Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar

Decision Date29 April 2015
Docket NumberNo. 13–1499.,13–1499.
Parties Lanell WILLIAMS–YULEE, Petitioner v. The FLORIDA BAR.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Andrew J. Pincus, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Barry Richard, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

Ernest J. Myers, Lee W. Marcus, Marcus & Myers, P.A., Orlando, FL, Eugene R. Fidell, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, Andrew J. Pincus, Charles A. Rothfeld, Michael B. Kimberly, Counsel of Record, Paul W. Hughes, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Barry Richard, Counsel of Record, M. Hope Keating, Greenberg Traurig PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

Thomas E. Hogan, Baker Hostetler LLP, Washington, DC, J. Joshua Wheeler, Charlottesville, VA, for Respondent.

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II.

Our Founders vested authority to appoint federal judges in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and entrusted those judges to hold their offices during good behavior. The Constitution permits States to make a different choice, and most of them have done so. In 39 States, voters elect trial or appellate judges at the polls. In an effort to preserve public confidence in the integrity of their judiciaries, many of those States prohibit judges and judicial candidates from personally soliciting funds for their campaigns. We must decide whether the First Amendment permits such restrictions on speech.

We hold that it does. Judges are not politicians, even when they come to the bench by way of the ballot. And a State's decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it to treat judicial candidates like campaigners for political office. A State may assure its people that judges will apply the law without fear or favor—and without having personally asked anyone for money. We affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.

I
A

When Florida entered the Union in 1845, its Constitution provided for trial and appellate judges to be elected by the General Assembly. Florida soon followed more than a dozen of its sister States in transferring authority to elect judges to the voting public. See J. Shugerman, The People's Courts: Pursuing Judicial Independence in America 103–122 (2012). The experiment did not last long in the Sunshine State. The war came, and Florida's 1868 Constitution returned judicial selection to the political branches. Over time, however, the people reclaimed the power to elect the state bench: Supreme Court justices in 1885 and trial court judges in 1942. See Little, An Overview of the Historical Development of the Judicial Article of the Florida Constitution, 19 Stetson L.Rev. 1, 40 (1989).

In the early 1970s, four Florida Supreme Court justices resigned from office following corruption scandals. Florida voters responded by amending their Constitution again. Under the system now in place, appellate judges are appointed by the Governor from a list of candidates proposed by a nominating committee—a process known as "merit selection." Then, every six years, voters decide whether to retain incumbent appellate judges for another term. Trial judges are still elected by popular vote, unless the local jurisdiction opts instead for merit selection. Fla. Const., Art. V, § 10 ; Hawkins, Perspective on Judicial Merit Retention in Florida, 64 Fla. L.Rev. 1421, 1423–1428 (2012).

Amid the corruption scandals of the 1970s, the Florida Supreme Court adopted a new Code of Judicial Conduct. 281 So.2d 21 (1973). In its present form, the first sentence of Canon 1 reads, "An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society." Code of Judicial Conduct for the State of Florida 6 (2014). Canon 1 instructs judges to observe "high standards of conduct" so that "the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved." Ibid. Canon 2 directs that a judge " shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Id., at 7. Other provisions prohibit judges from lending the prestige of their offices to private interests, engaging in certain business transactions, and personally participating in soliciting funds for nonprofit organizations. Canons 2B, 5C(3)(b)(i), 5D; id., at 7, 23, 24.

Canon 7C(1) governs fundraising in judicial elections. The Canon, which is based on a provision in the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct, provides:

"A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled by public election between competing candidates shall not personally solicit campaign funds, or solicit attorneys for publicly stated support, but may establish committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for the candidate's campaign and to obtain public statements of support for his or her candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions and public support from any person or corporation authorized by law." Id., at 38.

Florida statutes impose additional restrictions on campaign fundraising in judicial elections. Contributors may not donate more than $1,000 per election to a trial court candidate or more than $3,000 per retention election to a Supreme Court justice. Fla. Stat. § 106.08(1)(a) (2014). Campaign committee treasurers must file periodic reports disclosing the names of contributors and the amount of each contribution. § 106.07.

Judicial candidates can seek guidance about campaign ethics rules from the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee. The Committee has interpreted Canon 7 to allow a judicial candidate to serve as treasurer of his own campaign committee, learn the identity of campaign contributors, and send thank you notes to donors. An Aid to Understanding Canon 7, pp. 51–58 (2014).

Like Florida, most other States prohibit judicial candidates from soliciting campaign funds personally, but allow them to raise money through committees. According to the American Bar Association, 30 of the 39 States that elect trial or appellate judges have adopted restrictions similar to Canon 7C(1). Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 4.

B

Lanell Williams–Yulee, who refers to herself as Yulee, has practiced law in Florida since 1991. In September 2009, she decided to run for a seat on the county court for Hillsborough County, a jurisdiction of about 1.3 million people that includes the city of Tampa. Shortly after filing paperwork to enter the race, Yulee drafted a letter announcing her candidacy. The letter described her experience and desire to "bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the Judicial bench." App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a. The letter then stated:

"An early contribution of $25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to ‘Lanell Williams–Yulee Campaign for County Judge’, will help raise the initial funds needed to launch the campaign and get our message out to the public. I ask for your support [i]n meeting the primary election fund raiser goals. Thank you in advance for your support." Id., at 32a.

Yulee signed the letter and mailed it to local voters. She also posted the letter on her campaign Web site.

Yulee's bid for the bench did not unfold as she had hoped. She lost the primary to the incumbent judge. Then the Florida Bar filed a complaint against her. As relevant here, the Bar charged her with violating Rule 4–8.2(b) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. That Rule requires judicial candidates to comply with applicable provisions of Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct, including the ban on personal solicitation of campaign funds in Canon 7C(1).

Yulee admitted that she had signed and sent the fundraising letter. But she argued that the Bar could not discipline her for that conduct because the First Amendment protects a judicial candidate's right to solicit campaign funds in an election.* The Florida Supreme Court appointed a referee, who held a hearing and recommended a finding of guilt. As a sanction, the referee recommended that Yulee be publicly reprimanded and ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding ($1,860). App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a–25a.

The Florida Supreme Court adopted the referee's recommendations. 138 So.3d 379 (2014). The court explained that Canon 7C(1) "clearly restricts a judicial candidate's speech" and therefore must be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Id., at 384. The court held that the Canon satisfies that demanding inquiry. First, the court reasoned, prohibiting judicial candidates from personally soliciting funds furthers Florida's compelling interest in "preserving the integrity of [its] judiciary and maintaining the public's confidence in an impartial judiciary." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). In the court's view, "personal solicitation of campaign funds, even by mass mailing, raises an appearance of impropriety and calls into question, in the public's mind, the judge's impartiality."

Id., at 385. Second, the court concluded that Canon 7C(1) is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest because it " ‘insulate[s] judicial candidates from the solicitation and receipt of funds while leaving open, ample alternative means for candidates to raise the resources necessary to run their campaigns.’ " Id., at 387 (quoting Simes v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n, 368 Ark. 577, 588, 247 S.W.3d 876, 883 (2007) ).

The Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that some Federal Courts of Appeals"whose judges have lifetime appointments and thus do not have to engage in fundraising"—had invalidated restrictions similar to Canon 7C(1). 138 So.3d, at 386, n. 3. But the court found it persuasive that every State Supreme Court that had considered similar fundraising provisions—along with several Federal Courts of Appeals—had upheld the laws against First Amendment challenges. Id., at 386. Florida's chief justice and one associate justice dissented. Id., at 389. We granted certiorari....

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