Seidner v. de Vries

• Decision Date: 30 June 2022
• Docket Number: 20-17403
• Citation: 39 F.4th 591
• Parties: Preston SEIDNER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jonathan DE VRIES, Named as Devries #19922, Uniform Mesa Police Officer, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

39 F.4th 591

Preston SEIDNER, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Jonathan DE VRIES, Named as Devries #19922, Uniform Mesa Police Officer, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-17403

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted August 10, 2021 San Francisco, California

Filed June 30, 2022

Alexander J. Lindvall (argued), City Attorney's Office, Mesa, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant.

Mahogane D. Reed (argued) and Christopher Kemmitt, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund Inc., Washington, D.C.; Sherrilyn A. Ifill, President and Director-Counsel; Janai S. Nelson, Ashok Chandran, and Kevin E. Jason; NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund Inc., New York, New York; Samuel Weiss and Oren Nimni, Rights Behind Bars, Washington, D.C.; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before: Eugene E. Siler,^* Morgan Christen, and Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Forrest ;

Concurrence by Judge Christen

FORREST, Circuit Judge:

The question in this case is whether using a roadblock to stop a person suspected of a minor offense from fleeing on a bicycle is excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As required, we analyze this question based on the specific facts of this case, and we conclude that whether Officer Jonathan de Vries used excessive force against Plaintiff Preston Seidner would be a question for a factfinder. However, even if de Vries did use excessive force, the law was not clearly established that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, we conclude that de Vries is entitled to qualified immunity, and we reverse the district court's denial of de Vries's summary judgment motion.

I. BACKGROUND

At summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, here Seidner. Ames v. King County , 846 F.3d 340, 347 (9th Cir. 2017).

But we do not accept a "version of events that the record, such as an unchallenged video recording of the incident, ‘quite clearly contradicts.’ " Rice v. Morehouse , 989 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Scott v. County of San Bernardino , 903 F.3d 943, 952 (9th Cir. 2018) ).

A. Traffic Stop and Arrest

In February 2020, de Vries was on patrol just before midnight in Mesa, Arizona when he saw Seidner riding his bicycle on a well-lit residential street without a front light, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute § 28-817(A). De Vries pulled ahead of Seidner to confirm the bicycle-light violation and activated his marked patrol car's overhead lights. De Vries then stopped the car and opened his door to speak to Seidner. As de Vries exited his car, Seidner continued pedaling past him and began to flee. De Vries got back in his car and pursued Seidner. Seidner cut directly in front of de Vries's patrol car and continued fleeing. Seidner was traveling approximately 15 miles per hour.

After following Seidner, de Vries accelerated ahead and pulled his car at an angle across the street and stopped. Seconds later, as de Vries started to open his door, Seidner crashed into the patrol car. Seidner was on the ground when de Vries exited the car, de Vries handcuffed him while he lay moaning. De Vries asked Seidner why he fled, and Seidner responded that he was scared. Seidner also stated that his bicycle did not have working brakes. Seidner suffered a dislocated wrist

and sprained forearm and hit his head and chest in the impact.

B. District Court Proceedings

Acting pro se, Seidner sued de Vries under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that de Vries violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court construed Seidner's allegations as asserting a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and found that his claim was plausible.

De Vries then moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied de Vries's motion, holding that he "seized [Seidner] within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment" because he "pulled his car into the middle of the road ... to effectuate a roadblock to stop [Seidner] from fleeing from him." The district court also concluded that a reasonable jury could find that de Vries used excessive force by using a roadblock to stop Seidner for a minor bicycle violation. Finally, the district court held that "the law was clearly established at the time of [de Vries's] actions that his conduct could constitute excessive force." De Vries timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

We typically lack jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals from denials of summary judgment, but we may hear appeals from denials based on qualified immunity. Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff's Dep't , 872 F.3d 938, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2017) ; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review such denials de novo. Roybal v. Toppenish Sch. Dist. , 871 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 2017).

Qualified immunity shields a police officer from civil damages under Section 1983 "unless the officer[ ] violated a clearly established constitutional right." Monzon v. City of Murrieta , 978 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020). Thus, in deciding whether qualified immunity applies, we ask two questions: (1) did the officer violate a constitutional right, and (2) was that right "clearly established at the time of the events at issue"? Id. We address both questions in turn.

A. Constitutional Violation

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures. Torres v. Madrid , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 989, 995, 209 L.Ed.2d 190 (2021). Before addressing de Vries's use of force, we must decide whether Seidner was seized, thereby implicating the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Villanueva v. California , 986 F.3d 1158, 1165 (9th Cir. 2021). De Vries argued to the district court that he did not seize Seidner, but he abandoned this argument on appeal and for good reason. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that person." Brower v. County of Inyo , 489 U.S. 593, 595, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) ). We easily conclude that de Vries's use of his patrol car to stop Seidner from fleeing was a seizure.

The controversy is whether the seizure was reasonable. "The right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it." Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). But an officer's use of force must be "objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [hi]m." Williamson v. City of Nat'l City , 23 F.4th 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Lombardo v. City of St. Louis , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 2239, 2242, 210 L.Ed.2d 609 (2021) (per curiam) (requiring a "context-specific analysis" in excessive force cases).

In assessing "whether an officer's actions were objectively reasonable, we consider: ‘(1) the severity of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights by evaluating the type and amount of force inflicted, (2) the government's interest in the use of force, and (3) the balance between the gravity of the intrusion on the individual and the government's need for that intrusion.’ " Williamson , 23 F.4th at 1151 (quoting Rice v. Morehouse , 989 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2021) ). "We must judge the reasonableness of a particular use of force ‘from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’ " Id. (quoting Rice , 989 F.3d at 1121 ). Our analysis must make " ‘allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.’ " Scott v. Henrich , 39 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 396–97, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ). It is also well-established that the Fourth Amendment does not require that police officers "use the least intrusive degree of force possible," Lowry v. City of San Diego , 858 F.3d 1248, 1259 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (internal quotations and citation omitted), only that any use of force "be justified by the need for the specific level of force employed." Rice , 989 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Bryan v. MacPherson , 630 F.3d 805, 825 (9th Cir. 2010) ).

1. Type and Amount of Force

Some uses of force can be quantified categorically. The best example is shooting a firearm, which by definition is "deadly force": force that "creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury." Smith v. City of Hemet , 394 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard , 572 U.S. 765, 777, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) (referring to use of a firearm as "deadly force"); Tan Lam v. City of Los Banos , 976 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2020) (same).

Most often, however, quantifying a particular use of force requires consideration of the "specific factual circumstances" surrounding the event. Lowry , 858 F.3d at 1256. Both "[t]he nature and degree of physical contact" and the "risk of harm and the actual harm experienced" are relevant. Williamson , 23 F.4th at 1152 (citations omitted). For example, we have classified deployment of a police dog as both a severe use of force and a moderate use of force depending on the suspect's condition when the dog was ordered to attack, how long the attack lasted, and whether the dog was within its handler's control. See Lowry , 858 F.3d at 1256–57. Likewise, physical contact like hitting and shoving must be quantified based on the circumstances of the situation. See Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ("Not every push or shove ... violates the Fourth Amendment.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Felarca v. Birgeneau , 891 F.3d 809, 817 (9th Cir. 2018) (quantifying baton jabs used to control a crowd as "minimal" force); Young v. County of Los Angeles , 655 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011) (quantifying...