000. per occurrence, and which was in effect on the date of the Crash. (Joint S.M.F. ¶¶ 15, 17.) Williams-White is the named insured under the Interinsurance Policy. (Joint S.M.F. ¶¶ 19-20.) Calvin is not a named insured under the Interinsurance Policy, but he is the "resident" spouse of Williams-White under the Interinsurance Policy, (Joint S.M.F. ¶¶ 19-20.) Calvin's motorcycle is not an insured vehicle under the Interinsurance Policy. (Joint S.M.F. ¶ 18.)
Interinsurance was notified of and consented to Williams-White's settlement under the Motorcycle Policy. (Joint S.M.F. ¶ 21.) Subsequent to the Motorcycle Policy settlement, Williams-White made a claim under the underinsured portion of the Interinsurance Policy to cover her, damages beyond the $100,000. she had already recovered. (Joint S.M.F. ¶ 22.) In response to this claim, Interinsurance has asserted that it is not obligated to provide coverage due to the application of the "other-owned vehicle" exclusion in the uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage of the Interinsurance Policy and due to an application of the "named driver" exclusion in the Interinsurance Policy. (Joint S.M.F. ¶ 23.) The relevant language to the exclusionary clause in the Interinsurance Policy provides in relevant part:
Williams-White filed the Complaint in this action on January 6, 2022, asserting a claim for breach of contract against Interinsurance for refusing to pay her underinsured motorist coverage claim, On March 18, 2022, Williams-White filed this Partial Summary Judgment Motion ("Motion") and the Parties' joint Statement of Undisputed Material Fact. On April 15, 2022, Interinsurance filed its opposition to the Motion and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ("Cross-Motion"). On April 29, 2022, Williams-White filed her reply to the Motion, and opposition to the Cross-Motion. On May 9, 2022, Interinsurance filed its reply to the Cross-Motion. The Motion and Cross-Motion, both now fully briefed, are in order for decision.
An entry of summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Dyer v. DOT, 2008 ME 106, ¶ 14, 951 A.2d 821; see also M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case, and there is a genuine issue when there is sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the fact." Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2012 ME 103, ¶ 11, 48 A.3d 774 (citations omitted). At summary judgment, a court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 6, 784 A.2d 18. The meaning of the language in an insurance contract is a question of law and "whether the underlying facts bring the claim within the policy exclusion is likewise a matter of law." Allstate Inc. Co. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 263 A.2d 78, 80 (Me. 1970); see also Foremost Ins. Co. v. Levesque, 2005 ME 34, ¶ 7, 868 A.2d 244; Peerless Ins. Co. v. Wood, 685 A.2d 1173 (Me. 1996).
At issue in these motions is whether Williams-White can recover for her injuries sustained in the Crash through the uninsured and underinsured coverage in her insurance policy. To resolve the motions, the Court must determine the answer to two main questions. First, does the "other- owned vehicle" exclusion in the insurance policy at issue unambiguously exclude Williams-White from recovering for her injuries stemming from the Crash? Second, if the "other-owned vehicle" exclusion in the policy unambiguously bars Williams-White's recovery, is the exclusion permissible under Maine's insurance statutes and Maine precedent? The Court will address both of these issues in turn below.[1]
Williams-White argues that the language of the Interinsurance Policy is ambiguous, and that ambiguities should be construed against Interinsurance, as the insurer, under established Maine law. Specifically, Williams-White argues that certain instances of "you" and "your", although both are defined terms in the Interinsurance Policy, should not be read with the meaning of "you" and "your" as defined where...
To continue reading
Request your trial