Williamson v. City of Nat'l City

• Decision Date: 24 January 2022
• Docket Number: No. 20-55966,20-55966
• Citation: 23 F.4th 1146
• Parties: Tasha WILLIAMSON, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY; Lucky Nguyen ; John McGouch, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

23 F.4th 1146

Tasha WILLIAMSON, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.CITY OF NATIONAL CITY; Lucky Nguyen ; John McGouch, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 20-55966

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 10, 2021 Pasadena, California

Filed January 24, 2022

Lee H. Roistacher (argued), Mitchell D. Dean, and Heather E. Paradis, Dean Gazzo Roistacher LLP, Solana, Beach, California, for Defendants-Appellants.

Douglas S. Gilliland (argued), The Gilliland Firm, San Diego, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before: Susan P. Graber, Consuelo M. Callahan, and Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges.

FORREST, Circuit Judge:

This excessive force case concerns how police officers responded to a protest that Plaintiff Tasha Williamson and others participated in during a National City, California, city council meeting. The protest prevented the city council meeting from continuing, and police officers warned the protesters that they had to leave the meeting room or they would be arrested. The protesters refused to leave and passively resisted being removed by going limp. Officers handcuffed the protesters and carried or pulled them by their arms from the meeting room. Williamson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that she suffered wrist and shoulder injuries when she was forcibly removed. We conclude that the officers did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and we reverse the district court's denial of the officers' summary judgment motion asserting qualified immunity.

I. BACKGROUND¹

A. The protest

In July 2018, protestors, including Williamson, performed a "die-in" at a city council meeting in National City, related to the death of Earl McNeil, a black man who died in police custody.² At a predetermined time, the protestors disrupted the meeting by chanting, and several of them made their way toward the public speaking podium and city council members. After showing the city council members their "bloody hands," six protesters lay down on the ground near the podium, keeping their red-painted hands raised and chanting "I am Earl McNeil," and "you have blood on your hands." Several other people associated with the protest remained in the audience showing painted red hands, chanting, and video-recording the demonstration. The mayor called for order, but the protesters refused to stop their demonstration, and the council meeting was adjourned.

A few minutes after the protest began, National City police officers informed the protesters that they would be arrested if they did not leave the podium area. When the six protesters ignored repeated requests to leave, the officers began arresting them. The protesters had previously agreed that, if arrested, they would act as dead weight and refuse to cooperate with being removed. The six protestors followed through with this agreement, and officers pulled or carried each of them out.

B. Williamson's arrest

Officers Lucky Nguyen and John McGough³ (the Officers), handcuffed Williamson with her wrists behind her back and brought her to a seated position. But as they lifted her toward a standing position, they lost their grip on her and she rolled back to the ground on her stomach. The Officers then repositioned Williamson onto her back and again tried lifting her. Officer Nguyen held Williamson under her left arm, and Officer McGough held her under her right arm. As they lifted her up, Williamson initially placed her feet under her, but she did not support her own weight. The Officers struggled to lift Williamson and pulled her backward by her arms and wrists while she was in nearly a seated position. Williamson was loudly chanting before the Officers started removing her from the room. During the approximately 12 seconds that she was being pulled from the room, Williamson screamed continually. As the Officers and Williamson approached the exit door, Officer McGough released Williamson's upper right arm, and Officer Nguyen dragged her through the doorway alone, by her left wrist and forearm.

In the hallway outside the meeting room, Williamson told the Officers that they had hurt her shoulder, and they called an ambulance. The Officers also double-cuffed Williamson to lessen the tension on her arms and make her more comfortable, but she complained that they were "still pulling" her arms in doing so. Paramedics arrived, evaluated Williamson, and offered to take her to the hospital, but she refused to go with them. The Officers then arrested Williamson and took her to a detention facility. After she was released the next morning, Williamson drove herself to the hospital. She suffered a sprained wrist

, mild swelling, and a torn rotator cuff.⁴

C. Summary judgment proceedings

Williamson sued the Officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California's Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (the Bane Act), Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, alleging that they used excessive force against her in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, she claimed that it was excessive for them to "pull[ ] the full weight of her body by her hyperextended arms." The Officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the Officers' motion concluding—in pertinent part—that Williamson "present[ed] a genuine issue of material fact as to the excessive force claim regarding [the Officers'] pulling of [Williamson]'s arms and hands such that a reasonable jury could find excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Considering whether existing law clearly established a constitutional violation, the district court held that "[i]t was clearly established at the time of the incident that Defendant Nguyen's and Defendant McGou[g]h's use of force must be reasonable under the circumstances."

II. DISCUSSION

We typically lack jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals from denials of summary judgment, but an exception exists for denials premised on qualified immunity. Isayeva , 872 F.3d at 944–45 ; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, this exception is limited to legal issues, not factual disputes; whether an officer's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment is a legal issue. See Plumhoff v. Rickard , 572 U.S. 765, 773, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014). We have jurisdiction over the denial of summary judgment on Williamson's Bane Act claims under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction because the rulings related to that claim and Williamson's Section 1983 claim are inextricably intertwined. See Huskey v. City of San Jose , 204 F.3d 893, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2000). We review de novo "a district court's denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds." Roybal v. Toppenish Sch. Dist. , 871 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 2017).

A. Section 1983 claims

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures. Torres v. Madrid , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 989, 995, 209 L.Ed.2d 190 (2021). An arrest is the "quintessential seizure of the person." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Qualified immunity shields a police officer from liability for civil damages under Section 1983 "unless the officer[ ] violated a clearly established constitutional right." Monzon v. City of Murrieta , 978 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020). Thus, the qualified-immunity analysis involves two prongs: (1) whether the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right "was clearly established at the time of the events at issue." Id. Here, we conclude that the Officers did not violate Williamson's Fourth Amendment rights; therefore, we have no need to address the clearly-established prong of the analysis.

"In evaluating a Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force, we ask ‘whether the officers’ actions [wer]e "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.’ " Rice , 989 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ). To determine whether an officer's actions were objectively reasonable, we consider: "(1) the severity of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights by evaluating the type and amount of force inflicted, (2) the government's interest in the use of force, and (3) the balance between the gravity of the intrusion on the individual and the government's need for that intrusion." Id. (quoting Lowry v. City of San Diego , 858 F.3d 1248, 1256 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "We must judge the reasonableness of a particular use of force ‘from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’ " Id. (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ). It is also well-established that police officers "are not required to use the least intrusive degree of force possible." Lowry , 858 F.3d at 1259 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

1. Type and amount of force

We consider the "specific factual circumstances" of the case in classifying the force used. Id. at 1256. The nature and degree of physical contact are relevant to this analysis, Forrester v. City of San Diego , 25 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1994), as are the "risk of harm and the actual harm experienced," Nelson v. City of Davis , 685 F.3d 867, 879 (9th Cir. 2012). For example, in Forrester we held that police officers did not act unreasonably in using "pain compliance techniques" against protesters because this use of force was "less significant than most ... [where] police did not threaten or use deadly force and did not deliver physical blows or cuts." 25 F.3d at 807. Instead, the officers used "physical pressure ... on the demonstrators' limbs in increasing degrees, resulting in pain." Id. ; see also Johnson v. County of Los Angeles , 340 F.3d 787, 793 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing "hard pulling and twisting" used to remove a fleeing armed robbery suspect from a car as a "minimal intrusion" under the circumstances). Similarly, in Felarca v Birgeneau , 891 F.3d 809, 817 (9th Cir. 2018), we held that police officers'...